IPO 2009 Helsinki, Finland
Topics of Philosophical Essay Competition (English)
- "If, then, there is some end of the things we do, which we desire for its own sake (everything else being desired for the sake of this), and if we do not choose everything for the sake of something else (for at that rate the process would go on to infinity, so that our desire would be empty and vain), clearly this must be the good and the chief good."
(Aristotle: Nicomachean EthicsI, 1, 1094a 18-22 (translation by William David Ross, revised translation by J.L. Ackrill and J.O. Urmson; Oxford University Press, 1998))
- "In accordance with reason there is only one way that states in relation with one another can leave the lawless condition, which involves nothing but war; it is that, like individual human beings, they give up their savage (lawless) freedom, accommodate themselves to public coercive laws, and so form an (always growing) state of nations (civitas gentium) that would finally encompass all the nations of the earth."
(Immanuel Kant: Toward Perpetual Peace, VIII, 357 (translation by Mary J. Gregor))
- Must a work of art be beautiful in order to be a work of art, or may a work of art be ugly as well? If the latter is possible, why should we take interest in it?
- It¡¯s not just the existence of God, but rather the very coherence of the idea of God, that is problematic.
AWARD ESSAYS
- Gold medal
- Silver medals
- Bronze medals
- Honorary mentions
- Places 10-12
Gold Medal Essay
On Topic III
Sarri Nironen
Picasso¡¯s Cubist paintings, Philip Glass¡¯s eccentric music, Duchamp¡¯s famous statue of a toilet seat ? although considered art now, all have been criticized of being ugly, too left-field or simply unsuitable to bear the ¡®art-tag¡¯. Moreover, pop music, mainstream movies and television shows have long been criticized for not providing any real depth and solely existing for entertainment purposes, therefore, again, not being art at all. When answering this question I understand art meaning all its forms possible ?music, visual arts, literature, not limiting myself to one branch only and thus trying to answer as comprehensively and holistically as possible.
The question of whether an ugly piece of art can be called art is as long-lasting as art itself, and is difficult to answer precisely because we haven¡¯t defined the words with which we try to discuss the topic. First I will try to define the terms with which I will try to answer the question: can a work of art be ugly, and ? and this, perhaps, is the most difficult part -- if so, why should we take interest in it?
PART A: BEAUTY AND ITS PLACE IN ART WORLD
The definition of beauty has changed during the course of time, although some notable similarities exist at all times. A historical viewpoint is needed, particularly in order to understand that the definitions of art and beauty vary from time to time.
InAncient Greece, what was symmetrical was considered beautiful. A person, particularly a woman or a young man, was beautiful if his features were symmetrical; both sides of the face were similar and there were no notable faults to this accordance. Art, in its form if not content (for it is important to note that Greek tragedies were full of horror and cruelty, people going against Gods and ending up in tragedy), was supposed to follow the same pattern. For example, in the field of literature / theatre this aim at symmetry was summarized in Aristotle¡¯s view on theatre: a theatre piece should have a beginning, middle and an ending. Thus the beginning should have a worthy ending and everything should be in order and in its right place. The view was behaviourist: the clue to the characters minds¡¯ was in their actions. Of some importance is also the term ¡®catharsis¡¯, which theatre was supposed to have: where the audience is left with a satisfied feeling, a feeling of something soiled being finally cleansed, a heroput through dark times coming out golden, untouched, his morals intact through and through. There was a definite line of defining art through the audience¡¯s eyes ?as opposed to treating art as a purpose in itself. Art¡¯s form had a purpose, and that purpose was pleasure, and art¡¯s content had a purpose, and that purpose was teaching morals.
In medieval times, this view was painted more vividly and colorfully as Thomas Aquinas continued on the theme of beauty: beauty was now harmony and clarity, and in medieval Europe art was made to serve the church and was made to commemorate God. Art, in particular visual arts, still was defined through the audience, the people. Where it once had been made for pleasure it now served as a tool for teaching people, mostly illiterate, about God. What remained was the understanding that art had the power to move the viewer in a profound level. During this time, from mid-Medieval art to renaissance to baroque to rococo to neo-classicism, the focus was shifted from God back to symmetrical form, and although the ideal form was defined and re-defined from dark and heavy to pretty and conscientious, there still was a definite ideal -- until the 19th century.
In 19th and 20th century, the understanding of beauty and of art changed drastically. Where once there had been clear definitions for the form as to what can be considered art, now the demarcation was more difficult. Dostoyevsky and Tolstoy wrote about the human psyche and political undercurrents, Proust, Joyce and Woolf focused on the inner workings of the mind with their stream-of-consciousness technique, Picasso, Monet and Van Gogh changed the visual arts completely, from showing pictures to showing emotions, and there were risks taken in the musical world as well, form changing from tonal to atonal music, choosing to put the rules on the shelf for a while. All this was done before the Second World War, and, indeed, the reason for these changes can be found in the political climate. With the rise of democracy in the 19th century and the line between a servant and a ruler now blurred, the artist was now free to pursue his own self through art: he was now free to define art for himself. He was now an artist: someone who strives and dies for his art. Artists were outsiders of the society, they were observers and commentators (rather like a Greek choir, if you like). As the individual was freer and the political climate during the World Wars was messier it had an effect on art and a lot of art focuses on the existential despair of an individual. It is no wonder either that existential philosophy was born during this time. As for the form, in modern art there was no definite pattern, rather, patterns and rules were made to be broken (which, of course, makes it a rule in itself). With the rise of the individual and Freud¡¯s psycho analysis, art also was able to show ugly sides of someone whose behavior was beautiful, thus blurring the line between beautiful and ugly. James Joyce stated in his first novel A Portrait of an Artist as a Young Man that beauty means brokenness: it has to have a quality that breaks the harmony, and, consequently, the viewer¡¯s heart.
From what we can now conclude is this: there has been a tendency to define art through its purpose, and where at first the purpose was in its effect on the audience ? whether causing them pleasure or making them understand God ?now it seems that art has a purpose in itself, and art defines itself. Curiously enough, nowadays it seems that art with a clear dogmatic purpose is considered unworthy, whether it be causing pure pleasure or teaching black/white about something. However, what is perhaps most important to note from the course of history is that the meaning of both art and beauty has changed, thus in part justifying a relativistic view, where nothing can be said for certain.
PART B ? UGLINESS AND ITS PLACE IN ART WORLD
St. Augustine defined evil as a lack of goodness, and taking this route, I suppose we can define ugliness as a lack of beauty in a painting for example. However, as beauty in itself was so hard to define, it is probable that this definition of ugly is null-and-void to begin with. Moreover, bearing in mind the Joycean definition of beauty ? brokenness ?it is difficult to pinpoint ¡®ugliness¡¯, because if beauty is brokenness, what room does that leave for ugliness?
The dictionary gives a synonym for ¡®ugly¡¯ ? ¡®bad-looking¡¯, ie. something that is not pleasing for the eye. In real world this might just as well be the case. You see a person not fit in your beauty standards and you might think them ugly ?you see a house in the middle of renovation and that¡¯s not beautiful either ? etc. etc. There is no point in arguing about whether or not ugliness exists ?it is difficult to define objectively but we all definitely know what pleases us and what doesn¡¯t. I¡¯m taking a concept realistic view here.
In 20thcentury Duchamp, a modern artist, put a lavatory in a museum and called it art. In their own home, no one would call a lavatory beautiful, but in museum, it suddenly was. Did the lavatory change from ugly to beautiful by changing the context or did it stay ugly? Can something that is ugly be ugly when it exists in a beautiful context? And, if not yes, what purpose can it possibly serve ? why change a beautiful context into an ugly one when there is a whole world filled with ugliness should one need some?
Goethe was once quoted as saying ¡®Art and Life are different. That is why one is called Art and one is called Life.¡¯Although simply put, I think this quote holds heavy meaning. In context of art, one doesn¡¯t need practical knowledge. When seeing a lavatory, it serves the sole purpose of being there and for being looked at. It doesn¡¯t need another dimension; one doesn¡¯t need to use their common sense to work it. It exists in a world of its own. Even if one goes to a modern art museum where one can dosomething with the statues, one still doesn¡¯t do it to further any other purpose than art itself. With art, one experiences it, but is still left strangely cold. The objective-subjective ?dichotomy exists: the object, piece of art, lures the viewer, who thinks he does all the work by watching, analyzing and understanding, when in reality the object is the one that captures and manipulates. They both stay passive.
The Heideggerian thought of In-der-Welt-sein, of being a part of the world wholly and not being reduced to being a subject whose only dimension is its subjectivity seems to be nullified here, but that isn¡¯t the case at all ? I¡¯d rather define art as a safe haven when one is in need of a place where he can feel and dare to feel sympathy without constraint. One of these things he can feel and see and experience is ugliness ?either his own faulty ways of thinking or the ugliness of the piece of art.
Therefore the ugliness in an art piece is justified because one cannot watch and analyse it freely in the real world ?one needs the context of art to observe ugliness objectively.
Therefore I come to the conclusion thatyes, there can indeed be things that are ugly in the field of art, and yes, art itself can be ugly without it losing any of its ugliness by changing the context. Next I will try to explain why we should take interest in this ugliness.
PART C ? WHY SHOULD WE TAKE INTEREST IN UGLINESS?
Yes, indeed ? why should we?
There have been different ways of defining art in the field of aesthetics ?art defined by context, where something that is in a museum or respected in the art community is art; art by the form: something that pleases us in one way or another; artist¡¯s view, if a painter (who paints pictures) paints his home walls he can decide whether or not they are a part of his oeuvre; the meaning, if it says something real and true then it is art ?but these definitions do not help us when trying to argue successfully for the case of ugliness in art. Indeed, why on earth should we take interest? Why can¡¯t we just watch quaint comedy theatre and listen to Mozart all day long?
One answer would be that ugly things happen in life and if we are informed then we know and hopefully can do something about it. Morrissey¡¯s lyrics about handicapped persons might not have been necessarily pretty but they had an impact on youth who might otherwise have been ignorant about it. Knowing about different ways of life makes one understand life better, which, in turn, makes one more knowledgeable and understanding. This helps the community as well as the individual. This argument is universal whereas the second appeals to the individual.
