Themes for 14th International Philosophy Olympiad (English)
IPO 2006 AWARD ESSAYS
On Topic I
The painting collection of Goya, Los Caprichos and one of his masterpiece, The Madhouse, depict the lowest possible position of man in his course of history: the depiction of the mad. Though some may consider this disgraceful moment as a way of man¡¯s incapability of his expressing, some may also consider it as man enjoying his dark freedom and culminates his position during the course of expression of his own thoughts: the incapability of expressing, which is portrayed by the mad, is a way of expressing without limiting one¡¯s self within the language itself.
As Wittgenstein pursues to perceive the notions of ¡°understanding¡± and ¡°meaning¡± in his masterpiece The Philosophical Investigations, he comes to the point where he admits that when a person reaches to the moment in which he transforms his thoughts into one of the elements of the language transformation process, such as reading, writing, speaking, he will capture the real meaning of what he intends to say, fitting it to the systematic code of the language and transforming the use of the meaning into its representation: according to Wittgenstein, in the very minute of adapting a thought into the systematic code of language, we lose the meaning itself. Therefore, in order to understand the thoughts that wanted to be expressed, the silence and the moment of expressionless are more valid than the total control in the systematic code of the language itself. Stemming out from his investigation of the notion of ¡°understanding¡±, Wittgenstein comes to a point where he explicates his notion of ¡°meaning as use¡± as opposed to ¡°meaning as representation.¡± This shift from the use to the representation is solidified by his exemplification of the game of chess, in which the player moves its pieces according to the bearer of their names rather than the nametags of the pieces, meaning that for example, when the player moves the king, it is moved according to its function/role (the bearer), not according to its name. Therefore, the difference between the bearer of a word (meaning as use) and just the nametag of a word (meaning as representation) supports his point in which we empty the meaning of a word as we use it pragmatically within the context of our daily lives, ignoring its ¡°real¡± meaning.
As we modify our thoughts into the systematic codes of the languages, we find ourselves trapped within the grammatical code of the language, missing the meaning as use. This transforms us to build different discursive formations in our daily lives (Foucault) and therefore, create a language within language, trap within a trap, where we fail to aim at the meaning of word as use (the bearer of a word). By that way we are unable to attain the process of understanding that Wittgenstein underlines that it can be realized by the absorption of the notion of meaning as use.
Starting with the questions:
I am thinking of first identifying the attempts to break this cycle and then exemplifying how it was misused, ending up suggesting some solutions for the attainment of Wittgenstein¡¯s process of understanding by the discovery of the meaning of a word as use.
II.
I believe one of the most beautiful accomplishments of art and literature is their attempt to break apart the prevailing codes of languages and trying to express the ¡°expressionlessness¡± (parallel with Goya¡¯s mentioned works of art) of the aesthetical embodiment of the stages of the human beings have lived. The aesthetic theory of Collingwood perfectly explicates this sense of expressing the inexpressible. According to his aesthetic theory, the only way to understand the work of art is to feel its compositions in our veins and to practice it by aspiring to recreation in order to fully reach our aesthetic culmination. This theory brings a moment of catharsis, in which the admirer of the art work fully works for recreating it by producing new artworks stemming from the admired with an inspiration to attain its inexpressible meaning. Thus, the function of art and literature to attain the inexpressible has always been the very attempts that human beings have used to attain the meaning as use.
In the course of the Modernization process of the Western cannon, the dialectic clash between the avant-garde movements as opposed to the radically traditional moves, I believe has a very significant role in the evolution of this sense of breaking language codes, so that creating new ones in the attempt of expressing the meaning an use rather than the meaning as representation. However, all these trials failed to embody the real sense of the process of understanding, since the artists and authors failed to see that the new elements of language intending to break it apart, also are used to create new ones, retrapping the meaning as use that is to be emancipated. The example of the avant-garde vs. traditional clash between the Futurism and Rondo movements in the Modern period was just a way of seeking the expressing of the inexpressible within the clash of their opposite entities; however, as it was to create their own systematic codes, resulting in the failing of the aimed emancipation. For example, Marinetti¡¯s manifesto together with the futuristic works of Balla and Severini was a way of admiring the dynamism of the cultural change with the industrialization period. Their desire to mash all the traditional codes of Italian society was unfortunately transmitted into radical fascistic ideologies, which then locked itself in the radical doctrine of the fascism. Their attempts to cite the ongoing change in the industrializing world hampered by the very ideological standpoint trapping their attempt to reshape constant mobility, dynamism of the change. All those it was a movement in some ways against the traditional Rondo society, accusing its trappedness, the Futurism movement became trapped by itself.
