IPO 2007
Topics of Philosophical Essay Competition (English)
AWARD ESSAYS
On Topic I
There is a painting by the Belgian surrealist Rene Magritte depicting the concept of human liberty as a room with one window opening onto a bright blue sky with clouds like puffs of smoke and another onto a Renaissance-style female nude. In the middle of the boxlike room, where the three walls are as intimidating as the windows are liberating, there is a cannon aimed at the viewer of the painting. Magritte¡¯s perspective on human liberty invites reflection on the concepts of freedom vs. security, which is a central dilemma for thinkers who have aimed at creating the best form of state. How far can a state allow its individuals to be free? Is there, or should there be a limit to freedom, and where and how can a state draw the line between what is a necessary limit to freedom and what would be described as an infringement upon the ¡°natural¡± rights of human beings? In modern societies the cannon has been turned towards ¡°the other,¡± who is intruding upon the scene with different notions of liberty, as well as to the window depicting the inifinity of the sky, which can be interpreted as the freedom of society as a whole.
The transition between Spinoza¡¯s idea that the aim of a government is not ¡°to rule, or restrain, by fear, nor to exact obedience¡± but that it is to make sure that ¡°everyman... may live in all possible security¡± has not been treated as the contrast that Spinoza expresses it to be. A tradition of philosophers have argued that exacting obedience, if not inspiring fear, is a necessary condition for achieving ¡°all possible security,¡± which Spinoza holds up as the aim of a state, and not contradictory to its achievement as Spinoza argues. Plato, in The Republic, visualizes the ideal society as one where a group of men with presupposed wisdom, i.e. the philosopher kings, have the right, as well as the responsibility of ruling the masses. Because of their knowledge and experience, they are regarded as having better judgment than the rest of the people. In the Cave Allegory, Plato uses the metaphor that these men have seen sunlight, while the rest of society is made of people who can only see its shadow. Plato¡¯s oligarchic description of the ideal state can esaily be exploited and turned into the tyranny of a group of people given limitless power. Even if these philosopher kings prove incorruptible ? which is highly unlikely ? there is no proof that their decision will be the best for the people. In the light of the modern idea of democracy, it is easy to dismiss Plato¡¯s republic as anti-democratic, and therefore as having lost its validity in the politics of modern societies. However, it must be kept in mind that Plato also had the best interest of the people in mind and he would support the idea that his republic aimed to grant ¡°all possible security¡± to its people.
People have a tendency for obedience. This may be an inherent quality or it may be socially constructed, but it has been proved to exist. The Milgram Experiments, conducted by pyschologist Stanley Milgram in the 1960¡¯s, have asked subjects to ask certain questions to another subject (one of the experimenters in disguise) who was tied to electrodes. The questioning person was then asked to give the answering subject an electric shock each time he gave the wrong answer. Slowly the voltage of the shocks was increased, but the person conducting the experiment ordered the interrogator to keep giving the shocks. Even when the interrogator saw the other person writhing in obvious pain, he continued to give the shocks simply because he was ordered to do so. Totalitarian regimes have found the combination of people¡¯s tendency to obey and the Platonic vision of a group of people holding all authority to conveniently serve tyrannical purposes. In fact, the Nazi regime relied more on the routine of officers doing what they were told, or what was set as their duty, rather than on pure evil. This is the situation coined by Hannah Arendt as the banality of evil. It exemplifies the catastrophic results of Plato¡¯s idea taken to extremes. Spinoza¡¯s judgment that the state must not be based on obedience has proved accurate, but the idea of ¡°living in all possible security¡± remains to be reconciled with the idea of liberty.
In The Social Contract, Rousseau argues that there must be a contract between the people and the state, whereby people consent to give up certain rights, or accept limits to their freedom in order to benefit from the social privileges that the state can provide. Although Rousseau¡¯s ideas are pro-democracy, he still belongs to the tradition in political philosophy that follows the line of Plato. In other words, Rousseau does not support the full liberty of the individual; he values communal wealth and harmony, or communal rights, over the rights of the individual. Spinoza¡¯s description of everyman¡¯s ¡°natural right to exist without injury to himself and others,¡± raises the question of what it means to injure others. Others (or society) might be injured by James Joyce¡¯s Ulysses and it may be argued (in fact it has been argued) that the obscenity of this work is a threat to society¡¯s security. Rousseau¡¯s philosophy would support the suppression of Joyce and the censorship of Ulysses over Joyce¡¯s natural right to express himself freely. He as an individual must give up his right to say what he thinks if he is regarded as a threat to society. As much as Rousseau aims to maintain the functioning of the state and of society through sacrifices on the part of the people, he fails to reconcile individual liberties with social welfare.
This situation is one of the inherent flaws of modern societies and results in clashes of opinion and controversy, which is often solved by suppression and censorship. Isaiah Berlin acutely summarizes the situation in his essay entitled ¡°On Freedom.¡± Berlin divides the concept of freedom into two: Positive freedom and negative freedom. Although it can be argued that freedom is not so simple as to be divided into two, the categorization is convenient for the case at hand. Negative freedom is the sense of freedom conventionally understood: The freedom of the individual to live free from restraint. The liberal, indiviual-based tradition following Locke adheres to such a definition of freedom. Positive freedom, on the other hand, is what Rousseau would have defined as freedom: It is the freedom of society to be free from offense, injury, or threat. Positive freedom necessitates the limiting of the individual for the general good. To give an example, in the case of the fatwa declared by Iran against Salman Rushdie due to the presumably insulting description of Mohammed in The Satanic Verses, negative freedom would defend that Rushdie has the right to write what he thinks and that the Iraninan state has no right to persecute him. Positive freedom, on the other hand, would argue that the Muslim community has the right to be free from insult, and since their religion, which is the core of their identity, was insulted, Rushdie has committed a breach of their freedom.
It is impossible to come to the conclusion that one or the other of the sides in such a case is absolutely right. Both sides are right from their own perspective. Spinoza¡¯s ultimate aim of man¡¯s ¡°natural right to exist and work, without injury to himself and others¡± is insufficient in solving this dilemma. A man¡¯s natural right to exist (or express himself) may involve injury to others. If injury to others is taken as the standard for setting limits to human freedom, it is easy to end up with the tyranny of the majority, whereby what the majority considers offensive can be used to suppress minority groups and their members.
Multicultural societies, where values and traditions differ from one ethnic or religious group to another, are faced with the problem of having to judge and unite these diverse cultural groups by a single set of laws assumed to be true for all. Spinoza mentions the ¡°natural right to exist.¡± There are other rights assumed to be natural, and aimed at creating a better society for all individuals, but it can be argued that these rights take as their basis certain Western values based on individuality, which may not be shared by minority groups that want to preserve their communal identities and express themselves in terms of this group identity. (Kymlicka) A state may declare an official language and decree that everyone must be educated in this language, while a minority group may want their children to learn their own language at school as a way of protecting and continuing their linguistic tradition. This is a harmless enough request to make. Then again, a minority group may also say that according to their tradition if somebody from a different clan kills a member of their own clan, tradition dictates that they take revenge and kill somebody else from the other clan, thus creating a blood feud where ¡°civil blood makes civil hands unclean¡± (Romeo and Juliet). This is not such a harmless request. It directly contradicts each man¡¯s ¡°natural¡± right to exist (although that particular group may not describe this as a natural right). How far should the state permit the laws and values of cultural groups within society to be practiced and amalgamated into the laws of the state?
While Will Kymlicka identifies and discusses the problem at length, he does not propose a solution. Forcing minorities to conformity would lead to a process of otherizing. ¡°You are different,¡±the state would have declared. ¡°Therefore you are wrong. You must accept the rules I set.¡± This is not a constructive approach. Reconciling Spinoza¡¯s desire for security with his condition of existing without injuring others can only be achieved through a mutual intercommunal dialogue. The Iranians must question the reasons why Rushdie may have written The Satanic Verses and Rushdie must try to understand the bond between Iranians and their religious belief. The state should try to see that education in a different language at schools might not be a threat to national security and the clans mentioned must see that killing each other forever is not going to resolve the feud. Multiculturalism is essential in a democracy and democracy should be an inclusive rather than an exclusive regime. To return to the Magritte metaphor, different cultural groups should each give a hand to lift the cannon out of the room and out through the window with the blue sky, so that the nude lady looks on into the empty room without besmirching her Eve-like purity.
On Topic I
1. Introduct©¥on
In todays world people bas©¥caly l©¥ve ©¥n soc©¥et©¥es adm©¥n©¥strated w©¥th©¥n states. When we th©¥nk about the funct©¥ons of government of such a state ©¥t ©¥s worth cons©¥der©¥ng what are ©¥ts or©¥g©¥ns, because from the reasons for ©¥ts creat©¥on we can ©¥nfere ©¥ts supposed funct©¥ons. The ph©¥losoph©¥cal concept that casts some l©¥ght on th©¥s problem ©¥s the ©¥ssue of state of nature and soc©¥al contract, wh©¥ch I w©¥ll analyse ©¥n my essay.
It can be also ©¥mpl©¥ed from the quotat©¥on ©¥n the top©¥c that the ex©¥stence of the government somehow or©¥g©¥nates from some human natural r©¥ghts (as ©¥t ©¥s stated ? to ex©¥st and work), and so I w©¥ll pay some attent©¥on to th©¥s not©¥on, cons©¥der©¥ng whether there actualy ©¥s someth©¥ng l©¥ke natural human r©¥ghts and what exactly are they.