There is a term called ¡®sublime¡¯in art world. It is an adjective that can loosely be translated as ¡®other-worldliness¡¯ or ¡®supreme beauty¡¯ ?a piece of art that moves us so profoundly that it takes us to another, better world. I think that sublime transcends the terms ¡®beautiful¡¯ and ¡®ugly¡¯and therefore something that is ugly can be sublime and life-changing. This experience is something that is similar to William James¡¯s theory of truth where he investigated the pure experiential way of understanding truth in the field of religion. Ugly pieces of art or ugly art (because some even argue that commercial things, such as pop music, are ugly ?which is of course silly, as many classical composers put on a pedestal today were just mere craftsmen in their time) can be a way to experience something truly magical, as they are often so open in their ugliness and in their vulnerability. It is hard to love something that is perfect; a flawed object gives room for empathy and sympathy.
We should take interest in ugliness because that way the ugliness lifts itself into another level. The ugly becomes beautiful when in contact with an audiencewho sees it so. Seeing ugliness in art can be a form of escapism from the ugly of the world. The reason here is purely egoistical but also sincere and honest: because taking interest in art ? ugly or beautiful ?can result in transforming the viewer as well. And what could be more appealing than that? If life is egoistical desire, as Schopenhauer argued, then surely it is good to channel this desire somewhere where it doesn¡¯t hurt.
Perhaps this is what Ludwig Wittgenstein meant when he cryptically wrote that "Ethics = Aesthetics". They are both subjects that despite our analyzing, criticizing and problem-solving, we cannot say anything about them. Words fail us when used to try to understand transcendental things: goodness, art, death. Continuing the Wittgensteinian view, "There is nothing that can be said about art that is better than staying silent" we can try to define ugliness, then why it can exist in art, then why we should take interest in it, but in the end, there is nothing that when said can even vaguely resemble the subject it tries to talk about. The reason one should take interest in ugly art is in its possible impact on a person in the purest level, but if one does take interest, he does it for and by himself and not when forced from outside ? as personally he defines the things, ugliness and beauty, that he takes interest in.
Silver Medal Essay
On Topic IV
Eliza Tymianska
In this essay I would like to consider whether the following two are problematic ? the existence of God or the coherency of the idea of God. First I would like to think for a moment if the questions about God are important and why, then if the coherence of the idea of God is problematic or not and finally decide if it is more or less problematic than the existence of God.
Is the question about existence of God truly important? Maybe it¡¯s not even worth asking? Since the idea of God is one of the most important ideas in our culture, maybe even the most important one, this question is surely significant. The idea of God exists as long as human beings do and although during the centuries it was changing ?people believed in one or many gods (there were mono- and polytheistic religions), God was severe or loving, the idea of him was always somehow present in human life. But ¡®somehow¡¯does not really tell us anything about the significance of the idea of God. God is not only present in our culture but he is very often the central part of it. People are praying, going to temples, they try to (or at least they should) live the way they believe God demands, some are even able to kill in the name of God. Although today in Western countries God is not the center of the culture anymore, we still cannot escape from the question about his existence ?we have to answer to ourselves whether we believe that God exists or we believe that it is just a delusion as some contemporary atheists claim?
It¡¯s not surprising that philosophers have always been conducting a dispute about the existence of God. Right from the beginning in ancient Greece to today¡¯s world this question is always current. During the middle ages so called ¡®proves¡¯ has been formulated ?the most famous are those of Saint Anselm and Saint Thomas but there are many philosophers who tried to refute them and don¡¯t think those proves actually prove anything. The dispute is not yet finished and it probably never will since it¡¯s not possible to prove whether God exists or not. That¡¯s why many modern philosophers don¡¯t even try to formulate any prove (which does not mean they don¡¯t devote any attention to God itself.)
Nowadays many people who participate in discussion about the existence of God claim that question about the coherence of the idea of God is much more important and much more problematic than this about the existence of God. But what do they mean by ¡®coherence¡¯? Many people who believe in God are aware of the fact that the idea of God may not be as coherent as they wish. In medieval times theologians were often considering this problem, but the questions they asked may sound a little bit funny for us ?they wondered, for example, whether God could create a stone that he wouldn¡¯t be able to lift. God is omnipotent so he should be able to create such a stone. On the other hand he is omnipotent so he should also be able to lift every stone. It seems that the idea of omnipotent God doesn¡¯t really make much sense.
When we think about God there are also another attributes that come to our minds. People regard God as infinitely good and believe that he made us free. But if they do so, there are also other problems: Why is there so much evil in the world created by infinitely good God? If God knows everything, how can we be free? If God were really infinitely good, he wouldn¡¯t let all bad things happen ? there wouldn¡¯t be any wars, any violence, nobody would ever be hurt. But since there are wars, hunger, poverty and evil in our world exists, God cannot be infinitely good. What¡¯s more, it seems that he¡¯s not good at all ? maybe he is even evil? But we all agreed that goodness is a part of the idea of God. And the second question ?people believe that God knows everything and at the same time we think that we are free. But how is it possible if God already knows what we are going to do? It seems absurd¡¦
This questions show that the idea of God may not be coherent, may not make much sense. And if it doesn¡¯t make sense, if it¡¯s contradictory, then why should anybody believe in God? And since there¡¯s not a lot of people who don¡¯t want to believe in something that is senseless, questions like this have always bothered people who believed in God. Many philosophers tried to answer them to make the idea of God more coherent. The theodicy of Leibniz is perfect example of the attempts of explaining the first question. He agreed that God is infinitely good and didn¡¯t deny that there is evil in the world. But as he claimed there has to be evil in the world, human being must have a choice between good and evil otherwise he would not be free. Of course God might have created a world where there would be no evil at all, after all he¡¯s omnipotent but people living in world like this wouldn¡¯t be free because they wouldn¡¯t have any choice ?they only could make good deeds. And they wouldn¡¯t even know they choose the right way as there would be only one way to choose. So God created the best world of all possible ones and it wouldn¡¯t be the best without evil. But this answer is just not good enough for many people (we all remember Voltaire who ridiculed Leibniz¡¯s idea) and many deny that the idea of God is coherent. This lack of coherence is nowadays one of the most popular arguments against the existence of God.
But we¡¯re not wondering about the coherency of the idea of God just because it is the biggest problem, because it is the most important questions. We are doing this because it depends on the coherence of the idea of God ifhe might exist or not. Of course just because somebody proves that the idea is coherent, it does not yet mean that God exists. But if we prove that it is not coherent it would probably mean that God does not exist. That¡¯s why we might say that the coherence of the idea of God is more problematic than its existence itself, but the existence of God is problematic as well.
But there is another issue connected with the coherence of the idea of God ? it may not only be contradictory itself but may not be coherent with our knowledge of the world. Many people say that they don¡¯t believe in God because its existence does not explain anything. For many science is enough, belief in God is unnecessary and actually makes the world less understandable. Many people say that they don¡¯t believe in God because science is just offering much more coherent way of explaining the world. Of course science does not exclude existence of God, it doesn¡¯t deny that he exists and it has never proved neither that he exists or not. But since science is enough to explain the world, many people don¡¯t need God. As somebody said ? it¡¯s more important which of the two ? science or religion ?creates more coherent, more convincing picture of the world. And religion is not offering it anymore ? at least not in Western countries. The Old Testament claims that world was created in six days, woman was created from a rib of a man etc. Bible is not the only way to explain the world, what¡¯s more if we treat it literally it¡¯s simply wrong. And if it¡¯s allegory then it may be hard to interpret it correctly and since we now know how many times Churches and clergymen were wrong, we prefer to trust in science which seems to be much more coherent than the religion.
The existence of God and the coherence ofthe idea of God are both problematic. There are many problems that seem to deny the coherence of this idea and it is important to consider whether the idea of God is coherent or not, because if it isn¡¯t it means the existence of God is impossible. The question which of the two is more problematic doesn¡¯t really make sense to me because it is irrelevant. We should remember that it is not the coherence of the idea of God that is the most significant question ? the most important issue is the existence of God and considering the coherence is just a way to find an answer to this question.
Silver Medal Essay
On Topic II
Petar Penev
Theodore Adorno claimed that progress in society and enlightenment in culture are closely connected and it is impossible to have one without the other. However, the application of this principle in a transnational, multicultural environment can lead to two different inferences, which are presented in the books "The End of History and The Last Man" by Francis Fukuyama and "The Clash of Civilizations" by Samuel Huntington. In Hegelian fashion, Fukuyamaenvisioned the development of international relations as a process of constant convergence in which different customs and worldviews were both annulled and preserved according to the concept of ¡®sublation¡¯. The view of Huntingtonwas that different cultural traditions are extremely difficult toreconcile and that the inevitable process of cultural interaction will result in a struggle between a number of civilizations, each of which is based on a range of values that often contradict those of other civilizations. This two contrasting views about the course of development of cultural interaction illustrates a larger and fundamental issue: ¡®How are we supposed to organize the course of international relations in a world where differences between people are sometimes more important that the resemblances they share?¡¯ I intend to analyze this problem by presenting the views of Immanuel Kant and contrasting them with my own ideas and the claims of other prominent philosophers.
Kant claimed that there are at least three conditions which are necessary for the establishment of conditions for peaceful interaction between states: first, that they share a republican form of government in which those that pay the price for the decisions of the political authority have an opportunity to participate in them; second, that all states participate in a federation encompassing all states; and third, that they adopt the idea of universal hospitality. These three conditions seem to satisfy the minimum requirement for the foundations on which international order should be organized, but there still remains the question: ¡®Is it absolutely necessary to include them in our idea about the principles of organization of cosmopolitan world order?¡¯ According to me, the correct answer is ¡®Yes¡¯. First of all, they clearly protectthe rights of the individuals in the political community by emphasizing the importance of republican form of government. Secondly, they seem to give equal weight to the dignity of each person regardless of their race, social status or sex. This is achieved by adopting the view of universal hospitality ?the idea that states are obliged to treat foreigners according to a set of rules applicable to all persons, including their own citizens. And last, these three conditions seem to be derived by the principles of reason. By applying them, Kant formulated a concept that all rational persons should endorse. Since they cannot resign being part of the group of rational beings, they have a duty to support each concept based on these conditions if other aspects of its structure do not contradict the principles of reason. Formulating a concept based entirely on laws of reason is the only possibility of respecting people as possessing rationality and morality and, in my opinion, Kant succeeded in this difficult task.