Very similarly, the postmodern and abstruse ways to reach the meaning as use by deconstructing the language itself were also very unsuccessful attempts of emancipation from the language. The deconstruction and intertextuality in The Wasteland by Eliot, the meaninglessness for meaning as use in the context of political and economic complexity of the Second World War period by the Hermetism movement of Montale and Ungaretti, the usage of genital organs in place of paintbrush in the paintings of Yves Klein and the grammatically deconstructed word-games in the poems of e. e. cummings were just the efforts to deconstruct the systematic code of the language by eliminating it constantly to the very degree of the total collapse of it; but, as the very mentioned artists and poets could not disregard the idea of expressing when expressing the inexpressible, their attempts were just the cyclical efforts to reach their aim.
As Goya¡¯s mentioned collection of paintings belongs to the late eighteenth century, it would be illogical to consider it as a work of Modernist period. However, his works, in which he tries to depict the mad people (it is ironical that he was also working for the royal family at that time) instead of very noble Spaniards, should be regarded as his successful manifestation of the self, as he tries to break the cycle of painting of the noble, the rich, the ¡°in power¡±, by choosing to portray the mad so that he can attain the inexpressible by using the elements, codes of the language itself. This is far more successful and to the point than the Modern avant-gardes which fail to understand that in order to relieve from the systematic code of the language, one should use the power of the systematic code, breaking apart itself with the very same tools of the language trapping the meaning in use.
By the exemplification of the Modernization period (I believe Goya¡¯s looking forward works belong to the Modern period; and Goya had found the answer of the question that avant-gardist were asking for, long before), I tried to reply the very first question of my investigation, finding the answer that there were attempts galore for the breaking apart of the language for the attainment of meaning as use; however, as these attempts (except Goya¡¯s works to the same extent) failed to recognize other dimensions apart from the language itself (disillusioning the previous cycle by creating a new one unintentionally), so that the result is the opposite of Wittgenstein¡¯s theory.
III.
The constant discursive formations in our daily lives, which are drawn again by Foucault to his notion of ¡°canceral continuum¡±, are to signify that the system imposes on us its very principles, so that by the rationalization of humanity/us (Adorno and Horkheimer) and the modification of identity to the very subject (Althusser), the digestion of very original thoughts is managed and attempts to break this capitalistic (Deleuze and Guattari) systematic codes are impeded by the system itself. In today¡¯s world, rather than one whole system, the system has transferred itself to very different microsects (educational, religious, political institutions etc.), to which have its own principles that we have to adapt ourselves. By that way, as we are addicted to the capturing code of the daily language (the Wittgenstein¡¯s criticism), it is now impossible for us to realize and get rid of this capturing, since the daily discursive code is diffusing to us capturing our beings slowly. Now, it is impossible for us to recognize the meaning as use, but to accept the emptying of the words, since in order for us to exist in every single of the microsects -to be part of the system we have to obey them- and be admitted by the others, it is our only duty to act according the rules and accept the very imposed concepts as they are presented to us.
By losing control over our thoughts and being arrested by meanings as representation, the people of this microsectic environment are joined up under the power of a new concept of governmentality (Foucault), instead of the government itself. Governmentality controls individuals by one by within the different discursive formations in their microsects, so that they would obey inevitably the emptied words that governmentality offers for them in their microsectic course of discursive formations. This creates an eternal and absolute control over people and proves a total obeying of the imposed systematic codes by them.
Considering the ¡°War on Terror¡± policy of the USA, in which the US government¡¯ality tries to legitimize the notion of ¡°state of exception¡± (Agamben), so that by abusing this right, it can take control of the whole country and create a totalitarian rule. Both the misusage of the phrases, ¡°state of exception¡± and ¡°terror¡±, is to empty the meaning of these words, so that since people, embedded into the heavy microsects of the system are failed to recognize the meaning as use of these worlds, the US government¡¯ality can drag these meaning as representation to where it wants to take. ¡°War on Terror¡± definitely is a way to hail the constant misconception and misusage (by that way, abusing) in the language, which can be drawn to the annihilation of ethical values and human rights.