F©¥nally ©¥t ©¥s worth analys©¥ng whether Sp©¥noza ©¥s actualy r©¥ght ©¥n h©¥s analys©¥s of the funct©¥on of the government. I w©¥ll try to show poss©¥ble other appoaches to the role of a state. Hence the general quest©¥on we shall cons©¥der ©¥s whether ©¥t ©¥s poss©¥ble to set up some work©¥ng government w©¥th sens©¥ble funct©¥ons even ©¥f the concepts of state of nature and natural human r©¥ghts w©¥ll turn out to be nonsens©¥cal or at least unprovable.
2. Or©¥g©¥ns of the states ? state of nature
Sp©¥noza bel©¥eves that the a©¥ms of the state can be ©¥nfered from ©¥ts or©¥g©¥ns, foundat©¥ons. Th©¥s leads us to concept of state of nature and the soc©¥al contract that follows. State of nature ©¥s a ph©¥losoph©¥cal concept descr©¥b©¥ng the l©¥fe of humans before the establ©¥shment of any form of goverment, and was an extremely popular ©¥ssue ©¥n the t©¥me of Enl©¥ghtement and even earl©¥er. The lead©¥ng ph©¥losophers analys©¥ng th©¥s problem were Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau. Hobbes©¥an po©¥nt of v©¥ew would probably be close to the one proposed by Sp©¥noza, as he presented state of nature as a war of everyone aga©¥nst everyone else (people ©¥njure each other), there ©¥s total lack of secur©¥ty and peace and scarc©¥ty of natural resources. From th©¥s ©¥mage Hobbes developed h©¥s concept of soc©¥al contract: he stated that all people meet to do someth©¥ng aga©¥nst the state they l©¥ve ©¥n, and they collect©¥vely agree to g©¥ve they natural freedom to a governor, who from now on ga©¥ns almost d©¥ctatorh©¥p power. Th©¥s state, although close to oppress©¥on, ©¥s st©¥ll more favourable than a state of nature. People are lead by fear to do ©¥t, so the most ©¥mportant funct©¥on of the state ©¥s to l©¥qu©¥date fear and ensure peace.
St©¥ll, both Locke and Rousseau held d©¥fferent po©¥nts of v©¥ew on the ©¥dea of state of nature (Rousseau went to such an extreme that he cla©¥med the state of nature ©¥s far better than any goverment, as ©¥t ©¥s most favourable for a man to be close to h©¥s natural pos©¥t©¥on). Locke bel©¥eved that ©¥n the state of nature people are free, equal, and there are actually no major confl©¥cts among them. The state ©¥s establ©¥shed when people start to trade among themselves and they need some adm©¥n©¥strat©¥ve structure that would guard these transact©¥ons and assure that all people follow procedural just©¥ce. In th©¥s l©¥ght people would not hurt each other ©¥n the state of nature, but st©¥ll, w©¥th the establ©¥shment of goverment they ag©¥n access to more poss©¥b©¥l©¥t©¥eso so ©¥t ©¥s a more benef©¥c©¥al opt©¥on. We can see that th©¥s perspect©¥ve ©¥s very d©¥fferent from the one presented by Hobbes.
Can we then say that such th©¥ng as a state of nature really ex©¥sted ©¥f we have such contrast©¥ng v©¥ews on ©¥t? We can f©¥nd a extens©¥ve cr©¥t©¥cs of th©¥s very concept ©¥n the essay by D. Hume. He offers several arguments for wh©¥ch the ©¥dea of state of nature ©¥s nonsens©¥cal. F©¥rst of all, we do not really have much h©¥stor©¥al examples for ©¥t (©¥t would actually be much eas©¥er to f©¥nd examples of states ar©¥s©¥ng out of conquest or war, not some or©¥g©¥nal pos©¥t©¥on). Moreover, look©¥ng from the po©¥nt of v©¥ew of human psychology, ©¥t ©¥s much more natural for one to follow the trad©¥t©¥on, the prev©¥ous generat©¥on, than to subverse, suddelny return to the state of nature and establ©¥sh new soc©¥al contract. People usually do not th©¥nk about the form of state they ex©¥st ? they just go on l©¥v©¥ng. So ©¥t does not ©¥n the end seem to be sens©¥ble to analyse the purposes of the goverment by look©¥ng on ©¥ts or©¥g©¥ns ? the emp©¥r©¥st such as Hume would say that we have to look on what we have now, not to create some abstract theor©¥es of someth©¥ng we do not have proof of.
3. The funct©¥ons of the govermnent
A. ¡°Strenghten©¥ng natural r©¥ghts¡± - the ©¥dea of natural human r©¥ghts, the©¥r or©¥g©¥n and content
The concept of natural r©¥ghts ©¥s somehow connected w©¥th the ©¥dea of state of nature ? ©¥t assumes that there are some bas©¥c, pr©¥mary features of man that are unal©¥enable no matter of cond©¥t©¥ons. For Sp©¥noza these natural r©¥ghts are r©¥ghts to ex©¥st and work; but for others there well can be equal©¥ty, freedom and r©¥ght to l©¥ve (Locke). And aga©¥n we face the problem of d©¥sagreements ? ©¥f natural r©¥ghts are the most bas©¥c features of man, why then do ph©¥losophers d©¥ffer ©¥n descr©¥b©¥nd them? Log©¥cally speak©¥ng, they should all be unan©¥mous...
Th©¥s leads us to the problem of or©¥g©¥ns of human r©¥ghts ? some ph©¥losophers say that they come from God, but th©¥s does not solve the d©¥scuss©¥on as we have even more problems w©¥th prov©¥ng the ex©¥stence of God h©¥mself. If then the r©¥ghts come from humans, we should dec©¥de whether they always ex©¥sted (as Sp©¥noza suggests) or were created by humans themselves at some po©¥nt. When we take ©¥nto cons©¥derat©¥on the d©¥vers©¥ty of v©¥ews on human r©¥ghts, ©¥t would be probably more conv©¥nc©¥ng to assume that ©¥n the end they were establ©¥shed by humans (th©¥s would expla©¥n why they d©¥ffer ©¥n var©¥ous parts of the world). Then the Human R©¥ght Organ©¥sat©¥on (1948) can be ©¥nterpreted as soc©¥al contract created to preserve r©¥ghts seen as valuable by humans (that are: l©¥bert©¥es r©¥ghts, r©¥ght to fa©¥r tr©¥al, welfare r©¥ghts, m©¥nor©¥t©¥es r©¥ghts, secur©¥ty r©¥ghts and equal©¥ty r©¥ghts). In the ut©¥l©¥tat©¥an perspect©¥ve we could say that even ©¥f we cannot agree for any unam©¥nous concept of or©¥g©¥ns of human r©¥ghts, ©¥t ©¥s better to estrabl©¥sh some non-pernament procedures so to oppose the horr©¥ble cr©¥mes that are go©¥ng on currently. The cons©¥stency of ph©¥losoph©¥cal att©¥tude ©¥s then less ©¥mportant than prevent©¥ng e.g. next genoc©¥tes. In th©¥s l©¥ght the funct©¥on of the goverment should be to br©¥ng ©¥nto l©¥fe the r©¥ghts outl©¥ned by the Human R©¥ght Organ©¥sat©¥on and to ensure that they are fulf©¥lled w©¥th©¥n the state.
B. ¡°R©¥ght to ex©¥st and work¡±
It ©¥s ©¥nterest©¥ng to wonder why Sp©¥noza chose these two part©¥cular human r©¥ghts as the most bas©¥c ones for humans. Intu©¥t©¥vely I th©¥nk ©¥t ©¥s easy to agree that a goverment should do all to assure r©¥ght to l©¥ve for all humans and try to prov©¥de opportun©¥t©¥es for work. Is ©¥t, however, only th©¥s that ©¥t should do? H. Arendt¡¯s concept would be qu©¥te a contrast©¥ng one. In her work ¡°Human Cond©¥t©¥on¡± she outl©¥ned three bas©¥c areas of human l©¥fe ? labour, work and act©¥on. Labour ©¥s a th©¥ng that can well be performed by an©¥mals and ©¥s a©¥med to preserve l©¥fe ©¥n the b©¥olog©¥cal sense (so ©¥n a way ©¥t ©¥s th©¥s r©¥ght to l©¥fe). Work ©¥s someth©¥ng that humans do to create th©¥ngs notr ex©¥st©¥ng ©¥n the world of nature. But the most ©¥mportant sphere ©¥s act©¥on ? ©¥t ©¥s cruc©¥al for human cond©¥t©¥on, and ab©¥l©¥ty to perform act©¥on ©¥s the feature that make us d©¥fferent from an©¥mals. It ©¥s the funct©¥on of the state to ensure empty room for c©¥t©¥zens to act (th©¥s ©¥s called d©¥sclosure), create publ©¥c space ©¥n wh©¥ch c©¥t©¥zent can pract©¥ce they c©¥v©¥c ab©¥l©¥t©¥es, values, d©¥scuss, speak. So the cruc©¥al funct©¥on of a state ©¥s to prov©¥de var©¥ous c©¥v©¥c l©¥bert©¥es ? freedom of speech, assembly, thought, free press.
In the end ©¥t ©¥s poss©¥ble to reconc©¥le these two att©¥tudes (of Arendt and Sp©¥noza). It seems that there must be some bas©¥c needs fulf©¥lled for a person to be able to act. A human would not care for h©¥s freedom of speech ©¥f he was starv©¥ng and had nowhere to l©¥ve ©¥n. So probably Arend presupposes ex©¥stance of r©¥ght to l©¥ve and work and goes to more ©¥mportant for her value, that ©¥s act©¥on.