According to Kant, the view that states should unite in a state of nations regulated by the abovementioned conditions is underpinned by a number of arguments. First, he seems to make a parallel between people and states being in a state of nature beforesubmitting themselves to laws formulated by the public. Since this lawless condition is characterized either by a war of all against all (according to Hobbes) or by inability to reach reasonable consensus about the problems at hand because of the ¡®threat advantage¡¯stronger individuals (or states) have, the principles of reason dictate that states have to substitute this lawless condition for the organized state of nations. By doing so, nations will be able to live together peacefully without being faced with the constant danger of conducting war with their neighboring states which have not accepted the rules of the international order and are guided in their actions by the principle of self-interest.
Another argument in support of Kant¡¯s concept is the idea that both people and nations should be viewed as autonomous. According to Wolff, autonomy can be described as freedom and responsibility - people are free, but they have the responsibility to constitute their freedom by formulating rules guiding their actions. They do not act in complete lack of rules; rather, they can only act freely if they act according to laws formulated by their reason. This idea is supported by Fichte¡¯s understanding of freedom. According to him, freedom is never absolute, but always limited and conditioned. The ¡®I¡¯can set itself up as an individual only if it is summoned by another individual and if it limits its freedom out of respect for the freedom of the other. Similarly, states can be part of a federation of states (or state of nations) only if they recognize the freedom of the other members and limit their own in order to make the mutual peaceful existence of different interests possible. The ¡®civitas gentium¡¯ is possible only via the formulation of efficient international laws regulating relations between states and defending their autonomy.
However, there seems to be a contradiction between the ways Kant envisioned the realization of his concept ? in his early pieces of writing on the problem he stated that it was necessary for states to settle their internal problems and then take part in the state of nations, whereas in later passages he seems to support the idea that regulating relations between states should precede the establishment of internal social order formulated by principles of reason. These two views make the discussion of various interpretations of this Kantian concept possible ?both the idea that national problems are more important than international ones and the view that serious problems of international political and social relations should be solved with priority to the problems of the particular states. But both this two contradicting positions seem to neglect the fact that in a world with constant economic, cultural and political interaction between all states national problems can easily become international ones and international problems clearly influence the condition of every state in the world. Only by treating them simultaneously and by trying to reconcile the various requirements necessary for their solution can we hope to tackle them in the long term.
The concept of state interaction formulated by John Rawls is a good example of a theory that recognizes the need to address these two issues simultaneously. He divides states (peoples) in four categories ? liberal (applying the principles formulated in ¡®Justice as Fairness¡¯), decent (illiberal, but unaggressive and not violating human rights), outlaw (aggressive and illiberal) and burdened (unable to solve their particular problems). First, he stated that the system of international relations should encompass both liberal and decent nations since the exclusion of the latter will surely hinder the progress towards their integration into the group of liberal people and will make impossible the establishment of state of nations encompassing all states. Secondly, Rawls simultaneously claims that liberal and decent societies should take the necessary measures when natural rights of people are not respected (as in outlaw nations) or where people are unable to solve the problems they are facing (as in burdened societies). By following these two principles he addresses both problems of the external social order of nations and of the system of international relations without giving priority to either. Thus, he formulates a theory that is able to provide a solution to the complicated problems of the contemporary world of transnational politics.
Some ideas of Max Weber also support the view that national and international problems should be addressed simultaneously. He defines the state as having exclusive control over the legal application of the means of violence over a certain territory. However, this claim can be understood in two different ways ?that the state is recognized to ha understood in two different ways ?that the state is recognized to har a certain territory. However, this claim can be understood in two different ways ?that the state is recognized to har a certain territory. However, this claim can be understood in two different ways ?that the state is recognized to ha violence over a certain territory. However, this claim can be understood in two different ways ?that the state is recognized to have this exclusive control or that it actually possesses the means necessary to establish it. These different interpretations make it impelling to draw a distinction between ¡®de jure¡¯ and ¡®de facto¡¯ states. ¡®De jure¡¯ states are recognized as such by the international community of states even if they do not actually control the means of violence in their territory, whereas ¡®de facto¡¯states are the ones that are able to impose the legal means of violence over a certain territory regardless of whether they are internationally recognized as having this capacity. If we give preference to national rather than international problems, we may be faced with the perspective of having different groups claiming to fit Weber¡¯s definition of a state (de facto), but lacking international recognition (de jure). This situation may make it impossible for governments to deal with separatist and may endanger not only their authority, but also the possibility of establishing a state of nations. However, if we choose to solve only transnational problems and pay insufficient attention to the particular problems of certain societies, we are faced with the same perspective ?inability of governments to assert their authority and the principles of international toleration, which results in failure to achievethe ends this very choice was made for. Hence, national and international problems should be assigned equal weight and neither should have priority over the other.
So we arrived to the idea that international cooperation is necessary but possible only in the context of states being able to deal with their particular problems. But there still remains the question how we will achieve that and whether we possess the necessary means. The progress in various scientific fields in the past few decades and the process of globalization which started as a result of this technical development give us a clear answer to this question - just cooperation between states is possible and can be achieved by the means science gives us. By enhancing our perspectives and giving us better understanding of nature and other people it helps us overcome our prejudices and adopt a cosmopolitan perspective towards the world and other cultures. This possibility of science to overcome national, cultural and social borders was envisioned by Herder in the 17thcentury in his concept about science breaking national prejudices by making it necessary to recognize transnational achievements in certain research fields and by providing a common ¡®scientific¡¯language in which members of different cultures can communicate and achieve understanding despite the differences existing between them. This clearly illustrates the role of science for creating mutual understanding that appears crucial for international toleration. However, this view was questioned by C. P. Snow in his famous lecture ¡®The Two Cultures¡¯. In it he argued that the aim of the exact sciences is the convergence of knowledge and thus they contribute to the establishment of cultural toleration. In contrast, he claimed that sometimes human sciences tend to emphasize differences rather than similarities and thus they stimulate divergence rather than convergence. However, this inference fails to consider the fact that unlike the exact science, human sciences are not entirely focused on formulating general and unrevisable laws ?rather, they tend to focus on particular problems and appreciate the fact that some of them may fail to fit the general norms that are established in the scientific community. Thus, human sciences are not aimed at excluding, but at including. They respect the differences that exist between different people and cultures and tend to preserve them by finding ways to reconcile the contradictions between them, rather than make them fit a general norm and thus destroy their individuality. Thus, they can serve as an effective means to promote international toleration and cooperation.
It is clear that in a world of vast contrasts between different people and nations international cooperation is crucial, but possible only by adopting the principle of toleration. Kant is right in his claim that ¡®in accordance with reason¡¯ our societies have to support the formation of the state of nations by placing themselves under public coercive laws. However, we should try not to enforce our views about the structure and the functions of this state of nations in the process of its establishment. Rather, if it is supposed to ¡®finally encompass all the nations¡¯ , we should try to enhance our perspective by considering the viewpoints of other nations and trying to integrate them in a discourse process that determines the way in which we are to achieve stable and tolerant system of international relations. This means that we should try to overcome our prejudices and abandon dogmatism in intercultural communication. This is crucial to the achievement of peaceful intercultural dialogue which is a necessary prerequisite for the establishment of the state of nations. On philosophical level, dogmatism legitimizes fixed patterns of thinking and hindershuman progress. On political level, it legitimizes violence which cannot serve as a basis for the state of nations. I believe that the Kantian concept presented in this quotation is devoid of dogmatism and condemns the use of violence in international relations.
Bronze Medal Essay
On Topic III
Kristina Kashfullina
Must a work of art be beautiful in order to be a work of art, or may a work of art be ugly as well? If the latter is possible, why should we take interest in it?
Art¡¦is a thin peel that isolates us from
I love the ugly pictures,
the horrors and wildness and why
I do appreciate
shouldn¡¯t it be beautiful?
That awful illustrations
The things which collocate¡¦
O. Spengler, The setting of Europe.
The truth.
G.G. Byron
We have gone too far from the gorgeous ideals of Renaissance, from the chic of ampere, from the motto of Oscar Wild ? "Art for art¡¯s sake", but do you feel like, even after so many years and so many changes in our conscious, we are still asking each other the questions of "antithesisic" words "the ugly art"? And are we sure this words are truly "antithesisic"? The thing is that the question we are referring to again is eternal, due to the humanity will hardly ever find the answer to it. That comes from every person will still have his own opinion, even if there would be any cultural dominant, as Hegel used to call it. The topic of "ugly art" has become actual nowadays as never else ?the society tends to create a new cultural revolution, to collapse the old system of ideals and principles on the edge of the new historical epoch ?on the verge of globalised society. That is why it is essentially important to turn to that question again in order not to lose the wisdom of the past or not to conserve our ideas, not being able to adopt them to contemporary conditions, not being able to create our own.
The problem, which is raised in the question, the problem of coherence of beauty and art seems difficult to be discussed even more, thanks to it was being tried to solve not only by the philosophers (as "the philosophy is a theoretical explanation of culture", according to Spengler), but by the people of art ("as every work of art is a new theoretical basement of itself", according to Hugo), and somehow or other ?by most of us. Thus, the ocean of already accumulated ideas, conceptions and theories is so enormous that the only thing left to do is to look at them one more time and try to solve it by yourself¡¦
The art doesn¡¯t know what it is
I¡¯m sure that Volter was true, saying that "all the explanations are coming from the notions". And I can hardly try to give my version of answering the question, if I don¡¯t give the definition of the art itself. Only when the notion becomes clear, we are to judge about the content of the notion, as there are immediately connected. The thing I¡¯d like to mention that the views on the problems of art of philosophers and masters of art should not be opposed, but should be organically connected and should be considered in synthesis.