The misusage of the phrases, ¡°universality¡± and ¡°globalization¡±, is very common in our daily lives, a cunning indication of the diffusing of the notion of globalization into universality. This indicates that globalization tries to disguise itself by the meaning as representation of universality; thus, it will not only get rid of the meaning as use of it, but also ¡°misfill¡± it. It is a way of restricting the understanding process for the people; and even if they try to understand it, it is a way of trapping, never ending up in the understanding of the initial ¡°meaning as use¡±, not in the ¡°misfilled¡± one.
The answer to the second question is simple: Imposed misconceptions, misuses, distortions for the total hegemony of the ¡°governmentality¡±, by misfilling ¡°meaning as use¡±, totally annihilating it. Abstruse labyrinth with no way out: From one microsect to another, there is a total flux of human beings, who are inevitably captured and even if they try to break this cycle; by the distortion, misusage, misconception, the very basic rights of human beings are taken away and their ethical senses are paralyzed, not letting them to move, constantly limited in the microsects of capitalistic system.
IV.
By referring to the unsuccessful attempts of the Modernization period artists and writers in the Western cannon, I tried to come to a point, where these attempts faded away and the tragic capturing of human beings is woven by the many different discursive formations, signifying the criticism of Wittgenstein when he complains about the man¡¯s incapability to foresee the meaning as use, as man is trapped within the language. I believe, there is a way to escape from this microsectic labyrinth, in which the very same system should be used as the stemming point using and, by that way, overcoming its own dynamism to overcome this inevitable cycle.
It is only the human beings to transform the very imposed codes of the system. It is in the hand of human beings to stop the process of interpellation (Althusser), so that the imposed concept of the self by the ideology gained by misusage, distortion, misconception can be overcome. It is to reject ourselves first, so that by emancipating from the rigid systematic code of the language, we can reach to the zone of deterritorisation (Deleuze), where constant nomadic movements opening itself again constantly to new dimensions would break apart the microsectic divisions of the imposed system, by transferring its tools of hegemony for itself. This is the way to dismantle the trap within the language, which would lead us to the meaning as use.
We have to play the mad. Goya¡¯s way of criticizing the political struggle and social corruption in his own time says a lot about the tools to move up to a position out of the designated frame of human beings. It is time to insert a notion of ¡°parody¡± in place of our robotic yielding to the imposed roles, principles of the system, characterized by its many microsects: madness should be held as a virtue, so that the dynamism of the constant creating systematic principles by the mad (similarly, as the system imposes us), can be achieved, omitting its strengths and creating of our own.
Recalling Wittgenstein¡¯s statement in Tractatus, the very thoughts that cannot be put into the systematic codes of the language or expressed, are superior to the ones that are expressed by the means of the language, I believe that being ¡°mad¡± in the pursuit of expressing the inexpressible will take us out from the context of the language itself. Madness, as a way of confronting with the imposed power on us and a moment of incapability of expressing our thoughts (which is a virtue and only way to defeat the system, in my opinion), is the only way for us to attain the meaning as use in place of meaning as representation, in which we can enjoy intensely the process of ¡°understanding¡± without the restriction of the language itself.
On Topic I
Introduction
None of philosophers like to be criticized for his thoughts and all of them have equal right to develop in their own way. The quotation above is very good imprint of the criticism which were imposed on Wittgenstein for his breakpoint in philosophy. He went the different way then his supporters and thinkers who had had the same beliefs as he. Personally, I believe that the whole system of his is coherent and I will show that the quotation is the mature point of his philosophy. The development of his mind was gradually approaching the totally contrary state then he had had at the beginning. I agree with that though in opposite to the earlier one.