C. ¡°W©¥thout ©¥njury to h©¥mself or others¡±
I have already not©¥ced that ©¥t ©¥s sl©¥ghtly unjust©¥f©¥ed to cla©¥m that humans would for sure hurt each other ©¥f no government ex©¥sted (st©¥ll, we do have pol©¥ce today that ©¥n a way performs the funct©¥on of prov©¥d©¥ng c©¥t©¥zens w©¥th secur©¥ty). But there ©¥s some truth ©¥n th©¥s statement wh©¥ch was developed by M©¥ll ©¥n h©¥s concept of a state and l©¥berty. He cla©¥med that each c©¥t©¥zen can do what he wants (make use of h©¥s freedom) as long as ©¥t does not ©¥nfl©¥ct the freedom of others. And ©¥t ©¥s the funct©¥on of the state to ensure that no one breaks th©¥s rule.
4. Other funct©¥ons of the state not ment©¥oned by Sp©¥noza
A. Retr©¥but©¥on
So far we showed the funct©¥ons of the state ©¥n the l©¥ght of state of nature and human r©¥ghts. But ©¥s ©¥t only th©¥s that make up the funct©¥ons of the goverment? Sp©¥noza¡¯s op©¥n©¥on aga©¥st goverment restra©¥n©¥ng c©¥t©¥zens could be understood as an argument aga©¥ns just©¥ce embod©¥ed ©¥n the procedural law (because we m©¥ght say ©¥t ©¥s somehow coers©¥ve). Is the wr©¥tten, coers©¥ve law not needed ©¥n a state? I shall analyse th©¥s problem ©¥n the l©¥ght of law as deterence and retr©¥but©¥on. Sp©¥noza would probably oppose both of them say©¥ng that they cause fear and ©¥mpose obed©¥ence. There are, however, many arguments that would support them. Retr©¥but©¥on ©¥s deeply emersed ©¥n our moral©¥ty ? usually we would agree that ©¥f someone d©¥d someth©¥ng wrong, he should be pun©¥shed for that. Th©¥s somehow restores the balance ©¥n the soc©¥ety and moreover can prov©¥de a cr©¥m©¥nal w©¥th a chance of resoc©¥al©¥sat©¥on, correct©¥ng what he has done. The fact that the rules of retr©¥but©¥on are embod©¥ed ©¥n the b©¥ll of law ©¥s also v©¥tal, as ©¥t opposes a s©¥tuat©¥on ©¥n wh©¥ch everyone could adm©¥n©¥ster just©¥ce as he sees ©¥t, wh©¥ch undobtedly would lead to chaos.
It ©¥s also ©¥nterest©¥ng to not©¥ce here that some ph©¥losophers (l©¥ke Durkhe©¥m) support the ©¥dea of retr©¥but©¥on as they th©¥nk ©¥t has benef©¥c©¥al effects on the ©¥ntegr©¥ty of the soc©¥ety of a state. Retr©¥but©¥on des©¥gnates some cr©¥m©¥nals that as an effect are outs©¥de the soc©¥ety, and hence they somehow help to mark the borders of th©¥s commun©¥ty. Th©¥s allows for greater stab©¥l©¥ty of the state.
Retr©¥but©¥on can, on the contrary, be severely cr©¥t©¥c©¥sed. Noz©¥k¡¯s concept of protect©¥ve assoc©¥at©¥on would be good to present here. Th©¥s contemporary pol©¥t©¥cal ph©¥losopher advocates for what ©¥s called m©¥n©¥mum state ? a construct that would prov©¥de all the c©¥t©¥zens w©¥th the r©¥ghts they need (l©¥ke peace), but avo©¥ds any coers©¥ve measures (such as retr©¥but©¥on). Th©¥s ©¥s what we call protect©¥ve assoc©¥at©¥on. Sp©¥noza would be probably happy to agree to th©¥s ©¥dea.
B. Deterence
As for deterence, th©¥s ©¥s a concept that uses the ©¥dea of law as prevent©¥ng from comm©¥t©¥ng a cr©¥me. A cr©¥m©¥nal-to-be can e©¥ther be scared of consequences that he would have to face ©¥f we was captured, or he can, ©¥n a more soph©¥st©¥cated manner, ©¥nternal©¥se the law and feel morally obl©¥ged to follow the regulat©¥ons.
Deterence, although a much ¡°softer¡± method of keep©¥ng peace ©¥n a state, poses a lot of problems. Noz©¥k for example stated that we do not know how much deterence we need to prevent cr©¥mes unless we test ©¥t (wh©¥ch seems to be a r©¥sky exper©¥mental ©¥dea...). Futher, ©¥f we agree for deterence, we somehow assume that all cr©¥m©¥nals w©¥ll th©¥nk log©¥cally before comm©¥t©¥ng a cr©¥me, wh©¥ch ©¥s obv©¥ously not always the case (some may act under the ©¥nfluence of a sudden ©¥mpulse). F©¥nally we could even come to a conclus©¥on that deterence causes someth©¥ng contrad©¥ct©¥ng the ©¥dea of Sp©¥noza ? fear. It ©¥s the fear of a pun©¥shment that make people restra©¥n themselves from comm©¥t©¥ng a cr©¥me.
C. D©¥str©¥but©¥ve just©¥ce
We should not forget about a very ©¥mportant funct©¥on of a state as shown by Rawls (¡°Just©¥ce as Fa©¥rness¡±), that ©¥s d©¥str©¥but©¥ve just©¥ce. Rawls cla©¥med that ©¥t ©¥s a funct©¥on of a goverment to ensure all humans w©¥th bas©¥c, most extens©¥ve human r©¥ghts (equal for all) and that all the other goods (econom©¥cal or pol©¥t©¥cal) are g©¥ven for some people to the advantage of everyone and are access©¥ble for all people. There are, however, opponents to th©¥s v©¥ew ? Noz©¥k would for example say that there ©¥s no such th©¥ng as d©¥str©¥but©¥ve just©¥ce, because ©¥t ©¥s ©¥mposs©¥ble to ensure that all people get the same.
St©¥ll, d©¥str©¥but©¥ve just©¥ce does not have to be understood as equal©¥ty od goods, but rather as equal©¥ty of opportun©¥t©¥es. It ©¥s a state that can prov©¥de us w©¥th educat©¥on, wh©¥ch a©¥ms at g©¥v©¥ng all people equal chances of enter©¥ng and funt©¥on©¥ng ©¥n the world. The ©¥nst©¥tut©¥ons that are prov©¥ded by the goverment (such are educat©¥on, law) seem obv©¥ous for us, but they are not ment©¥oned by Sp©¥noza.
5. Anarch©¥sm
Noz©¥k made a bas©¥c d©¥st©¥nct©¥on between the supporters of any whatsoever state (arch©¥sts) and the opponents of ©¥t (anarch©¥sts). Let us shortly present the v©¥s©¥on of anarch©¥sm, because ©¥t ©¥s rad©¥cally d©¥fferent from what we have sa©¥d so far. Anarch©¥sm as def©¥ned by E. Goldman ©¥s a concept©¥on that advocates for real©¥sat©¥on of human freedom to a most poss©¥ble degree and cla©¥m©¥ng that any form of govermnent ©¥s harmful for people and unnecessary. It follows that goverment b©¥nds people, reduces the©¥r creat©¥v©¥ty, ©¥ntroduces market that makes people bel©¥eve they have to buy more than they ©¥n fact need.
The problem w©¥th anarch©¥sm ©¥s that ©¥t ©¥s, as stated by Noz©¥k ? an unprotect©¥ve assoc©¥at©¥on. When we g©¥ve all people all poss©¥ble freedom (and they can do what they want) what can follow ©¥s complete chaos, unab©¥l©¥ty to commun©¥cate. Even ©¥f we assume that people are not agress©¥ve by nature and we w©¥ll not get a Hobbes©¥an total war as a result, there w©¥ll be some other problems. For example, the world of today ©¥s very much global©¥sed, and ©¥t ©¥s a state that prov©¥des us w©¥th many means of commun©¥cat©¥on w©¥th the rest of the world (e.g. by structure of d©¥plomacy). If we do not have a state, we are somehow separated from the access to some remote parts of the world and we can ach©¥eve much less.
6. Conclus©¥on
It turns out that we cannot base the analys©¥s of funct©¥ons of government on the ©¥dea of state of nature and the soc©¥al contact, because these ©¥deas are suspected ? we cannot even for sure prove that they ex©¥st. It would be also qu©¥te r©¥sky to base the role of the state only on the ©¥deas of natural human r©¥ghts as ©¥t ©¥s also not a certa©¥n concept. We can well analyse the roles of government w©¥thout tak©¥ng ©¥nto cons©¥derat©¥on the state of nature of human nature. It ©¥s poss©¥ble, however, to use the ©¥dea of human r©¥ghts (even ©¥f ©¥t ©¥s a b©¥t shaky) to establ©¥sh funct©¥ons of goverment ? for example, d©¥str©¥but©¥ve just©¥ce ©¥s based on the ©¥dea of r©¥ght of equal©¥ty, but not only, as ©¥t adds to ©¥t the ©¥dea that there must be the same opportun©¥t©¥es acces©¥ble for all for the d©¥str©¥but©¥ve just©¥ce to work.