Thus famous culturologers were creating schemes of understanding art as one of the most important parts of culture. (The question of correlation ofculture and art is a bit different one that is why we should not digress on it.) Thus American philosopher-sociologist Toynbee and Russian religious philosopher Berdyaev used to explain that art is the expression of free immanent God¡¯s spirit that is why it cannot be ugly by the definition. That is why it is not human¡¯s concern to evaluate the art¡¯s works, because they were created under the influence of God. These theories, which are quite close to each other do not concretize ? which work of art is worthto be called the work of art. That is why the explanation comes idem per idem, even obscures per obscurium. Ancient eastern civilization used o define art as a gift of Gods. The theoretic of art ?Moliere had his own opinion of that art should not be defined somehow, it should just be understood by every individuality, but should be created according some laws. Another point of view comes from Spengler, but it also admits that every art, which is created in the time of "culture" but not at the time of "civilization", is beautiful ? it simply cannot be ugly. Hegel in his work "Esthetics" explains that the Absolute spirit realizes itself as he wishes threw our work, and the items that may seem to us ugly is above our understanding now, that is how he comes to the conclusion ? culture is the realization of Absolute spirit and can be understood differently. Here we come to the point I share partially ? Ung in his book "Archetypes and Symbols" muses on culture as the reflection of personal symbols, but one phrase is worth being mentioned here ? "The art comes from the free creating person as the subjective reflection of archetypical symbols and the reality around him". Thus let me now try to give my own definition, based on the experience of the past generations. As far as I am concerned, the art is a deeply individual reflection of the immanent and transcendent world of the creator, understood exclusively subjectively according to the emotional and intellectual impressionability. Because the creator does not speak to the army of audience as the orator, but he tries to speak to everyone personally, so to keep invisible "eye to eye contact". Thus the art is so much universal and even eternal that the creators sometimes cannot give the definition of it, and that is correct ?the wider the notion is, the weaker is its content. Here I also would like to quote Aristotle, who said that "you should be very subjective, discussing the art, but not individual, cause you cannot be simply objective, thanks to the subject of the discussion".
As far as I have tried to give the definition, let me now try to share my point of view about the paradox or the normal fact of "ugly art", based on the very notion.
To create or not to create?
As the art has two so called "components" ? objective (let¡¯s say the technical ?the way the picture was drawn, the play was performed, the way the song was sang etc.), and subjective (what is depicted on the picture, what is written in the book, what the play is about). So, as I have already said if the art can and should be created and understood in the most individual manner, not even talking about the subjective side, even the objective can be treated differently, often polarilly different. The manner of drawing of impressionists and then fovists was estimated by the society in the most negative way ? they said Mone and Dega didn¡¯t know how to draw well. The same thing then happened to abstractionists and primitivists. The modern dancers are accused of not knowing the classical theory of dance. But as Beethoven has said "The new and genius things and trends are born as heresy, and appreciated only by the descendants". Now the picture of Wan Gog "The sunflowers" is the most expensive picture in the world. That is why what is consideredto be ugly even technically, even in the way it is presented can be a true art, because it can simply bring new vision of the world, it can go ahead its time.
Then comes the ugly content. I believe the thing you call ugly can be absolutely beautiful for me. It again and again repeats the ancient thought that the beauty is relative.
First let¡¯s define "ugly"in art. The most correct in my mind will be the thing that does not collocate our ideals. The modern standards of beautiful woman would e consideredunbelievable to the people of Renaissance. Moreover, ugly is something that is subjectively not pleasant or calls for emotions, not satisfying you. The works of Goya ("The Mars eating his son"), Bosch ("The garden of earth satisfaction"), Remark ("The Western front has no changes") and thousands of other classical and respected works possess some extracts, expressing horrors, death, sins, ugly bodies and so on. However, it doesn¡¯t mean they are not worth being called the art works. Furthermore, they are widely appreciated, even though they depict unpleasant for most of human beings symbols and descriptions. Thus, I can undoubtedly conclude ? ugly content doesn¡¯t prevent people from calling their works "true art", and I¡¯m sure they are right. But what do wehave to do with the art works, which are not considered to be beautiful by everyone? The composer Bah didn¡¯t hear any of his works played during the whole life. The authors, who presumably guess they would not be understood as their works will be considered ugly, usually have to ask themselves the Hamlet question, I have put as the title of the paragraph. And in my opinion the answer is ?to create. The work of art must not be beautiful, this is not the imperative, even if the ideals of time insist on it. For example, the early Christian works were totally against the ideals the ideals of Roman beauty. The medieval works of the religious themes are full of blood and horror, following the motto "Memento mory", but aren¡¯t they the real art works, spiritually beautiful?
The functions of art are not only entertaining and bringing peace into person¡¯s soul ? they are polyhedral as the art itself. One of the functions is to tell the truth, to reflect the inner and outer world, as I have already mentioned, to fix the reality. Art, purified from the moments, which cannot be excepted without closed eyes and pain in heart looses the very nature of art ?it stops being different! It becomes limited and turns into one-sided embodiment of culture.
For what the bell tolls?
The ugly art is a subject of fierce argue not only because "ugly"is different for everybody, but moreover, because it is that force, by the way very powerful, that creates a great variety of clashes in cultural world, in our minds and souls. The discussed question asks "why should we take interest in it". Let me disagree with such a word used as "should". That is true. Nobody is obliged. But we can. Omar Hayam used to say that ? "stop thinking of the art if you want to stop thinking at all". As far asI feel the ugly art tolls for thinking. Beautiful story impresses us, it raises our mood and purifies our heart may be from aggression and envy. But the beautifully written books of Kafka, Dickens, and Dreiser, which contain the description of evil and ugly truth make us oppose, think and fight mentally. I can¡¯t but mention ?art without beauty is not an art, it loses its origins, it turns into a science of morality. However Konfuziy in his "Thoughts of the state" mentioned an unforgettable wisdom ? "the power is in the balance". Thus the balance of two opposing and at the same time correlating universes can help us develop.
Leo Tolstoy used to write that the real author describes real things. So imagine, the awful, truly ugly things happen in the some state, in the culture, in the nature. Should the writers keep silence? So the ugly art tolls for the truth.
The art of Daly and Ray Bradbury imagine new worlds, numerous science fiction authors try to analyze the existing facts and predict the future. Their aim is to warn future generations about the reality they can face if continue to follow this or that trends. Such creators follow the Socrates method "from against" ?show the ugly thing in order people to be afraid to behave badly. Thus the ugly art tolls for the future.
The secret to define
The thing that is really important to touch upon is the greatest problem ? the problem of defining the ugly art. Except the subjective emotions and appreciation art as ugly I must admit ?there is almostly no ugly art. All the examples, mentioned above, all the works of art, contending ugly episodes follow the noble aims. They can even reveal the inner world of the creator, still teaching us something, showing the real or imaginary situation ? the philosophers are not afraid of this, J.P. Sartre and his work "Nausea"is one the brightest examples. Thus the answer on the topic question is dualistic ? yes, there may and should be ugly art, if it is created ugly or contents unpleasant ideas and fiction symbols. But at the same time, no, down to such kind of art is not ugly; it is sometimes even more beautiful then sweet images, if to take beauty as a philosophical category.
The thing, worth mentioning here ? finding truly ugly art is practically pretty difficult. I keep the criteria of "opened idea", but I believe ?art, created under pressure, or by somebody¡¯s order is ugly. It remains art, however, because it is still individual, but it loses freedom. Not in the existential meaning of this category, but in the understanding of such philosophers as P. Sorokin. The unique finding has recently been made in Egypt ? on the back of the statue the sculptures wrote "I am sorry for this statue, because I was made to do it like this by my master". The frightening lines about such kind of art are in sonnet 66 of William Shakespeare:
¡¦
And art, made tongue-tighted by authorities,
And folly doctor-like controlling skills
¡¦
The very delicate question, whether such things as drawing with the blood of killed animals or creating sculptures from rubbish is worth being called art, even if it is ugly. The matter here is in the very thin boundary that distinguishes true art from the insanity or the desire to seem eccentric or to make money. This problem has to be solved individually by everybody, but I¡¯m sure, Toffler was true, saying that "Time has a power to define true from false". The thing, left to us, is to create this time by our deeds.
Will the ugly art save the world?
The famous phrase of Russian writer Dostoevsky ? "The beauty will save the world"is a wonderful wisdom to follow, but let me be brave or insolent enough to change it and affirm that today¡¯s world is not so ugly as someone thinks and the dialectical law of "unify and struggle of oppositions" should really work. I¡¯m sure ugly art, revealing the truth, opening eyes, predicting and warning is the thing we need now to sober ourselves from the art, turning into entertaining industry. May be then we are to understand the gorgeous ideals of Renaissance, the chic of ampere, the motto of Oscar Wild in another way and find the authentic world of art as a heritage, time has carefully saved for us.
Bronze Medal Essay
On Topic III
Luiza Pasca
Apology of the Expressive Ugly
In a century of speed, when all people complain that they do not have time, what can be the meaning and purpose of Art? Nobody seems to be able to go to an art exhibition or to read a book, simply because they do not have time. For some people, educated or non-educated, Art presupposes a suspension of time (even if they are not conscious of this effect); when one looks at a painting or reads literature, then one gets access to an unconscious, unseen part of oneself ? a new "time", perhaps the real one, the interior duration, in Bergson¡¯s terms, where everything is considered as intuition, intensity of feeling ?and manages to forget, even for a short period of time, that the outside world, with the problems it involves, exists. For other people, art is a mere waste of time, in the sense that it does not involve a practical result or a pragmatic activity. They consider that everything that is devoid of a pragmatic core is pointless and invaluable. Can it be so? Can Art really mean nothing?
For anyone who considers the human being as the most evolved of all animals and denies the existence of a spirit or soul, the answer seems obvious. Although the problematic of what defines a human being is very complicated, one thing is quite clear: humans have created culture, and culture involves Art, thus Art must have a meaning, even if only for that undefined and ineffable thing that resides in us and we like to call spirit.