Round first
¡®Tractatus¡¦¡¯ - the flag symbol of first Wittgenstein
Essentially Wittgenstein¡¯s philosophical system contains 2 parts: earlier, which basic book was ¡®Tractatus Logico ? Philosophicus¡¯: afterward one, which centers in ¡®Inquiries concerning the philosophy. In the first part there are seen the connections with Bertrand Russell and the whole philosophy of mathematics and language, the analytic point of view and empirical thoughts. The second one is the changing his course towards relativism and pure philosophy of language in the contemporary meaning. The main issue in Tractatus was how to use language in proper way and what kind of words are we supposed to utter. The crucial sentence was: ¡®What you can¡¯t say anything about, you are allowed to be silence¡¯ It was the elimination of metaphysics from the language because of the relativity which is involved in uttering these notions. Moreover, Wittgenstein claimed not to speak about ethics and to clean the language from these absurds ? ethic and metaphysic notions. Apart from that, he formulated the criterions of uttering words, which would have any meaning. ¡®Meaning¡¯ in earlier philosophy of his was said to be a verification with experience and thing which we could find in our experience. These were the sentences about mathematics (of course with care put on the Russell¡¯s remarks about descriptions). Every word should have its equivalent in real world. The basic thing for human is uttering then. When something has its name, it exists, and the words are determining our view and the apprehension to the world, which should be empirical reasoned and plainly pointed out in the world we are living in. Aside from that, the general notions weren¡¯t devaluated; they came into the correlates of singular words. Then, Wittgenstein philosophy developed towards atomic logicism, which were accepted by him as the basis of human¡¯s uttering (so called atomic propositions) and his comprehending. When we juxtapose that with his quotation: ¡®The borders of my language are also the borders of my world, we can claim that he relied whole human knowledge on speaking and finally on meaning of the words. In spite of this there are no word in Tractatus about the nonexistence of metaphysics and ethics. Paradoxally, they are just meaningless, but they really can exist or influence our life.
Second Round
Signs of breakthrough in ¡®Tractatus¡¦¡¯
That was the first step of breakthrough in Wittgenstein¡¯s system. Plainly speaking, the metaphysical and mystical dimension of it. In the book thinker divide the world implicit in two spheres: the things which can be utter, which are setting the borders of the world as we see it and the second one, the unsaid world which in fact exist, but man cant say about it because of its relativity in the material words. He didn¡¯t tend to think that one of them is material and the other isn¡¯t. He just mentioned implicit the existence of the world of ethical ideas and generally the ideas. It points out that there is something behind the curtain of the silence. The contemporary question is whether he thought about some kind of noosphere or just it was about the intrinsic world which inevitably is a part of self. Thus he achieved the point where he divides the self into two areas: the ego, which was connected with real word by speaking and meaning and the ego which was dealing with the other, ¡®silent¡¯ world (scheme).
It shows that not only the empirical verification is important but also, the mystical comprehension is included and grasped. It¡¯s just a small step from the view expressed by the quotation about meaning. Aside from that interpretation, Wittgenstein kept his beliefs on uttering meaningless words about our ethical problems, values etc. In my opinion he has made a room for the second part of his philosophy which will be described afterwards. I believe, it¡¯s worth telling that many of neopositivists from Vienna Association were asking Wittgenstein to join them and to create a great system which will ultimately eliminate metaphysics and ethics from the area of philosophy, according to their metaphor of philosophy as a king Lear who had given all his money to his daughters and then he became a poor man. Wittgenstein referred distantly to their plans. He was concerned about his views and he wouldn¡¯t like to eliminate the ¡®soft¡¯ philosophy (notion of analysts), but he saw an importance of it in human¡¯s thinking. It was the prospect of the new stage of his thought which became such divisive.