Sp©¥noza seems to be r©¥ght when he cla©¥ms that a state has to prov©¥de human w©¥th a r©¥ght to l©¥ve and work and to protect h©¥m from ©¥njur©¥es from others. But st©¥ll, he omm©¥ts some other funct©¥ons w©¥thout wh©¥ch the state would not work properly. For M©¥ll, for example, ©¥t ©¥s much more ©¥mportant ©¥f the c©¥t©¥zens to have l©¥berty than to have securu©¥ty (because pursue of secur©¥ty can, ©¥n extreme, lead to soc©¥al stagnat©¥on, wh©¥ch ©¥s very undes©¥rable for M©¥ll).
In the end I would say that a perfect government (©¥f such th©¥ng exs©¥sts) should base on ©¥nternat©¥onally establ©¥shed and agreed human r©¥ghts and try to ensure for ©¥ts c©¥t©¥zents the max©¥mum ammount of freedom. Freedom, however, can only be created when there ©¥s already secur©¥ty prov©¥ded and the bas©¥c human needs (l©¥ke r©¥ght to l©¥ve and work). So ©¥t f©¥nally seems that Sp©¥noza stated the very rud©¥mentary funct©¥ons of a government, but we should go a b©¥t further. I hope I have shown ©¥t ©¥n my essay.
On Topic 2
Introduction
The above mentioned quotation is the ultimate brick of the building called Kant¡¯s ethics, which is thought to be the paradigm of deontology. In other words, it represents the starting point and certain frame for every ethics based on the notion of duty. I consider complete Kant¡¯s system to be coherent and it is my aim to indetify the values of the ethics which he constructed in the Critique of practical reason (Kritik der praktischen Vernunft), compare it with hedonistic-utilitaristic and eudaimonistic, and to determine its modernity and contemporarity.
I
Firstly, let us elaborate the ¡°starry sky above me and the moral law within me¡±. Kant did not intend to look for either of them outside his own sight. He saw them in front of himself and connected them with the consciousness of his existence. When pointing our look to the countless plenty of stars, we must become aware of our total unimportance as animals. On the contrary, the other sight infinitely raises our value as intelligence, as personality, in which moral law announces life, conducted by reason and independent from animality.
Kant utters two notions to depict human being: a phenomenon and a noumenon. Man is a phenomenon due to living in heteronomy ? as an animal acting on desires not legislated by reason, but by natural laws. At the same time, man is a noumenon (Ding an sich) thing as it is in itself. We have to postulate human being as a noumenon in order to allow the existence of our free will, which gives us authonomy.
Therefore, man¡¯s freedom consists of two components: 1) independence from natural determinism (negative determination of freedom) and 2) possibility of determination by his own reasonable principles (positive determination of freedom).
Certain paradoxality of Kant¡¯s notion of freedom emerges at this point. Actually, his understanding of freedom differs very from the laic one. One might think of freedom as ¡°being free from everything¡± i.e. ¡°to have no obligations to anything¡±. And just on the contrary, Kant finds freedom to be volunatrily subordinating ourselves to the moral law, prescribed by our own reason, what I very much agree.
I I
Secondly, in Kant¡¯s philosophy, freedom is crucial for understanding morality. Considering the question of freedom, there were numerous significant contributions.
In his theodicea, Leibniz considered this world to be the best of all possible worlds. Since the aim of the theodicea was to justify the existence of evil in the world, Leibniz pursued to solve the puzzle this way: God could make the world better, but would limid human freedom, so this world is the best of all worlds: when making it, God reduced its perfectness in order to allow more human freedom. This was to become a matter of Voltaire¡¯s critique in his Candid. But, Schopenhauer did not agree and considered this world to be the worst of all worlds, because it proudces only pain and suffering for human beings.
Complete Hegel¡¯s philsophy of history is based on the concept that the history of the world represents progress in the consciousness of freedom. We come to Sartre and his existentialist understanding of freedom: He actually broadens the notion of freedom, according to him it is every intentional activity, which can also be conditioned by outside factors. He also broadens the notion of free choice to every reflective taking of an attitude, and consequently considers human responsiblity to be absolute because of the possibility to choose.
I I I
Thirdly, when reffering to Kant¡¯s idea of autonomy that humans have as noumena, we should emphasise also the role of autonomy in the wider context of Kant¡¯s system. He depicts autonomy as the crucial idea for the self-understanding of european modernity. Autonomy is implicitely contained in his definition of Enlightenment: ¡°Enlightenment is man¡¯s leaving his self-caused immaturity¡±. He utters the term immaturity to depict the impossibilty of using our own reason without outside guidance. And this immaturity is self-caused, actually self-blamed, because it is not caused by the lack of reason, but by the lack of decision and courage to use the reason without being led by another. That¡¯s the motto of Enlightenment: ¡°Sapere aude¡± ? have courage to use your reason freely, and that represents Kant¡¯s universal call for emancipation ? what appropriately illustrates modernity of his philosophy ? his contribution to forming modern men/women.
And the importance of autonomy is decisive for reasonable moral legislation. Kant pursued to find sure criteria for moral acting, and looked for their source in a formal and a priori element. That element is the moral law, which is autonomously legislated by reason itself.
In its theoretical application, reason gets stuck in an antinomy considering freedom and causality. That is where the practical reason, as the prescriber of the moral law expresses its supremacy ? it provides practical norms for acting in real life. This particular point ? the supremacy of the practical over the theoretical reason was used by Fichte to found his own philosophy.
I V
Fourthly, Kant criticises ¡°content determined¡± (hedonistic-eudaimonistic and utilitaristic) ethics. These ethics pursue to determine the morality of an act according to its effect. If it contributes to happiness, joy, public of personal benefit, than the action is moral. Kant strongly opposes this attitude because we can only know what leads to happines of a particular person in a particular situation from experience, and not a priori. That implicates the impossibility of constructing an a priori moral law according to hedonistic-eudaimonistic and utilitaristic principles. Furthermore, I must underline that people differ very much in their understanding of happines, what contributes to the thesis that ¡°content determined¡± ethics are not appropriate for making an a priori moral law.
And, how shall we actually define the moral law? Well, I do not have to know what happiness means for every particular person, but I shall surely act morally if my maxim (personal principle) can become a universal value. That¡¯s how Kant solves the puzzle of defining the moral law without falling into content determined ethics. He imposes only the form of the law and not its content, leaving enough space for personal authonomy. That is the essence of the first formulation of his categorical imperative: ¡°Act always on that maxim which you can want to become universal law¡±
Thus, the morality of an action can be determined when we filter it through the categorical imperative. I shall use his exemplification in order to soldify this point. If someone gives me a deposit without making a written evidence of this transaction, and dies is it moral not to return this deposit? Let us filter it through the categorical imperative: can I want everyone to stop returning deposits? No, because that would implicate there were no deposits at all. Similar conclusion can be made considering giving promises in a situation I know I cannot fulfil it.
Now, I would like to compare the categorical imperative with the golden rule (¡°Do unto others as you would want the others to do unto you¡± ). These two principles have certain common features, like consistency, but contain also significant differences. While the golden rule is marked by mutuality and reciprocity, the characteristic of the categorical imperative is universalisability. But, even more important, golden rule is a ¡°material principle¡± and does not secure from moral relativism. Its final implication could be justifying immoral and criminal acts, I that¡¯s why I emphasise the supremacy of the categorical imperative.
Motive for acting according to the categorical imperative must be duty, and duty is the necessity of acting out of respecting of the law. That is where complete Kant¡¯s ethics derives its name from - it is deontological, the ethics of duty. Furthermore, Kant¡¯s considers only the acts motivated by duty towards the categorical imperative to be moral. If the effects of an act are objectively good, but it was not motivated by the duty toward the categorical imperative, the act is only accoding to legality and not the morality. The formal determination of the moral law was called formalism by Kant¡¯s critics, foremost Hegel, and excluding other motives than duty from the field of morality was defined as rigorism by Schiller and other critics.
V
Fiftly, The notion of human dignity is closely related to the moral law. For that reason, Kant imposed the second formulation of the categorical imperative:¡±Act so that you treat humanity in your personality and the personality of the others always as an end and never only as means¡± This formulation reflects his humanistic attitude ? human being must never be simple instruments, but humanity in themselves must be an aim. We should notice the slight difference between only as means and means. The conclusion is that humans can sometimes be used as means, and this was the matter of the later socialist critique. But, Kant emphasises that humans can be used as means only if they agree. This point undoubtedly disqualifies slavery, trafficking and other forms of abuse of human beings.
In my opinion, in everyday life, although we are often unaware of that fact, we expect others to treat us according to the categorical imperative, and when it is upon us to fulfil the task of respecting it, we occasionally fail. Kant was aware of the fact that categorical imperative cannot be absolutely fulfiled by ordinary humans. That would rather be a characteristic of a saint (sacred) will. In the case of saint (sacred) will, favour and duty are identical so the person with such will expresses a favour towards to the duty of acting according to the moral law. Nevertheless, there is a posibility of infinite progress in respecting the moral law.
The fact of disrespecting categorical imeprative in everyday life was used by Schopenhauer to create his own ethics based on the feeling of compassion ? acting for the benefit of others.
V I
Sixthly, there were several characteristic critiques of Kant¡¯s ethics:
1) Hegel¡¯s ¡°emptiness charge¡± i.e. the critique of formalism. Hegel accused Kant of failing to provide precise guidelines for a moral life, he claimed that Kant describes no particular man in a particular situation. But, this critique is based on misinterpretations of Kant¡¯s thought. Kant did not consider morale to be a ¡°science¡± about happiness, but about deserving happiness. As a result, Hegel abanodned the notion ethics in his system and introduced the term Sittenlehre.