Art seems to transcend reality; the meaning of the concept of art itself becomes hard to be caught in words. Art is generally regarded in close connection with the main categories of aesthetics: the Beautiful and the Ugly, and a usual definition of art would include a reference to one of these: art as a form of spiritual manifestation, an expression of beauty. The debate about a definition of art is not over, but is this essay shall try to follow a new perspective over art and shed a new light over the problem: Art itself should not defined as subservient one aesthetic category or another; art transcends these categories and adumbrates itself as superior to these, encompassing both. Art may be regarded as beyond good and evil (to use Nietzschenian terms), as beyond beautiful and ugly, but closely related to meaning ?a form of significance. The value of art does not reside in the aesthetic distinction between Beautiful and Ugly, but in the meaning it encompasses. Of course, then comes the question, what does meaningmean? Are there grades of meaning, which may become criteria to asses a work of art? These questions do not make the real subject of this paper, although we shall encounter some points of view regarding these problems as well. Categorical answers cannot be given, only subjective ones, because art has a personal meaning for each and every one of us, and thus subjectivity becomes an obstacle in giving a certain answer. We shall consider, generally, that meaning implies both manifestations of the intellect (is the work of art capable to invite us to meditate?) and affects, strong emotional impressions that are provoked by the mere looking at of a work of art ? relevant for the interior dynamism of the intuition (in Bergsonian meaning) and also stimuli for the intellect.
1. Art in connection with Truth and Knowledge
Art becomes the center of a problematic, in relation with knowledge: can art offer real knowledge? Can this be its real function? Plato and Nietzsche offer two antagonistic points of view over knowledge and thus over truth, which may lead us to conclude over (at least one of the) functions of art.
The simplest idea that most of us have if art is that it presupposes Beauty. From Plato¡¯s point of view, Beauty is an immutable, eternal and self-consistent Idea, Form, situated beyond the visible world; he considered that Beauty is of the same value with Truth, two forms that immediately follow and "obey" thesupreme Idea, that of Good. But for Plato, beauty in art is simply a pointless, a vacuous imitation of the Idea of Beauty. He places Art at the second level of imitation. First, there is the world of the immutable Forms, which our own, so-called "real" world imitates. But Art imitates our world, so it only shows us the copies of copies. Through art, people do not free their souls from this world (supreme goal in Plato¡¯s view); on the contrary, they only deepen themselves into falsity, fakeness, strengthening the bounds of the soul to matter.
For Nietzsche, the truths of human beings are only illusions, metaphors of which people have forgotten to be such. He explains that at the dawn of humanity the ancestors have created these truths in order to be able to survive (especially in a spiritual way), and this is perfectly comprehendible, if we imagine the first of our ancestors paralyzed with fear and wonder regarding the world that they knew so little about and that seemed to overwhelm them. Nietzsche further states that all truths are relative and that there is no such thing as an absolute, general truth (thus totally opposing Plato¡¯s view). People make their own truths, depending on their needs and on the strength with which the will of power manifests through them. The real creator of values and truths is the Uebermensch, whom weaker people must turn to.
To draw an immediate conclusion, it seems that if all concepts and values are relative, it results that there is no absolute Beauty and no absolute Ugliness, to which we may turn for comparisons. Where does art find its essence then?
Also, Nietzsche seems to be giving an explanation of the beginning of mythical and religious beliefs. As the history of religions tells us, myths were of the highest importance in the life of the primitive human ? they were explanatory tales about the gods and the activities people were obliged to do in order to have a safe, regulated life and be in harmony with the nature and the whole universe. Thus the people did not complain about anything, if the gods had left it be so. Their myths brought them consolation and serenity. Myths are the base of religious doctrines and furthermore, for the first cultural manifestations. Could myths be placed at the base the first literary manifestations? Considering the hindu ancient writings or even the works of Homer and Hesiod, which contained the cosmogony myths, it can be asserted that myths played a big role in the development of culture and implicitly, in that of art.
Thus could have art taken further the role of the myths, that of ensuring spiritual survival? In other terms: What is the role or function of art for the human being? Following the next points of view, we shall arrive to our conclusion.
2. Homo symbolicum
Paul Ricoeur seems to think that meaning, significance, describes our deepest nature: we are conscious beings, capable of giving meaning to things, and to translate and perpetuate this meaning through expression. Expression may take various forms, as we can distinguish various forms of art, but the form that has the ability to easily encompass and transmit meaning is the image. Even a literary work of art transmits its meanings to us through images, through symbols this type of communication is very complex, and presupposes a multi-level organized meaning. On one hand, the author of a work of art wishes to encompass a certain meaning into a certain image, but the viewer or reader may not interpret that particular image in that certain way, because an interpretation always presupposes making reference to one¡¯s particular view over life, to one¡¯s particular nature. On the other hand, a work of art may be the result of "inspiration", this meaning that the artist does not consciously gives significance to his artistic images, and that they are the result of some subliminal mechanisms, or of a divine consciousness that uses the artist as an instrument and the creation of the artist as a mundane expression (this was widely believed in Antiquity, if we are to think of the Muses or daimonions which inspired the ancient poets and musicians).
Therefore, these main considerations conduct only to relativism and perspectivism, which lead back to Nietzsche and to his point of view from above.
3. The Dasein and the Light of Art
As suggested by the point of view expressed above, the concept of meaning can also be regarded in connection with Aristotle¡¯s concept of telos, to which Heidegger gave an interesting and original interpretation in his theory about the Being and the Dasein. The Dasein is defined as that specific form of manifestation of the Being, which is capable of making inquiries about the Being itself. The Dasein is able to identify, to recognize the different purposes, meanings of all other forms of manifestation of the Being.
Heideggers regards art as a form of aletheia, where the earth, the world, the human and the divine meet, where the two poles, two constituents of all things dual nature of all things fuses and is perceived as unity; this doesn¡¯t mean that the two antithetic components of unity lose their shape, but that the tragic, eternal conflict between them becomes visible (in the sense that it canbe clearly perceived) into this "open space", non-ensconced anymore. Heidegger regards the Greek aletheia as defining a state of non-ensconcing, where the true being of things comes to the surface and can be "seen", perceived consciously. Aletheia has often been translated as "truth", but truth becomes for Heidegger a state, a context where the being of things becomes "visible". Thus for Heidegger Art offers the ideal "place" where the Being of things (represented in paintings or suggested by words - but he had in mind mostly paintings) emerges and allows the Dasein to actually be the Dasein ? to become aware of the true significance of all mundane things.
Thus art becomes the cure for alienation. The estranged person may become itself again through art, regaining all the lost significances of things and of itself.
Conclusion: Art as a form of survival through meaning
A work of art seems not to admit a single interpretation, we are free to give our own interpretation, depending on the way we see things. It is true that we can see things differently at different times, but perhaps that is the genius of art: it encloses stimulates not only our emotional faculties, but also our intellect, helping us to see the same thing from many perspectives. All relativism may be for the best: if the world we see is in flux (ta panta rhei, as Heraclitus wisely asserted), how can we get knowledge of things, if they do not have an immutable essence to which we could have direct access to? Perhaps a solution is trying to see things from all perspectives, and since we cannot reach that "all", we could take knowledge of as many perspectives as we can, to as many sides of that thing as we can. Therefore, ugliness may be just another perspective over a thing or a situation, asbeauty also. Why should the works of art reproduce only beautiful things? Should we despise and refuse to take into account an ugly work of art as a form of art, just because it represents things in a another light?
Art may be a helpful "tool", to adopt a pragmatic view, in one¡¯s process of constructing his life. The meanings revealed through art can be very useful and help us perform a metanoia, a change of mentality and perspective in our own advantage.
Apart from this, when the rapid flow of time seemsto give birth to illness among the people, Art may be considered one of the last forms of spiritual survival. In a world of nihilism, where the man is "condemned to be free", free to interpret and give meaning, meaning relevant for his own condition, art is a subtle form of communication and may help us in remembering what the world and our specific way of being are all about: giving sense and cultivating our spirit. Art may still encompass all lost meaning and may reveal the old values that modeled our cultural being and that may be contained in what C.G. Jung¡¯s calls collective unconsciousness; through writing, these meanings unconsciously receive expression; through a symbolic lecture, old, forgotten meanings can be brought forth again and re-interiorized, under a new light, but nonetheless most useful for us.
In the end, perhaps art should not be regarded only as a form of expression of the beautiful, but just as a form of expression.
Honorary Mention Essay
On Topic II
Hyun-Kyu Kim
In accordance with reason there is only one way that states in relation with one another can leave the lawless condition, which involves nothing but war; it is that, like individual human beings, they give up their savage (lawless) freedom, accommodate themselves to public coercive laws, and so form an (always growing) state of nations (civitas gentium) that would finally encompass all the nations of the earth.
Part 1: Introduction: How can we stop fighting?
From Abel and Cain to Zanzibar Wars, from the conquest of King Hammurabi to the World War 2, conflicts and wars always have been, and always will be, an unavoidable yet bloody part of human history. The modern society has not been free from this, as we can see from the massacres of Rwanda and the recent attacks on Georgia. It is also important to realize that trying to avoid wars and conflicts has also been a futile yet integral part of human history. From the quote above, Kant tries to establish a solution to wars; something that mankind has not yet managed to pull off.
Before I move on to discussing the validity of his solution, let us observe some natures of conflicts and wars reflected in his quote. Firstly, conflicts, regardless of scale, work in a similar kind of structure. Kant proposes the same kind of solution for intra-national conflicts so an international conflict (wars.) This logic implies that the same forces which drive intra-national conflicts also drive international ones. Secondly, conflicts require freedom. Without freedom, an entity cannot engage in a physical clash with another entity. With these qualities in mind, let us move on to a different question.
What is it that drives entities into wars? So far from Kant¡¯s quote, we have gained insight that it is a force that is present in both intra-national and international level, and a force that requires freedom to be activated. The answer is desire. The want, the greed to have more than others is the driving force of all conflicts. I hit my brother because I want the ice cream that my brother has. Sons of Liberty in Colonial America attacked British ships for their liberties. USA invaded Iraq for oil. All the conflicts, regardless of scale, have their root in desire, a basic natural instinct. These instincts can be restricted by restricting freedom to go for the desire. We can see that placing desire as the source of war is compatible with Kant¡¯s insight on wars.
Now let us return to Kant¡¯s quote. Observing the quote, we can find peculiar in the first four words. Kant writes that his solution comes in accordance with reason. In other words, Kant¡¯s solution is a solution that is based on rational thinking. Can rationality bring peace ? Kant has limited his solution to an international level, but I would like to take this question deeper. Can rationality stop conflicts-international or intra-national? This is the central question that I want to tackle in this essay. I have discussed above that the source of conflicts and wars is desire, want, a basic instinct. Through my essay, I would first like to observe whether rationality can bring peace in two ways- intra-national and international. Then, I would like discuss overall whether rationality can truly be a solution for peace.