Third Round
The full-fledged, philosophical system contained in ¡®Inquires¡¦¡¯
Late Wittgenstein included his thoughts in already mentioned book called ¡°Inquiries considering philosophy.¡¯ He reversed from the atomic logicism and became a pragmatic philosopher, who considered meaning, the central notion of his as a usage. That¡¯s the meaning of the quotation. Whatever you utter it depends on the situation, the person who you are talking to, context and the place and the time where it is taking place. It¡¯s obvious for Wittgenstein to notice that the word gets it¡¯s meaning while saying. Let¡¯s consider the sentence:
Language-games were apprehended by Wittgenstein as situations in which we are using words. They have their rules, which are set by the ¡®players¡¯, their time extension and they are determined by the place where they are played. They are the moments, when words are gaining their meaning. Above we had two language-games: in the mechanic¡¯s workshop, and somewhere in space with described conditions. Wittgenstein wrote that they have also the characters of play (from German word ¡®das Spiel¡¯). It means that there is an amusing factor involved in them. The players are actually free in their game as far as they don¡¯t surpass the border between one game and the other. They are like children on the seesaw-they can decide whether they want to dangle faster or slower until they really are at the seesaw. Wittgenstein noticed some difficulties among the language-games
The consequences
As I have described, the dependence of words upon their usage are also mentioned by Wittgenstein as an important problem of philosophy. It is worth considering, that his prior apprehension of philosophy from the logical point of view, has been dwindled to the methodological usage. I believe, that is the right place for that. We cannot forget that logic is only the instrument of thinking which can¡¯t influence our world view. The gradual development of his mind is based on that point. Wittgenstein was approaching step by step, from completely logical (but not exactly analytic and positivistic!) point of view, to the idea of total plurality of instants in which the meaning can change. I think the views from ¡®Tractatus¡¦¡¯ became full-fledged in the ¡®Inquiries¡¦¡¯ Stress was removed from the real consequences of meaning to more intrinsic ones (I mean the human¡¯s condition in the world). From antipodes of human¡¯s thought Wittgenstein converged with hermeneutical philosophers. He had heralded the linguistic apprehension before Hans Georg Gadamer matured. Consequently, his philosophy is anticipation for the language strand in philosophy which has been the leading one in the contemporary philosophy.
Some remarks for the end
I find symptomatic, that he rejected logical apprehension and approached closer to the human¡¯s life. He didn¡¯t let himself being locked in a cage of logic, in which he could settle down, but he referred to practical philosophy in spite of making theories with no connections to the real human¡¯s life. The importance of language in his system was surely the most influential. The term ¡®meaning¡¯ of the word, which was included in the quotation, should have been important for him if he had pointed out so many consequences of it in ordinary life. It is empirically proved that his term of meaning is correct what I have shown above. I agree with his belief from the quotations. I evaluate Wittgenstein¡¯s development as very important and good. I¡®m not surprised that he was commonly criticized for betray of logic traditions by ¡®Inquires¡¦¡¯ I think it is basic right of philosopher to develop his thoughts. They are not right that he made an unexpected and violent leap between his views. I daresay that they have omitted the symptoms of that change in the ¡®bible¡¯ of analytics ? ¡®Tractatus¡¦ - or they didn¡¯t want to see it for a very obvious reason.
This sounds rather paradoxical. To know one has to love and yet to love one has to know. It appears as if Kitaro Nishida is coming to the conclusion that love and knowledge are more or less equal. No one without the other. He doesn¡¯t explain in this quotation, from which to start, the knowing or the loving, he just points out that this is how it is. Knowledge produces love, and love makes one want to increase the amount of one¡¯s knowledge on the object of one¡¯s love.
Nishida uses some wide-range terms in this quote. First there¡¯s the term ¡°know¡±. There are some definitions on the field of philosophy for knowledge. Probably the best known is Plato¡¯s classical definition of knowledge. According to Plato knowledge is a well-stated true belief. There are also some other ¡°requirements¡± for knowledge. There is the element of believing and the element of truth. This means that in order for one to claim something to be knowledge, one has to believe it. It surely affects the opinion of other party in the conversation if one was to say ¡°I know that 5-2=3 but I don¡¯t believe it¡±. In a case like this the value of the argument comes questionable. The element of truth may be harder to find depending on the question, but one can¡¯t possibly claim to know that all cats are born with six legs. The other party of the discussion surely knows at least by experience that this argument does not work in practise and is therefore untrue.
Love is another terrifyingly big term. Whether there is any basic philosophical definition for love, it¡¯s unclear. Even though knowledge and love are both uncountable things, it still seems that it¡¯s easier to try to measure the amount of one¡¯s knowledge by testing than the amount of one¡¯s love. Still even the ways of testing the amount of knowledge remain imperfect. Although for example nominalists claim that even the abstract terms, as yellow or truth, exist as independent creatures, that their existence is not based on human minds, even in that case the terms love and knowledge are impossible to measure and compare with each other in a trustworthy way. Still both knowledge and love are a part of everyday life and have an effect on people. An average daily life is full of empiric proof of knowledge and love. One knows by experience that falling down hurts, and at the same time hopes that people close to him do not hurt themselves, which can be interpreted as the feeling of love and concern.