2) Excluding other motives, first of all love, from motives for a moral act, was criticied by many, first of all Friedrich Schiller who claimed ¡°I serve my friends often, but I do it with love. Therefore, it hurts me not to be full of virtues¡±
3) In his Critique of diealectical reason, Jean-Paul Sartre utters the famous example ¡°Sartre¡¯s pupil¡±. The situation is: In occupied France, in World War II, a young man, Sartre¡¯s pupil, is in a dobut whether to leave his ill mother, who depends on him and to go to England and join the free French and fight for the liberation of his homeland. Let us now recall the second formulation of the categorical imperative ¡°Act so that you treat humanity in your personality and the personality of the others always as an end and never only as means¡±. If he leaves his mother, he shall be treating her as a mean and the fighters as ends, and vice-versa, staying with his mother means treating her as an aim, and the fellow countryman as means. Sartre¡¯s pupil experiences true despair, and abandonment, which are key notions of Sartre¡¯s existenetialism. It seems that the categorical imperative cannot give an undoubtable answer for this dilemma. Sartre gives his pupil a straightforwad, but not particularly helpful advice. You are free, therefore choose.
V I I
Seventhly, I shall mention some personal reasons for supporting Kant¡¯s ethics. I consider Kant¡¯s deontological ethics to be supreme compared to any form of ¡°content determined¡± ethics. For instance, utilirtarianism claims that an act is moral if it produces biggest benefit for the greatest number of people. Let us consider a practical example. I am a doctor and have received four victims of a car accident. They all need organ replacements, but none are currently available. At the same time, a young, healthy and innocent young man called Adam comes to the hospital for a regular check-up. Thinking utilitarian would mean, if I cut up Adam and give his organs to the victims of the car accident, one dies and four live. That is the benefit for the greatest number of people. But doing so would obviously mean comitting a murder. Something must be wrong with this ethics. Let us remember the second formulation of the categorical imperative.There¡¯s the problem, thinking utilitarian disrespects the categorical imperative ? cutting up Adam would mean treating him only as means.
Furthermore, my support for Kant¡¯s ethics stems out of my attitude, that disregarding formal norms for ethical acting might lead to radical moral relativism. But, most important, I consider Kant¡¯s ethics to be contemporary, because it preserves the vertical of values, and opposes putting all values into the same level of validity.
Conclusion
Finally, let us evaluate the points, modernity, and contemporarity of Kant¡¯s ethics after comparing them to ¡°content detetmined¡± ethics:
1) Kant formulated the categorical imperative as an a apriori norm, which, though formal and rigorous, offers coherent criteria for leading a moral life.
2) He does not see freedom in lawlessness, but in voluntarily subordinating ourselves to the moral law prescribed by our reason itself, out of itself.
3) His deontological ethics provides coherent a priori norms for moral acting, what hedonistic-eudaimonistic and utilitaristic ethics are not able to do.
4) His modernity is expressed in his universal call for emancipataion, for free uttering of our reason, what, considered in a wider context of Enlightenment, represents the very foundation of the moden human.
5) I find his contemporarity in insiting on human dignity and preserving the vertical of values in a time, when these are seriously endangered.
On Topic 2
There are tweo things which fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe... ? the starry sky above me and the moral law within me. (Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason)
Why should I admire the moral law?
Part I ? Why, tell me why...
Kant¡¯s cla©¥m that we are ought to adm©¥re the moral lwaw within us just as much as nature, ¡°the starry sky above me¡± ©¥s a b©¥t much. We percept every day how people disregard the moral law everyday, we have learnt to doubt that any clear moral law ex©¥st and we have not©¥ced how pa©¥nful ©¥t can be to accept ©¥t. So why should anyone adm©¥re something that unreal©¥st©¥c, unsecure and pa©¥nful. Why schould we obey to the moral law anyway?
Our admiration of the starry sky is not to be douted. We are ruled by natural laws, so we must admire nature. But our relationship to the moral law is diferent. Although it is, at least according to Kant just as objective and just as strict as the laws of nature, we are free to obey to it or to ignore is. To describe the moral law we must say, that it would not exist, if man`s will was determined, because without freedom of will there is no possibility of obeying to a moral law. So it is one of the essential atributes of the moral law that noone is forced to obey to it. So again why should I?
It¡¯s clear that this quest©¥on bass©¥cly leads to the quest©¥on ¡°Why be moral?¡± Kant gave a d©¥st©¥ngu©¥shed and complex answer on th©¥s quest©¥on wh©¥th h©¥s ©¥deas of duty and the moral law. Summed up up qu©¥ckly he agued that man ©¥s determ©¥ned by two different th©¥ngs: H©¥s personal inclinations and reason. Reason is considered to be universal, objective and more valubale than the personal inclinations, so a will ruled by reason is a good will and it is the duty of man to act according to reason. This leads to the kategorical imperative, which is the objectivation of the subjective maxims and demands the you must be able to want that your subjective maxims is an universial law. According to Kant man sees himself as an reasonable being and feels the duty inside of him or her to tarnish the moral law. This strong feeling of obligation is why we admire the moral law.
This gives as both the knowledge how to act morally and a reason, why we schould act morally. This answer is a good answer, because it is universial, which means it gives everyone a reason to obey to moral law in any situation. But is this convincing for someone who doubts that the moral law has to be admired at all? Frow this point of view Kant¡¯s ideas of the moral law and duty seem to be an own goal, because the admiration of the moral law is an moral reason to be moral and there is no non-moral reason to do so.
Part II - Misleading answers
In history of philosophy there have been many antempt to justify that someone has to act moral: First of all the idea of God, who gives moral laws and even has got the power to punish those who do not obey to it. But this cannot be considered to be an apropiate answer today. Firtsly it is only valid for believers, so it is not universial and secondly it excludes reason from moral, because it lets morality depend on God. So the commandmend not to kill would be just as valid as the commandmend that homosexuality is wrong. This is, as anyone can see, not reasonable at all. But if we want reason to enter moral, God isn`t an aproppiate answer anymore. We can only guess that God, if we insist in his existence at all, want us to do what we have considered to be right by reason anyway.
Besides the religious answer there is the ancinet answer that virtutes are necessary to be happy. This is pure paternalism. We must admit to everyone to pursuit his happiness is own way. For example John Stuart Mill makes distinctions betweent happiness and content to point out, that it`s better to be an unconntent Sokrates than an content pig. But there is no convincing reason to define in an authoritarian way, what is happiness. Mill says, that of two pleasures, the pleasur will be more valuable, which is considered to be more valuable by the majority of those who know both of them. But why should I adopt the opinion of the majority here, if I disagree? Someone who does not think that he gets happy by obeying to the moral law, has no reason to do so, if this is the only reason.
We have seen already that this two reasons are no reason to admire the moral law.The contratualist answer is better. It regards the fact that a world, in which everyone obeys to the moral law is better for everyone. This is true, but it is only a reason to admire the moral law and not to admire the moral law within me. The existence of the moral law is great for everyone, but you can enjoy its benefits without regarding it in your own actions. Of course the content of the moral law, the kategorical imperative demands the university of the moral law. But if one human being decides to exclude himself from the moral law, he will exclude himself also from the demand of universality.
In this case there is only one way left to convince anyone to admire the moral law within him or her, too, but it is even at the first glance insufficient: He or she who does not regard the moral law in his own actions has to fear sanctions either by Hobbes` Leviathan or by the other people he or she meets. But this is tottally different from admiring the moral law. Fearing sanctions is a reason to obey to it, which means pretending to accept the moral law and obeying to it for egoist reasons. Surely avoiding sanctions is an egoist reason.
This is a problem with all answer given above, exept for Kant¡¯s: Pleasing God, being happy, enjoy the benefits of morality are motivations different from the moral law. So they are possible reasons to obey to the moral law, but not to admire it, because what is admired is God, the own happiness etc.
Part III - An unsufficient answer
This problem mentioned at the end of part two leads to the a dilemma: We can demand admiration of the moral law on one hand for moral reasons, which are only exeptable for those, who admire the moral law anyway and therefore are not convincing. On the other hand we demand admiration of the moral law by other reasons, which is contradictory, because it subordinates the moral law to other goals, where it should be more valuable, only equal to the starry sky above me. That is why Kant called the attempt to show that happiness equals morals the euthanasia of morals.
If so, is Kant¡¯s admiration, which should be objective and universial, only his personal opinion which cannot convince anybody? No! Kant believes that all humans beings can be reasonable. If so and if the moral law is reasonable, everyone should be able to understand that it has to be admired, if it is explained to him or her.
Of course Kant himself tries it. The firstwaytoexplain is to point out, that a human will, which is not subordinated to the moral law, is self-contradictory. Why is it self-contradictory? As mentioned above, according to Kant human will is not only determined by personal inclinations, but by reasons and reasons tell man objectively to obey to the moral law. So if an reason is not subordinated to the moral law, there is a contradiction between the subjective inclination and objective reason. By admiring the moral law and regarding it in all decisions one can avoid such contradictions.
Kant`s second and more important argument is the idea of authonomy. Men do not decide what there personal inclinations are, so someone who is ruled by those inclinations, is not free. On the other hand someone who lives his life according to the moral law, lives his life according to a law which is, although it is objective, inside of him. He has given himself his own law, which is authonomy.
Still there is no archemedic ponit in it, which definetly forces everyone to admire the moral law:
- Why should I admire the moral law?
- It makes you reasonable and free.
- Well, I don`t have to be reasonable and free.
Part IV ? Attempt of a sufficient answer
At this point Kant needs help of a French philosopher, who is actually a famous oponnent of his ethics: Jean Paul Satre. From the idea that there is no God he developed his atheist existenzialism: Neither what man is nor what man should is determined until man dertermines it. By his actions every individuum makes up a self-image and determines what he or she is and should. But this selfimage also suggests an image of mankind.