Part 2: Intra-national conflicts: Rationally convince me why I should not fight with my neighbor who has a better house.
In this part, I would like to observe rational solutions for Intra-national conflicts and show why the solutions may be flawed in some way. Intra-national conflicts may be something as small as a conflict between roommates which cannot be settled by words. It might be something big as a revolution to throw over the government. Whatever the case may be, the rational solution for stopping these kinds of conflicts have been what Kant has proposed- giving up parts of liberty to the state. There are many different limits and ideas on how to rationally limit liberty so that conflicts would be stopped, but I would like to present Hobbes¡¯s version.
Hobbes, in his book ¡°The Leviathan¡±, envisioned that a complete sovereign who would have dictatorial powers over all aspects of state would solve conflicts. People in its natural states will have freedom to do whatever that he or she wishes to do. According to Hobbes, people will misuse this freedom leading to the famous situation of ¡°Everyman for Himself.¡± This abundance of conflicts and fighting will eventually lead to chaos. Rationally thinking, this is a waste of talent and energy. The energy and talent that can be used in cooperation to build and to make greater society is used up for individual wants of greed. This leads to a situation where no man is safe. All man tries to take away property of others and worthless conflicts do not end. This makes arises the need for a complete sovereign. Subjects can hand over their individual powers over to their sovereign, which would in place lead to social stability and cooperation. Conflicts would no longer be in place because the people would no longer have the freedom to make conflicts. By following the absolute orders of the sovereign, the second aspect of Kant¡¯s insight- that conflicts require freedom- cannot be kept, and therefore there would be no conflicts. People would cooperate instead of having clashing and this would eventually lead to a better society. A point that must be noticed is that this is a rational solution that Hobbes has come up with. Hobbes did not use an appeal to emotion, but rather he used his power of reasoning and thinking to come up with his own idea of how to ensure that no conflicts would happen. Hobbes¡¯s rational solution of solving intra-national conflicts was through a complete sovereign. It should be noted that Hobbes¡¯ s version of sovereign is an extreme one compared to many other philosophers, but the main idea is not very much different- give up liberties to the state so that conflicts do not arise.
However, intra-national conflicts arise even though we have given up liberties to the state. Even when the people within the state gives up liberties to the state, conflicts still arise because people ignore the laws and guidelines set by the state and use freedom that they have not been allowed. The rational solution has not been enough for men to keep them in a state of no conflicts. This is because men use rationality itself to counter the rational solutions. Philosophers like Locke and Paine advocated conflicts and revolutions in a ¡°rational¡± way. Even though the two philosophers have put up guidelines and restrictions, they have justified conflicts and revolutions even in an intra-national level. Let us take a look at Locke for an example. Locke actually advocated an overthrow of the government- a clear conflict- in case whether the ruler is not ruling for his people. Locke actually believed that the rebellion of the people in case of bad rulers was not only a right but also an obligation. Paine wrote in similar patterns in his pamphlet ¡°Common Sense,¡± in which he justified (rationalized) that it is common sense for people to choose independence and have war (and therefore conflict) rather than to stay within the rule of Britain (no conflict.) The writings actually brought about real-life intra-national conflicts in the American Revolution and the French Revolution. People, through rational logic, can see the good of not having conflicts. However, people can also use rational logic to justify that some conflicts are worth having because the good and liberties that they will bring. The writing of two philosophers show one way how people in intra-national level still have conflicts- by overcoming the rational logic with rational logic.
In this part, we have so far seen how it is possible for rationality to give solutions to intra-national conflicts. The rationally thinking, we can realize that conflicts waste energy and realize that we need to stop conflicts at an intra-national scale. We set up laws and governments and give up our liberties for sake of peace, for sake of stopping conflicts, as demonstrated by the writing of Hobbes. However, we use rational thinking once again to justify that conflicts can sometimes get us more than state of no conflicts- and rationally have more conflicts.
Part 3: International conflicts: Now tell me why I shouldn¡¯t take that oil.
Now, let us look at a bigger picture. Instead of focusing on individual states and how conflicts can be prevented within the individual states, let us observe how conflicts can be prevented in an international scale. Again, I would like to propose rational solutions that have tried to attempt absolve international conflicts through logical reasoning, and also show why this solution might have a certain weakness.
The essay which from the original quote was from, Kant¡¯s essay Toward Perpetual Peace, shows an attempt to solve international conflicts. Kant saw the states as very similar to human beings. When left alone with full liberties, people have their savage, lawless freedom. This leads to more conflicts and fighting. Again, using rational logic, this is defiantly a waste of effort, lives and energy. The problem is more amplified because this conflict is in a larger scale. As Pascal once said ¡°Patricide and infanticide all have their places in history, but what could be more absurd than killing a person just because he is on the other side of the river and his ruler has quarreled with mine?¡± This quote shows that international conflicts cannot be justified rationally even more compared to intra-national conflicts. Intra-national conflicts (as symbolized by patricide and infanticide) might be justified rationally as shown in part 2. But what could possibly justify a large loss of lives? World War 2, an international conflict, was the bloodiest 5 years in human history, and what can justify or rationalize this kind of conflict? Rational thinking once again convinces us that there is a need to eliminate international conflicts. Kant gives us concrete formulas to work out a system which would bring perpetual peace. He gives two steps:
i) Give up the freedom and accommodate themselves to coercive laws
Form a state of nations encompassing all nations of earth.
We can notice that these formulas are very similar to one of solving intra-national conflicts. Just change the word nations to individuals and sate of nations to state, and the formula looks almost exactly the same. Moreover, the world has actually taken giant steps that are extremely similar to Kant¡¯s ideas. Kellogg-Briand pact of the early 20th century was a pact to ban all laws. Member nations gave up their freedom to wage war upon each other. The Geneva Convention on international law is another good example. In this case, countries have made international agreements and laws a binding part of their laws. Therefore, now all international pacts are legally binding by member nations who have signed the Geneva Convention on international laws- they have accommodated themselves to coercive laws. Last, but not the least, doesn¡¯t the term ¡°state of nations¡± sound somewhat familiar? Maybe because the term United Nations can find its roots in the term. All the 192 nations around the world have gathered together in hopes of promoting world peace, human rights, and preventing conflicts. General Assembly gives equal votes to every single nation.
However, as good as Kant¡¯s idea might sound and no matter how many steps the world has taken toward ensuring there would be peace and no conflicts on a global scale, there simply have been many conflicts and rationality simply did not ensure the conflicts would not happen. The first reason, similar to intra-national conflicts, is that nations can rationalize themselves into justifying conflicts. Nationalism and imperialism were all based on rational thinking. These ideas came from dogmatism and putting their countries over everything else. This way, the countries could rationalize their actions. The imperialist nations rationalized that they had the ¡°white man¡¯s burden¡± to enlighten other nations, and therefore, the having colonial war could be justified. Their form of rationalism saw that the benefit of spreading their culture was larger than the cost of losing their own citizens and killing many Africans, Asians, and Amerindians in the process. The second reason is that rationality does not rule a country. In Aristotle¡¯s nation ruled by Philosopher King, this rationality might have worked. However, in real life, nations are not rule by philosopher kings and definitely not rationality. Kant¡¯s postulation for world peace is to ideal for it does not taken into account irrational decisions made by the decisions. Rulers cannot us rationality alone to rule their governments, and often times they had to sort to other measures such as emotions to keep their power. Politicians stir up emotions and sentiments to galvanize countries to go to wars. Kellog-Briand pact was dismantled when Mussolini managed to convince Italians that ancient glory of Rome was more important than international pacts and lives of Ethiopians. United Nation is now also something like a Kantian Philosophy- idealistic, but not working.
I have tried to shown in this part that Kant¡¯s rational solution to stop international conflicts did not work in theoretical nor concrete forms. Kant¡¯s rational solution for the individual nation-states to give up power and liberty to a ¡°state of nations is too idealistic¡± to work in reality, yet still has some faulty holes theoretically to work out completely in theory as well.
Part 4: Then can rationality stop conflicts?
This is the part that we ask ourselves in desperation: Do we really need rationality to stop conflicts? Can rationality actually do anything to stop conflicts? It seems from the writing above that rationality really cannot stop conflicts- intra-national or international. However, the rational solutions to stopping conflicts and the responses against them that I have mentioned above are all flawed in certain kind of ways, and I believe that rationality actually can be a solution to fight conflicts. So in this part of the essay, I will attempt to show some problems with discussions of Part 2 and Part 3.
Firstly, the rational solutions given above are categorical assertions. The solutions above are full of hidden assumptions and suppositions such as all humans only follow rational thinking and humans will always follow the more rational paths. This overly simplifies the mankind. Mankind is much more complex than rationality and there is more to it. By assuming mankind only with rationality, the solutions above made categorical assumptions. They advocated a certain kind of peace that they believed to fit in all kinds of society- from Azerbaijan to Zambia. The truth is that there are no real solutions that can work for mankind everywhere. Each solution should be case by case, taking into each culture¡¯s history and tradition into account. Mankind is not same everywhere in the globe. They are different, and they should have different solutions. The fact that the rational solutions are categorical assumptions might be one reason that rationality can still work as a solution for peace.
Realizing that there are different types of people in the world leads to the second problem of the solutions mentioned above. As there are different kinds of people in the world, there are different kinds of rationality in the world. In part 2 and part 3, I have written about how people can actually rationalize wars. However, this is rationality in a peripheral sense. Peripheral rationality might justify wars. Peripheral rationality might advocate nationalism and imperialism. Peripheral rationality sees only some part of the humankind. They scope of this rationality stops at ¡®my¡¯ family, ¡®my¡¯ friends, and ¡®my¡¯ society. This is more of an instinct rather than true rationality. True rational thinking should extend beyond just thinking about people nearby. True rationality would observe people beyond the traditional scope and therefore, would not justify wars. By looking at the bigger picture and not just the interest at hand, it can be rationalized that peace is a better state than warfare, even though winning wars might bring temporary gains. In the long term, there are more lost to the mankind as a whole, and this is what true rationality would focus on. By adding the concept of true rationality and peripheral rationality, we can avoid the concept that rationality can actually advocate conflicts.