It¡¯s also possible for one to question Nishida¡¯s argument. To know a thing one has to love it, and to love a thing one has to know it. It seems that Nishida is referring to a complete and through-out knowing of something. In this kind of thinking the problem of many differing arguments about the possibility of through-out knowing rises. Fundamentalists claim that it is possible to know the absolute, unwavering, ultimate final truth about something. Many rationalists have agreed, that the final truth can be reached by logical deductions. Then there are some less solid sides. Fallibilists do not believe in finding the absolute truth, but they believe that knowledge is true until something comes up to tip it over or correct it to be more accurate. It doesn¡¯t become clear from Nishida¡¯s quotation, how he believes, but there¡¯s an allusion that he means ultimate knowing.
One term that also makes the argument of Nishida quite interesting, is ¡°a thing¡±. This comes back to the knowing of a thing. ¡°Thing¡± is really a wide term. There are many things in the world. Still Nishida doesn¡¯t make any limitations to what we can know if we only love it. It seems to an average person that knowing a dead leaf and knowing the main point Wittgenstein makes in Tractatus Logico Philosophicus do not have the same status. In Nishida¡¯s argument there¡¯s the element of love involved, but it feels rather unbelievable to claim that, if we assume that the final truth can be known, one can truly and trough-out know these two things similarly with the aid of something as fickle as love. Or more accurately put, can¡¯t know either without the aid of something as fickle as love. Although in philosophy all schools do not make much of a difference between material and mental things, in ordinary everyday-life the difference in understanding and knowing them is crude. In the mists of weekdays it seems that even though we might claim that we know for example our own pockets, even love doesn¡¯t help us to know whether it¡¯s right to have an abortion or whether the killing of a human being is justified. But it¡¯s a lot easier to say that I like chocolate ice-cream more than vanilla, because I just love chocolate. Chocolate ice-cream is a material thing, whereas saying whether something is right or wrong is not.
It¡¯s also possible that Nishida means a different kind of knowing. The term knowing is usually linked with studying, books and testing. The possibility of the simple love towards something bringing in the knowing of the thing makes people shrug and perhaps laugh up their sleeves with prejudices about daydreamers and romantics. However, the word intuition is not completely unknown in philosophy and could be associated with a sort of a level of knowing a priori. Whether the trigger to the intuition is love towards something seems as good of an alternative as the other possible forces.
It seems that love for something does make people think they also know the thing. Therefore it seems somewhat acceptable to claim that love increases the knowing of a thing to a certain extend. But it seems rather bold to claim that one can¡¯t know a thing without loving it. Many workers are good in what they do, and they might even like what they do, but it still doesn¡¯t mean that they love what they do. The feeling of love towards something might give the necessary willpower to gather knowledge about something, but it¡¯s not required. Other feelings can also make it seem that one knows something completely. There are things that people know painfully clear, but do not love. It¡¯s possible for one to completely and utterly know the feeling of for example envy, and hate the fact that he knows the feeling. The fact that it¡¯s unwanted and unwelcome doesn¡¯t make it any less known or powerful than if he would love it. So maybe the more accurate form of the argument could be: ¡°To know something we have to feel something towards it.¡± Not necessarily love, for there are other powerful and overwhelming feelings as well.
Is it possible then, to know a thing completely free of emotion of any kind? The modern world has shown that it¡¯s possible to contain information completely free of emotions. That¡¯s what thermometers, books and computers do. These items have information, but whether it can be called knowledge is a different thing altogether. The term knowledge also requires a self-conscious agent in hold of information. So far humans are the only self-conscious agents that science has discovered, and emotions are essential in human existence. So for humans, to know something completely without any feeling for it is impossible. Even ignorance isn¡¯t the same as lack of feeling.
¡°To know a thing we must love it, and to love a thing we must know it¡±
For a fallibilist it¡¯s a real challenge to try to accept that something could be known through and through. For a self-conscious agent it¡¯s a real challenge to try to accept whether something could be known without feeling something, should it be love in this case. For personal beliefs and preferences it¡¯s a real challenge to try to accept that feelings could increase the amount of knowledge, but still believe in the power of intuition. Fortunately the philosophical world revolves around challenges.