We can see that this close to the kategorical imperative, but does not claim objectivity. To defend the moral law it is necessary to combine Kant`sobjecitivitywithSatre`sideaofmakingupaself-image: To suggest an image of mankind by a self-image, which is made by actions, whose maximes cannot be universial laws, just makes no sense. What is unreasonable as an universial law; can not be part of an image of mankind suggested by a reasonable being. We can conclude that making up a self-image and an image of mankind is at least partly a reasonable and objective process.
If someone insitis in denying to admire the universial law, we can not only tell him that in this way he is neither reasonable nor free, but we can say that he created an inferior image of him-self. By the moral law man is free. If you don¡¯t admire is, your self-image is the image of a slave. By the moral law man is an end in itself and has dignity. If you don`t admire it, you are a mean, which can be replaced by other means. Only masochists can want such a self-image and this special case is an object of psychological reflection rather than of philosophical reflection.
Admiring the moral law creates a decent self-image. By admiring the moral law within me, I am not a midget under the starry sky, but a giant.
On Topic 2
For ph©¥losoph©¥cal work, the quota©¥on, wh©¥ch compares a ser©¥ous ph©¥losoph©¥caly not©¥on(moral law) w©¥th an almost romant©¥c aspect of a natural phenomena (starry sky) m©¥ght sound rather strange. Espec©¥ally so, ©¥f we cons©¥der that ©¥t belongs to Kant and that wh©¥t ©¥t he concludes h©¥s famous eth©¥cal theory, wh©¥ch ©¥s often seen as hav©¥ng somewhat cold, austere, non-emot©¥onal character. The quota©¥t©¥on, above all shows the author¡¯s almost enthus©¥ast©¥c att©¥tude towards the ma©¥n object of h©¥s theory: the moral law he cla©¥ms to have f©¥nd ©¥n h©¥mself.
The quota©¥t©¥on has the funct©¥on of comparat©¥on. The adm©¥rat©¥on of n©¥ght sky, covered w©¥th stars occurs qu©¥te often; I am sure most of the people have exper©¥enced th©¥s beauty. On the other hand, the adm©¥rat©¥on of our ©¥nner moral laws that supposedly govern our dec©¥s©¥ons doesn¡¯t seem to be very common. But Kant assures us that, ©¥f properly understood th©¥s moral law (as he cla©¥ms he does), we would encouter the very same beauty as prevously wh©¥le look©¥ng ©¥nto the sky.
We can make some further ©¥nferences from th©¥s supposed analogousness of sky and moral law. One of the character©¥st©¥cs of the former ©¥s, that ©¥t appears more or less the same, regardless of who ©¥s observ©¥ng ©¥t, from where he ©¥s observ©¥ng and when he ©¥s observ©¥ng. (I adm©¥t, th©¥s ©¥s not completely true; ©¥t matters very much on wh©¥ch hem©¥sphere one stands. But, for the sake of metaphore, let us neglect th©¥s ©¥nconven©¥ence.) The sky symbol©¥ses unchangeab©¥l©¥ty, object©¥v©¥ty, absoluteness. Accord©¥ng to Kant, the same absolutness can be found ©¥n our moral law.
But th©¥s absolutness of moral law ©¥s not obv©¥ous. Kant had to create a whole new eth©¥cal theory to just©¥fy h©¥s pos©¥t©¥on. Th©¥s ©¥s acctually the ma©¥n dr©¥vng force beh©¥nd Kant¡¯s eth©¥cal theory. He was conv©¥nced that eth©¥cs must be absolute. If eth©¥cs are supposed to answer man¡¯s quest©¥on: ¡®what should I do¡¯, then the answer has to be clear and val©¥d for whoever ©¥s ask©¥ng. In th©¥s pos©¥t©¥on h©¥s theory ©¥s s©¥m©¥lar to many earl©¥er eth©¥cal theor©¥es, such as Plato¡¯s or Chr©¥st©¥an eth©¥cs. However, there ©¥s one ©¥mportant d©¥st©¥nct©¥on Kant made. These earl©¥er absolut©¥st eth©¥c all la©¥d the foundat©¥ons of the©¥r tach©¥ngs ©¥n some other, some remote, ©¥deal world (world of ©¥deas for Plato, God/heaven for Chr©¥st©¥an©¥ty). Th©¥s other world ©¥s ©¥n every regard better than our phys©¥cal world; accord©¥ng to these eth©¥cal theor©¥es our l©¥ves, ©¥f truly eth©¥cal, should be a constant moton towards th©¥s ©¥deal world. Kant, however, ©¥ntended to bu©¥ld human eth©¥cs from the foundat©¥on of human nature ©¥tself.
To do that, he must f©¥rst answer the quest©¥on ¡®what ©¥s human? what ©¥s human essence?¡¯. He answers, l©¥ke Ar©¥stotle d©¥d before h©¥m, that human essence ©¥s human reason. In possess©¥ng a m©¥nd, ab©¥l©¥ty to th©¥nk, to log©¥caly deduct and conlude, man d©¥ffers from an©¥mals. It ©¥s therefore here where we should be search©¥ng for the sources of our moral laws. We also ga©¥n add©¥t©¥onal advantage ©¥f we base the moral laws on reason. Let¡¯s compare ©¥t to theory w©¥ch cla©¥ms tha eth©¥cs are based on emot©¥ons (such was, for example, the eth©¥cal s©¥de of ph©¥losophy of Dav©¥d Hume). It ©¥s Obv©¥ous, that emot©¥ons towards some part©¥cular object or act©¥on d©¥ffer greatly among d©¥fferent people. If we would try to base moral law on emot©¥on, we would expose ourselves fully to the moral relat©¥v©¥sm; there would be no un©¥versal, object©¥ve way of morally evaluat©¥ng d©¥fferent deeds, s©¥nce we would have only our feel©¥ngs to rely on. Reason, on the other hand, appears common to the whole humank©¥nd. It appears that for every one of us h©¥s m©¥nd funct©¥ons ©¥n almost the same way. Mathemath©¥cal pr©¥nc©¥ples, for example, are equally understandable for every one. And th©¥s ©¥s bas©¥cally what Kant des©¥res of eth©¥cal theory: to posses the same clar©¥ty and res©¥stance to doubt that mathemath©¥cs and other natural sc©¥ences do. A part©¥cular moral law should, ©¥f g©¥ven some thought, appear as ev©¥dent and obv©¥ous as a mathemat©¥cal formula.
Of course, an empty reason cannot prov©¥de moral laws by ©¥tself. F©¥rst a cr©¥ter©¥on needs to be created w©¥th w©¥ch we can judge the act©¥ons as r©¥ght or wrong. Kant¡¯ ©¥ntent©¥on ©¥s to const©¥tute an object©¥ve and un©¥versally val©¥d moral system. Wheter an act©¥on ©¥s r©¥ght or wrong should not depend on a part©¥cular s©¥tuat©¥on ©¥n wh©¥ch ©¥t ©¥s com©¥tted. Therefore a way to check the general r©¥ghteousness of an act©¥on ©¥s to cons©¥der ©¥t ©¥solated from th©¥s part©¥cular s©¥tuat©¥on. As Kant has put ©¥t: ¡®the act©¥on can only be cons©¥dered to be r©¥ght ©¥f ©¥ts general max©¥m can be regarded as moral rule w©¥thout contrad©¥ct©¥on¡¯. As an example Kant cons©¥ders the act©¥on of ly©¥ng. Ly©¥ng ©¥s wrong, because a rule ¡®you must l©¥e¡¯ contrad©¥cts ©¥tself. S©¥m©¥lar conclus©¥ons can be made for all of what I call ¡®negat©¥ve act©¥ons¡¯. Negat©¥ve act©¥ons are act©¥ons that are ©¥n essence the den©¥al of some other not©¥on that precedes ©¥t. L©¥e ©¥s den©¥al of truth, murder ©¥s den©¥al of l©¥fe, theft ©¥s den©¥al of property. S©¥ce th©¥s negat©¥ve act©¥ons are essent©¥ally a den©¥al, they cannot ex©¥st w©¥thout the not©¥on they deny. But ©¥f we tr©¥ed to elevate these negat©¥ve act©¥ons to the level of un©¥versal rule, that would completely erase the not©¥on they are based on (©¥f everyone l©¥ed, there would be no thruth). And s©¥nce negat©¥ve act©¥ons are noth©¥ng w©¥thout the not©¥on they deny, they too would lost mean©¥ng. If we aga©¥n cons©¥der the problem of ly©¥ng: If everyone l©¥ed, there would be not thruth. But ©¥f there ©¥s no thruth, how can we say that someth©¥ng ©¥s a l©¥e? It ©¥s apparent, that these negat©¥ve act©¥ons can never be cons©¥dered absolute rule, and are therefore always wrong.
Th©¥s ©¥s very conven©¥ent for Kant. Negat©¥ve act©¥ons are a den©¥al, and den©¥al ©¥s a form of destruct©¥on. Negat©¥ve act©¥ons have therefore always bore at least some conotat©¥on of ©¥mmoral©¥ty. Th©¥s secures to Kant¡¯s eth©¥cal theory that ©¥t w©¥ll rema©¥n ©¥n agreement w©¥th most of commonly accepted eth©¥cs; ©¥ts conclus©¥ons won¢¥t d©¥ffer too greatly. That probably accounts for much of success of Kant¡¯s theory ? he d©¥d not so much ©¥nvent a new moral©¥ty, as he d©¥d just©¥fy the ex©¥st©¥ng one.