Lastly, solutions do not have to solve every problem. Solutions need not be perfect. Kant and Hobbes¡¯s solution claim that they can solve all the conflicts in categorical assertions. Solutions would be really great if they were perfect and every single time. However, we should be contempt with a solution that brings fewer conflicts. Let us look back to the original questions that I have asked. Can rationality bring peace? Can rationality stop conflicts-international or intra-national? Rationality cannot bring a perpetual peace that Kant has envisioned where there would be a perfect peace where no countries would have reasons to fight with each other. Rationality cannot stop all conflicts-international or intra-national. Rationality can bring some form of peace where no countries would have reasons to fight with each other for an extended period of time. Rationality can stop many conflicts-international or intra-national.
Part 5: Then what can be a rational solution?
I believe that there cannot be a categorical rational plan that will work every single time and solve conflicts every time. However, by providing a condition where true rationality will work, a condition where inter-subjective rationality (borrowing this term and idea from Habermas) will communicate with each other, and where the rationalities will gather to form a public rationality, rationality can be a solution to stop conflicts.
My proposal for peace is simple. I first assume that everybody has their own rational minds. Everyone can think with a rational mind. Rationality can rule over their instinct and control an individual¡¯s actions. First, there should be a condition where true rationality can develop instead of peripheral rationality. Education should provide a condition where men are allowed to think about the whole of mankind, not just the people around them. This kind of education will help foster rational minds which can think not only about themselves and their families, but the whole mankind. This true rationality would allow people to rationally exclude conflicts as a way of living. Secondly, there should be inter-subjective rationality which communicates with other inter-subjective rationality. The people with true rationality should also have inter-subjective rationality, which means rationality which allows other ideas, admits one¡¯s own mistakes, and amends one¡¯s own mistake. Inter-subjective rationality will allow people to communicate with other rational minds. My plan does not propose a categorical assertion that a certain way will provide peace. On the other hand, I believe that inter-subjective rationality communicating with other inter-subjective rationality will help develop mechanisms for peace in the cultural context. Communicating might bring a solution to a certain part of the world. Lastly, I believe that this inter-subjective rationality will come together in a public rationality. Public rationality would be a combination of much different rationality and unlike individual rationality; it has the power to act as a combination. The communication between inter-subjective rationality will inevitably lead the single individual true and inter-subjective rationality to combine as a working, effective, public rationality. Single rational minds would have communicated in the inter-subjective rationality and find common points with other inter-subjective rationality. The common points to bring forth peace would be found and be taken into action by a bigger rationality- the public rationality.
There are problems existing in this solution as well. First of all, this is very vague and depends on the inter-subjective rationality to actually come up with a solution. Also, true rationality, inter-subjective rationality, and public rationality are all abstract terms which really cannot be shown or proven. However, the fact that democracy, which would be the closest thing to what I have mentioned, commits no acts of genocide against its own people and does not wage wars against other democracies, could be thought as an implicit support for my solution.
Part 6: Conclusion: The end of the long fight.
In part 1, I introduced the main question: can rationality stop conflicts? I tried to show in part 2 and part 3 how past attempts at forming a rational solution to stop conflicts really did not work. In part 4, I showed how the limits of my discussions in part 2 and part 3, and opened a door for rationality to become a solution. Part 5 I attempted to come up with my own solution which allowed peace to be achieved through rationality. However, through 5 parts, I have still failed to answer a more fundamental question to the problem. Do we really need to stop conflicts? I viewed it more as an axiom when I stated that can be rationally proven that wars and conflicts are not really needed. However, many aspects of human societies have developed through conflicts and wars. Rationality might help stop conflicts, but is there a need?
Honorary Mention Essay
On Topic II
Ayse Dilek Izek
ON A WALK, IN THE COMPANY OF KANT
"No man is an island,"John Donne once famously declared. What he probably failed to foresee at the time, however, was that this well-known maxim would, in an age of rapid globalization, be re-interpreted and extended to include not only men but also nations. Dominated by the dissolution of boundaries and the spread of shared perceptions, the modern world obliges nations to understand, interact with, and learn from each other. Although on a much greater scale, such a setting resembles that of the initial organization of individuals into societies and the ultimate emergence of states. The surrender of personal liberties parallels the sacrifice of national sovereignty just as the individual¡¯s subjection to a set of societal rules and regulations is similar to the state¡¯s subjectionto international law. Where survival depends on collaboration, super-structures of human existence emerge; and today¡¯s global world is certainly no exception.
The need for the establishment of a governing body superior to the individual finds its roots, according to Thomas Hobbes, in the human urge to protect oneself from those who are more powerful. Our ¡®natural state¡¯ is rather animal-like and one in which the extent of our rights are determined by the amount of our power; thus a complete surrender of personal liberties to the state in exchange for stability stands out as more preferable. The nature of our "savage freedom"engenders in us an inclination to subject ourselves to certain guidelines that facilitate a joint existence while preserving individual liberties in our private sphere. Several checkpoints -enumerated by John Stuart Mill as a pluralistic parliament, a constitution, and universal suffrage- work to establish a clear divide between the public and private spheres of life. Whilst the state of "lawless freedom" promises nothing but chaos and violence, the state -even when it takes the form of a totalitarian regime which Hobbes named Leviathan- ensures order and protection despite the required limitation of liberties. Hobbes¡¯s argument that even a bad government is better than no government prevails as the latter only brings an unchecked violation of all rights whereas the former guarantees the lawful exercise and preservation of at least some. The sacrifice of a portion of our individual freedom brings with it greater benefits that serve to compensate for the state-induced loss of liberties.
This relationship between the individual and the state is best described in Jean Jacques Rousseau¡¯s Social Contract, in which he entrusts both parties of the agreement with certain duties and obligations towards each other. A voluntary shift of power from the individual to the state as the representative of the ¡®general will¡¯ is necessary in order for the individual to obtain and maintain certain liberties that would otherwise be left to the hands of an unrestraint authority. In dismissing the idea of the ¡®noble savage¡¯, Kant asserts that the need for organized society and lawfulness emerges as an undeniable fact wherever and whenever individuals are forced to live together.
While the need to interact, communicate, and cooperate always existed between humans -thereby leading to the establishment of states-, the emphasis placed on international relations gained momentum as states were forced into frequent contact through trade and diplomacy. As the abolishment of both physical and ideological borders between nations continues and globalization brings states closer at an astonishing pace, the regulation of international relations becomes more and more important ?and, according to Kant, resembles that of interpersonal ones. Just as nation-states and organized society are institutions founded by and yet situated above individuals, an institution with jurisdiction over individual governments is equally compulsory.
The same urge that drove diverse groups of individuals to establish collective super-structures is at play in terms of the organization of the international society. The forfeit of national sovereignty and subjection to international law emerge as the only two milestones that would eventually lead to a world in which peace and cooperation reign. The European Union, which has succeeded in ¡®making war physically impossible¡¯on a continent that witnessed insensate bloodshed and acrimonious rivalry for centuries, exemplifies this most evidently. The ¡®soft power¡¯that the European Union has as a supranational organization that can offer membership in turn for the observance of certain criteria is astounding. In compelling states to adhere to the rule of law, enhance the freedom of speech, and recognize minority rights, this soft power proves to be much more efficient than the wars provoked by "savage or lawless freedom."
The organization of divergent nations into a union, however, is destined to face a myriad of complications that stem from discriminative attitudes and national pride. Similar to individuals who are reluctant to forgo their personal liberties and surrender them to the control of the state, nations appear unwilling to give up on national sovereignty and perceive globalization as a threat to their natural and cultural identities. The ¡®clash of civilizations¡¯seems just as likely to become the product of the modern era as ¡®perpetual peace¡¯. The European Union suffers from enlargement fatigue as its members are reluctant to merge with those who have been labeled ¡®the others¡¯for centuries. Xenophobia, racial prejudice, and intolerance towards different cultural practices remain among the domineering dynamics of many societies. National pride prevents citizens and governments from accepting higher authorities that mediate international law. The United Nations fails to render its jurisdiction consequential in the face of superpowers determined to further their interests at the stake of individual lives.
Such problems force humanity to take detours from its march "Toward Perpetual Peace"and paint a pessimistic portrait of the current human condition. What Francis Fukuyama called "the End of History" now proves to be the beginning of a series of challenges mankind has yet to face. It is, however, vital to preserve a sense of optimism balanced with realism while facing these challenges. Dreams of an unattainable utopia serve only as distractions while an Orwellian pessimism detracts from our ambition to strive for the better.
Nationalistic sensitivities must be reconciled, equality and the promotion of tolerance must be emphasized while breathing life into a "state of nations" and designating the fundamental tenets of a Social Contract between states. The allure of a global union must not only depend on economic benefits of membership but also incorporate a willingness to cooperate and a focus on similarities instead of differences. The establishment of supranational organizations such as the European Union and the United Nations is, without a doubt, an initial materialization of Kant¡¯s ostensibly idealistic notion of a "state of nations". Their perfection into egalitarian arbitrators of international justice and pioneers of global prosperity could pave the way to what he called a state of "perpetual peace" in which individuals are united not under different nationalities but as citizens of the universe. It seems that we will continue to set our clocks according to the timing of Immanuel Kant¡¯s walks in the future just like the housewives of Konigsberg did centuries ago.
Honorary Mention Essay
On Topic II
Pietari Kupiainen
Contract theories are a group of theories from different philosophers with different ideas sharing one thing in common, the natural state, a theoretical "beginning state"for humans where no societies or power structures exist, and the possible need to get out of it. Famous philosophers with these kinds of views include Hobbes, who thought that the natural state was the worst place for humanity and life in it was short andruthless which is why we must give our freedom to a sort of a dictator who will enforce the laws and keep us safe, and Rousseau who introduced the term noble savage and actually thought that the natural state is where humanity strives. Also, among contract theorists is Kant, whose citation is the assignment. In the citation, Kant applies the contract theories to the relations of nations. They are usually used to explain why is organized society needed and what should it be like but Kant¡¯s version is quite well applicable to them. In the citation, Kant suggests that states are in a lawless condition in relation with one another and that in order to leave it they must accommodate themselves to public coercive laws and form an always growing "state of nations". The lawless condition could be called the natural state of states, in order to further enhance the similarities between Kant¡¯s argument and the so called regular contract theories. Kant¡¯s argument does seem to have appeal, promising to end wars with little sacrifices, so let¡¯s see if the initial appeal can last through the analysis of the argument.