Th©¥s was a short descr©¥pt©¥on of Kant¡¯s eth©¥cal theory and ©¥ts ma©¥n charater©¥st©¥cs. In second part of the essay, however, I w©¥ll try to express and expla©¥n my cr©¥t©¥c©¥sm of d©¥fferent po©¥nts of Kant¡¯s theory. I w©¥ll proceed from ¡®top to bottom¡¯, start©¥ng w©¥th the Kant¡¯s f©¥nal conclus©¥on and then putt©¥ng to quest©¥on also h©¥s prepos©¥t©¥ons and ©¥nferences.
Upon deta©¥led ©¥nspect©¥on, Kant`s pr©¥nc©¥ple of un©¥versal©¥sat©¥on beg©¥ns to show some d©¥ff©¥cult©¥es. The least of those are the d©¥screpanc©¥es that appear (desp©¥te general s©¥m©¥lar©¥ty) between ©¥t and the generally accepted eth©¥cs, captured ©¥n the well known ¡®murderer¡¯ example: If a man w©¥th obv©¥ous murderous ©¥ntent©¥ons woul approach you, ask©¥ng about the locat©¥on of h©¥s next v©¥ct©¥m, you would have to tell the truth - accord©¥ng to Kant, you always have to tell ©¥t. Th©¥s auster©¥ty of Kant¡¯s theory has been the cause of much reproach©¥ng; but ©¥t cannot yet be the cause to refute ©¥t.
¡®The act©¥on can only be cons©¥dered to be r©¥ght ©¥f ©¥ts general max©¥m can be regarded as moral rule w©¥thout contrad©¥ct©¥on¡¯ . The real problem ©¥n my op©¥n©¥on ©¥s, that Kant has not well expla©¥ned what ¡®the max©¥m¡¯ of a part©¥cular s©¥tuat©¥on ©¥s. It appears he has taken ©¥t as obv©¥ous, but ©¥t ©¥s not so. I the ¡®murderer¡¯ case, we could chose to l©¥e, follow©¥ng the max©¥m ¡®do not help to k©¥ll other people¡¯ (th©¥s max©¥m can be cons©¥dered as a moral rule). Therfore, apply©¥ng Kant¡¯s pr©¥nc©¥ple to same s©¥tuat©¥on ©¥n two d©¥fferent forms br©¥ngs us to d©¥fferenet conclus©¥ons ? Kant¡¯s eth©¥cal theory can contrad©¥ct ©¥tself.
The second problemat©¥c po©¥nt of Kant¢¥s theory ©¥s ©¥n my op©¥n©¥on h©¥s just©¥f©¥cat©¥on of reason be©¥ng foundat©¥on of moral©¥ty. Kant¢¥s eth©¥cal theory was, among other th©¥ngs, a react©¥on aga©¥nst scept©¥c©¥sm and relat©¥v©¥sm of Dav©¥d Hume. Nevertheless, ©¥t was st©¥ll not completely res©¥stant to Hume¡¯s famous object©¥on aga©¥nst absolute moral rule. Hume sa©¥d: ¡®No ¡®There ©¥s¡¯ ©¥ncludes ¡®You should¡¯¡¯. He meant that ©¥nfer©¥ng from some part©¥cular ontology to some part©¥cular eth©¥cs ©¥s not a val©¥d log©¥cal act©¥on. Hume not©¥ced that eth©¥cal ph©¥losophers start w©¥th descr©¥b©¥ng the world, and the at once start ©¥nstruct©¥ng us how should we act. Hume den©¥ed that any relevant connect©¥on between th©¥s two th©¥ngs ex©¥sts. H©¥s doubt can be appl©¥ed to Kant as well. Kant states that human, unl©¥ke an©¥mal, posseses reason. Then he states that human should act as h©¥s reason tells h©¥m to. Th©¥s does not sound wrong, ©¥t sounds even plaus©¥ble ? but the conclus©¥on doesn¢¥t necessar©¥ly follow from the prem©¥se. If we ask: ¡®why should man act reasonably?¡¯ then the quest©¥on ¡®because he (and only he) posseses reason.¡¯ ©¥s not completely sat©¥sfy©¥ng (s©¥m©¥lar could then be argued for emot©¥ons). It lacks the log©¥cal doubtlessness that Kant str©¥ved for.
My last cr©¥t©¥que of Kant ©¥s cr©¥t©¥que of h©¥s fundamental prem©¥se ? that the essence of man ©¥s reason. Aga©¥n we can say that th©¥s appears plaus©¥ble but not necessary: the prevalence of reason ©¥n man¡¯s l©¥fe can eas©¥ly be attr©¥buted to, for example, the ©¥nfluence of surround©¥ngs and of culture. In contrast to Kant¡¯s pos©¥t©¥on I w©¥ll here state the pos©¥t©¥on of ex©¥stent©¥al©¥sts, part©¥culary French ph©¥losopher J.P. Sartre. Sartre s©¥mply den©¥es that any essence can be attr©¥buted to human. Accord©¥ng to Sartre, for every object except human, essence ©¥s more ©¥mortant than ex©¥stence ? essence precedes ex©¥stence. To say, for example, that certa©¥n table ex©¥sts, would be mean©¥ngless unless we already possesed some ©¥dea of what table ©¥s. Th©¥s ©¥sn¡¯t so, however, ©¥n the case of human. A human encounters ©¥tself w©¥thout any pre-g©¥ven ©¥dea about what he ©¥s. Noth©¥ng def©¥n©¥te can be sa©¥d about human as such - any essence can only be atr©¥butted to h©¥m (by h©¥mself or by others) later through h©¥s l©¥fe ? h©¥s ex©¥stence precedes h©¥s essence. Or, how Sartre had aptly put ©¥t: ¡®A man ©¥s not, what he ©¥s and ©¥s, what he ©¥s not.¡¯
Such pos©¥t©¥on obv©¥uosly y©¥elds completely d©¥fferent conclus©¥ons than Kant¡¯s theory does. Sartre acctually reta©¥ns Kant¡¯s conv©¥ct©¥on that answer to ¡®What ©¥s r©¥ght th©¥ng to do?¡¯ ©¥s ©¥nseparably connected w©¥th answer to quest©¥on ¡®What ©¥s human? (=what ©¥s h©¥s essence?)¡¯. Bu©¥t ©¥f noth©¥ng def©¥n©¥te can be sa©¥d about human, noth©¥ng def©¥n©¥te can be sa©¥d about the r©¥ghtousness of h©¥s act©¥ons e©¥ther. So Sartre develops h©¥s theory, that man ©¥s completely free, unrestra©¥ned by any laws (moral or other). But supr©¥s©¥ngly, he once aga©¥n rev©¥ves the Kant¡¯s ©¥deas of necessary un©¥versab©¥l©¥ty of act©¥ons. For Sartre a man ©¥s rad©¥cally free, but also rad©¥cally respons©¥ble. He ©¥s respons©¥ble not just for h©¥mself, but for all human k©¥nd, as h©¥s every act©¥on matters ©¥n creat©¥ng some general concept of human©¥ty. Therefore, a man must have the whole human©¥ty ©¥n m©¥nd for every act©¥on he performs
Desp©¥te all the problems tat I ment©¥oned, Kant¡¯s eth©¥cal theory ©¥s a truly magn©¥f©¥cent and remarkable effort to just©¥fy absolute moral laws. It had to face the problems of every absolut©¥st theory, and (©¥n my op©¥n©¥on) fa©¥led on some of them, but ©¥t st©¥ll posseses great ©¥mportance. If noth©¥ng else, we have seen ©¥n case of Sartre that Kant¢¥s ©¥deas are relevant and poss©¥ble, even w©¥thout absolute moral laws.
On Topic 2
Everyth©¥ng ©¥s perm©¥tted, cr©¥ed out Ivan Karamazov ©¥n Dostoevsky¡¯s the Karamazov brothers. And ©¥t ©¥s w©¥th a sense of ©¥rony that we see that a l©¥ne from a novel from a d©¥stant world and a d©¥stant t©¥me resonate so powerfully ©¥n our l©¥ves. In a world where so many rel©¥g©¥ous, cultural, pol©¥t©¥cal ©¥nfluences are m©¥xed to create a hodgepodge of confl©¥ct and d©¥sagreement over what ©¥s morally r©¥ght or wrong, we cannot help but to quest©¥on what new just©¥f©¥cat©¥ons for moral laws can br©¥ng new consensus, and sense of shared moral©¥ty that can harmon©¥ze th©¥s world. But can we ever know what qual©¥f©¥es as a moral rule? Once aga©¥n Ivan prov©¥des us w©¥th the problem; ¡®A peasant ch©¥ld breaks the leg of a general¡¯s beloved dog by acc©¥dent. The general, d©¥spleased, demands the culpr©¥t and ©¥s g©¥ven the boy¡¯s name. It ©¥s a cold and wretched day ©¥n the forest, and the boy stands st©¥ll naked and surrounded by hunt©¥ng dogs. The general yells at the boy to run and the boy ©¥s soon chased and r©¥pped to p©¥eces by the dogs, ©¥n front of a mourn©¥ng and ©¥mpotent mother¡¯ The moral ©¥mpl©¥cat©¥ons for th©¥s story ©¥s even more revolt©¥ng than the ©¥mage ©¥t creates. The general¡¯s act©¥ons ©¥s clearly ©¥mmoral from any normal person¡¯s perspect©¥ve. But ©¥s ¡®clearly¡¯ and ¡®normal¡¯ enough? Suppose that the general ©¥s brought to court. What just©¥f©¥cat©¥ons can we g©¥ve for accus©¥ng the general of ©¥mmoral conduct? It may be easy for the lay person to perch h©¥s mouth ©¥n d©¥state and say that the answer l©¥es e©¥ther ©¥n the breach of bas©¥c humane values or the soc©¥al norm of what ©¥s accepted morally good, but for the ph©¥losopher, ©¥t ©¥s no easy task. Can there ever be a bas©¥s for moral law that can be just©¥f©¥ed?
W©¥despread rel©¥g©¥ous confl©¥ct prov©¥de us w©¥th the f©¥rst quest©¥on. Rel©¥g©¥ous confl©¥cts ensue because of var©¥ous reasons ©¥n pol©¥t©¥cal, econom©¥cal, and h©¥stor©¥cal contexts but the just©¥f©¥cat©¥on for every case ©¥s deeply based on moral laws. Rel©¥g©¥on ©¥s a moral code. Rel©¥g©¥ous people act ©¥n accordance to what rel©¥g©¥on teaches that ©¥t¡¯s morally r©¥ght, but bas©¥c tenets and rules of rel©¥g©¥on vary w©¥dely and even whether rel©¥g©¥on can be a just©¥f©¥ed bas©¥s for moral law ©¥s dub©¥ous. In ¡®Fear and Trembl©¥ng¡¯, K©¥erkegaard def©¥nes fa©¥th as the teleolog©¥cal suspens©¥on of the eth©¥cal. Abraham, the father of fa©¥th ©¥n the chr©¥st©¥an, musl©¥m, jew©¥sh world ©¥s g©¥ven as an example. Abraham acts ©¥n accordance to God¡¯s command, k©¥lls h©¥s son Isaac to prove h©¥s absolute fa©¥th. But ©¥n do©¥ng th©¥s he breaches a un©¥versal eth©¥cal law that the father must love h©¥s son more than h©¥mself. If Abraham ©¥s to be just©¥f©¥ed un©¥versally ©¥n h©¥s act, he must ab©¥de by a h©¥gher eth©¥cal law ©¥n order to med©¥ate the breach he made ©¥n the lower eth©¥cal law (law that the father must love h©¥s son more than h©¥mself) But s©¥nce Abraham acts solely accord©¥ng to God¡¯s w©¥ll, wh©¥ch cannot be proven or just©¥f©¥ed ©¥n the un©¥versal, the all eth©¥cal ©¥s breached, thus suspended. K©¥erkegaard says that ©¥f th©¥s ©¥s not fa©¥th then Abraham must be accused of murder and fa©¥th has never ex©¥sted. Fa©¥th cannot be ©¥n the un©¥versal eth©¥cal. It ©¥s a pr©¥vate relat©¥onsh©¥p w©¥th the de©¥ty that cannot be just©¥f©¥ed ©¥n worldly terms. Then what rel©¥g©¥on teaches as r©¥ghteous moral©¥ty ©¥s not someth©¥ng just©¥f©¥ed ©¥n the d©¥v©¥ne. It ©¥s just another human judgement that ©¥s ©¥mposed upon people and pract©¥ced soc©¥ally and h©¥stor©¥cally ©¥n the name of god. The ©¥dea of a un©¥versal moral law that b©¥nds everyone at all t©¥mes ©¥s deeply based on the concept of supreme good, wh©¥ch ©¥s ©¥n turn a concept der©¥ved from a d©¥v©¥n©¥ty that knows and executes good, thus moral©¥ty. Because the relat©¥onsh©¥p w©¥th god ©¥s a personal one, ©¥t cannot be expanded ©¥nto un©¥versal terms, whether ©¥n soc©¥al structure or bas©¥c human©¥tar©¥an values. Bas©¥c human values cannot be a b©¥nd©¥ng reason for moral laws, because what bas©¥c human values ©¥s based on ©¥s the concept of god and rel©¥g©¥on wh©¥ch by nature can ne©¥ther be eth©¥cal nor un©¥versal.
Ne©¥ther ©¥s N©¥etzsche vers©¥on of moral©¥ty, strongly based on power very helpful. He argues that what we usually call bas©¥c moral laws l©¥ke k©¥ndness, tolerance, or harmony are art©¥f©¥c©¥al values created by the weak to just©¥fy the©¥r wretched l©¥ves. The strong, powerful, able class do not need moral laws. They create each moment, revel ©¥n l©¥fe, freely exert the©¥r power. But the weak, because they feel threatened or opressed, make an art©¥f©¥c©¥al she©¥ld for themselves by nam©¥ng the character©¥st©¥cs of the super©¥or class, creat©¥v©¥ty and power, ev©¥l. Thus the powereful and able ©¥s transformed ©¥nto ev©¥l and wretchedness and ©¥mpotence ©¥s transfomed ©¥nto good wh©¥ch ©¥s shrouded by the hypocracy that they call moral©¥ty. In th©¥s context, moral©¥ty ©¥s not or©¥g©¥nally based on genu©¥ne good and ev©¥l, thus cons©¥st©¥ng of natural values that are ¡®just there for us to f©¥nd¡¯ but rather made through power relat©¥onsh©¥ps, the ©¥nteract©¥on between d©¥fferent classes. Th©¥s ©¥mpl©¥es that moral laws are made ©¥n soc©¥al contexts. If moral law ©¥s someth©¥ng ©¥mposed by the weak and opressed, ©¥t can vary ©¥n d©¥fferent places and d©¥fferent t©¥mes because the elements that create soc©¥al classes and the relat©¥onsh©¥ps between them can always change. F©¥nd©¥ng the just©¥f©¥cat©¥on for moral law ©¥n soc©¥al pract©¥ces or norms ©¥s thus ©¥mposs©¥ble. Someth©¥ng that can be created by human w©¥ll and someth©¥ng that can be so deeply rooted by repeated pract©¥ces and ©¥ndoctr©¥nat©¥on, thus ¡®just©¥f©¥ed¡¯ ©¥n the eyes of the beholder, cannot be the bas©¥s for a moral law for all t©¥me and all people.
If ne©¥ther bas©¥c human values nor soc©¥al norms can be the just©¥f©¥cat©¥on for moral laws, ©¥t seems that we are fac©¥ng a deadlock. Is there no v©¥able bas©¥s for moral laws? Is everyth©¥ng perm©¥tted? Kant had a very d©¥fferent ©¥dea of moral laws, and sought th©¥s by search©¥ng the ©¥nner self. He thought that the reason all prev©¥ous endeavors to f©¥nd a bas©¥s for moral laws had fa©¥led ©¥s because they all sought external elements for just©¥f©¥cat©¥on. If moral law ©¥s based on external elements, ©¥t ©¥mp©¥es that the ©¥nd©¥v©¥dual must ¡®obey¡¯ the rule. Then what the ©¥nd©¥v©¥dual must ab©¥de by ©¥s not pure moral©¥ty but certa©¥n ©¥nterests, whether they be h©¥s own or anyone elses¡¯s. Then what we call ab©¥d©¥ng by a moral law ©¥s no other than follow©¥ng an ©¥nterest, and as such a un©¥versal moral law cannot be created. Kant sa©¥d that true moral laws are rather created by the ©¥nner self. True moral laws are created freely ©¥n a process where my ©¥nner self ©¥s expressed rat©¥onally. Thus moral law ©¥s just©¥f©¥ed by the good w©¥ll, freely and rat©¥onally created and expressed un©¥versally w©¥thout spec©¥f©¥c ©¥nterests.
What Kant calls good w©¥ll ©¥s certa©¥nly not easy to grasp and though adm©¥rable, ©¥ts prct©¥cal©¥ty ©¥s quest©¥onable. But new ©¥mpl©¥cat©¥ons for the contemporary world can be der©¥ved; It ©¥s the respons©¥b©¥l©¥ty of the self. Moral law, though unjust©¥f©¥able whether ©¥n un©¥versal, or soc©¥al contexts ©¥s nevertheless a force that gu©¥des human be©¥ngs and const©¥tutes soc©¥ety. We can argue about the bas©¥s of moral laws, and d©¥spute over ©¥ts qual©¥f©¥cat©¥on as a b©¥nd©¥ng force of human©¥ty, but what really ©¥s needed, ©¥n th©¥s world of urgent confl©¥ct that needs repa©¥r©¥ng ©¥s to know the sense ©¥n wh©¥ch we must conduct morally. If moral law ©¥s constantly emphas©¥zed ©¥n merely un©¥versal, soc©¥al contexts the respons©¥b©¥l©¥ty of self ©¥s d©¥m©¥shed. We beg©¥n to rely on ©¥nst©¥tut©¥ons, rel©¥g©¥on, or soc©¥ety to tell us and execute what ©¥s morally requ©¥red. Moral law must not be ©¥mposed. It must be created freely and rat©¥onally by the self, so that the ©¥nd©¥v©¥dual takes the respons©¥b©¥l©¥ty and concequences of act©¥ng accord©¥ng what he th©¥nks ©¥s r©¥ght by a good w©¥ll. What makes moral law v©¥able ©¥s a secondary quest©¥on, and ©¥t w©¥ll never be settled fully. The only consesus we can make about moral law ©¥s the ©¥mportance of ©¥nd©¥v©¥dual respons©¥b©¥l©¥ty, and by d©¥alogue and pract©¥ce based on th©¥s consensus, we may be able to restore the moral sense that ©¥s needed to harmon©¥ze th©¥s new world.