First of all, we need to take a look at why the current state is bad and why should it be changed. What should be taken into consideration in analyzing this argument is that Kant lived in a very different time than us war-wise. In his time, wars were fairly common but they didn¡¯t affect the civilian population as much as in nowadays. Now, wars affect each and every person in the nations at war and they are much more devastating with the developed weapons, especially weapons of mass-destruction. So what Kant said back then is ever the more important today. Steps have been taken to the direction Kant probably meant with the creation of first the League of Nations and later the United Nations and the international laws, but is this enough, because as has been seen these laws and obligations are clearly not coercive. Is this the best state for us, or should we take more steps to the Kantian direction? Or perhaps some other theory could provide us with the best answers?
What¡¯s wrong with the current situation is that the lack of coercive laws puts nations into unequal positions. Strong nations like the United States can start wars almost whenever they please, while smaller nations or nations without the respect and trust of the international community of states, such as North Korea, can¡¯t even launch satellites without other nations threatening to intercept them because they think they are actually missiles. What¡¯smore, United States has these missiles but nobody questions them. Despite the existence of the United Nations and the international laws, currently the relations of nations are working by the ethical principle of strongest rules. This is never good because it leads into two things, the unequal relations of nations where little nations have almost no say concerning bigger issues and the constant pursue of power between nations in order to get to a position involving the power in deciding things, because no country wants to be in a position where other nations can rule it. Hereby we can see that change is needed, so let¡¯s have a look at what Kant¡¯s argument has to offer.
Kant¡¯s theory excels in allowing nations the maximum freedom within the boundaries of reason. It actually follows the famous liberalist theory of harm principle, which states that everyone should be allowed maximum freedom as long as they don¡¯t harm others in any way. This principle works enormously well when applied to the relations of nations as no nation wants to give up a lot of its freedom even for the sake of great things, so the biggest amount of freedom that can be given to nations should be given to them in order to make the theory work in action. Kant¡¯s purpose of stopping wars seems to go well with this principle, but the definition of harm is quite unclear when considering the relations of nations and needs to be looked in to. Only direct harming should be considered. For example it shouldn¡¯t be considered harming if two countries are searching for oilfields in the same region and one of them finds it therefore leaving the other with only the expenses of searching. This is indirect harming, which is unintentional and should be left out of the definition of harming in order to allow countries to engage in normal business ventures. If only direct harming, such as war or the discrimination of citizens of certain nations, is taken into account the harm principle is a good tool in organizing the relations of nations and Kant¡¯s "state of nations".
Other good qualities in Kant¡¯s argument include the equality it would bring among nations. It would eradicate the present law of the jungle, or the rule of the strongest, by creating common and compulsory laws which everyone must follow whether large or small, powerful or weak. This would make it impossible for bigger nations to control weaker ones by intimidation as they couldn¡¯t execute their threats because they would be illegal. Of course power would still be divided by wealth, and wealthier nations would have more power than poorer ones, but they couldn¡¯t control the poor as wars and the blockade of goods are considered straight harming. Perhaps it would even correct some wrongs because rich countries couldn¡¯t exploit poorer ones anymore so maybe this kind of a system would even start the economical rise of the third world when fair and just trade policies would be used towards them, especially if reversed disfavouring would be used. This would mean that third world products and businesses would be favoured in order to get them on level terms with other countries who have gained their position by exploiting the third world.
Kant¡¯s theory is not perfect though and it faces some severe problems. Most of these problems are technical in nature, but nevertheless severe. First of all, the phrase Kant uses, "the ever growing state of nations", is very problematic because it indicates that nations will be gradually adopted to the state of nations. This situation can be solved by two ways which are equally problematic.
The first possible solution would be for all the nations involved in the state of nations to apply the laws towards every nation in the world. The problem can be clearly seen. When the countries who are in the state of nations have to obey these laws but the countries outside of it don¡¯t, the nations in the state of nations are in a disadvantage. Other nations can threaten them and even start wars, but they can¡¯t. This solution would make the relations very unequal and it could be even worse than now, so this is certainly not the right solution.
The other one would be that the laws would only concern the countries in the state of nations. This would make them able to defend themselves against the nations outside of it while also obeying the laws. Sounds good, but it has one problem. This kind of arrangement would create a world of double standards, dividing the world into two camps, the ones inside the state of nations and the ones outside. Having to separate sets of rules governing the relations of nations would be unequal and nations inside the state of nations can¡¯t really force anyone to join in because it would be against the principles of it. This could even result in the nations outside the state of nations to form some kindof an alliance or organization which would mean further trouble and controversity, especially as the state of nations isn¡¯t really an organization but more like a condition or a state of being.
As can be seen, there is a lot of difficulty around the forming of the state of nations, but even though it could be done more problems would follow. The problem is mainly about the nature of the laws. What would they include? War and armies would be forbidden, but how about for example a trade embargo? A tradeembargo would be direct harming, but the idea of making direct harming illegal was mine and it is not included in the Kant-citation. But if we would follow that definition of the harm principle we would have to make trade embargoes among other such things illegal. This poses an obvious threat. If nations don¡¯t have any way of pressuring one another, why would they cooperate with other nations unless there is something to gain. After all, if all direct harming would be illegal no action could be taken towards forcing them to cooperate. On the other hand, if we allow trade embargoes and such in certain occasions, who gets to decide what those occasions are and who gets to give the ok signal to commission a trade embargo? Allowing it on some occasions would lead into more controversity and arguing about who can commission one and when. So no solution here is really ideal.
The asking of who gets to decide and what leads to another question, who would uphold these laws? Should all nations give up their freedom to some sort of a dictator who would enforce the laws as Hobbes suggests in his contract theory or should all countries form a so called democratic government of the world to enforce the law with each country having one seat. It is unclear and all solutions could be problematic as for example the United Nations has shown, agreements are hard to come by and some country always uses his veto-right. Even though this kind of a higher authority should look after the common good, all nations usually look after themselves first, then start to think about the common good. So a democratic solution isn¡¯t probably the best idea. Neither is a dictator because if it would be for example illegal and therefore impossible to start a revolution as Hobbes suggested, the dictator would have too much power and too great temptation to abuse it. So the enforcement of the laws Kant wants is also hard to arrange.
Having analyzed Kant¡¯s argument and finding its flaws, can we think of a better solution or should we just stick to the system we have now? In my mind, Kant had a very noble goal but the idea presented in this citation seemed to have too many flaws and unsure parts. What would, however, in my mind come close to accomplishing all of the goals Kant wants and dodging some of the flaws would be a combination between Rawls¡¯ contract theory and utilitarianism. Rawls¡¯idea was that behind a theoretical veil of ignorance where people would not know anything about their skin colour, health, height, place of birth or anything like that, they would decide the best possible principles to a society because they¡¯d want it to be as equal as possible so that whatever they turn out to be, they are happy in that society. If this would be applied to the relations of nations, then nations would decide the best possible rules and laws to govern them. These would probably mean no war among other things, which is what Kant hoped to achieve. However, Rawls¡¯theory has been criticized for its blind trust for people, as in real life people could take risks and make some groups benefit at the cost of another and hope that they are not part of that group. Same goes for nations.
This argument is hard to contradict so this is where utilitarianism comes to play. The basic principle of utilitarianism is "as much benefit to as many as possible". Benefit here means happiness, monetary gain etc. This principle is one that many nations can relate to, because even though they might want to get the maximum amount of benefit for themselves first it is clear that when every country has this agenda the total benefit for every country is greater than what each country could achieve individually.
When rules decided behind to vale of ignorance are in place it doesn¡¯t matter whether some nation has taken risks and something is unequal, because utilitarianism evens it out. If some nation has been left in an unfavourable position by the rules, other nations with utilitarian agendas will lift it to the same level as them eventually when they try to bring as much benefit as possible to that country as well as others.
Critics have pointed out two problems in utilitarianism. Firstly, they have argued that it allows the majority to do whatever they want because that maximizes benefit. On the other hand, they have argued that everything would be divided equally, no matter what, if utilitarianism would take place as that would maximize benefit.
These both arguments are easily contradicted. The first argument isn¡¯t plausible because what produces the maximum amount of benefit for individual people is that they have a sense of security and that they know that their basic rights are respected. Therefore, even though the majority would want to perform genocide for example, it would produce less benefit because the loss of the senseof security would be greater than the happiness and pleasure the majority would get. This, applied to nations, means that nations need that sense of security too which if broken, results in a far greater unhappiness than any gain.
The second one can be contradicted with a similar argument, because nations need to feel that they can affect how well they do, so even distribution would mean that everyone gets the same amount no matter what they do and therefore nations can¡¯t affect how well they fare. This would, again, result in a bigger unhappiness than the happiness gained from even distribution. What should be also taken into account is that even though somehow utilitarianism would be falsely interpreted the rules decided behind the vale of ignorance would prevent any major unethical actions.
So in my opinion if international rules or laws could be decided as Rawls suggests and after the rules are in place, each nation would apply an utilitarian agenda, we would have a much fairer world.
So in conclusion, we can say that Kant¡¯s argument was insufficient to achieve his admirable goals as it produced a lot of difficulties. Of course, my suggestion has it flaws too and the in-depth analyzation of it would require another essay altogether, but it has in my mind achieved Kant¡¯s goals quite well without the bad sides Kant¡¯s argument produces.
Honorary Mention Essay
On Topic II
Patrick Mujunen
The development of international relationships is suggested by Immanuel Kant to be grounded in reason. Indeed, he argues that the sole possible way of establishing peaceful accord between nations is to emulate the actions of individual human beings seeking to escape the "lawless condition": to surrender certain liberties in order to safeguard others. By drawing this parallel between individual and nation, Kant raises several questions regarding the extent to which the analogy applies.
For the rationalist Kant, the importance of the faculty of reason as a fundamental characteristic of human beings is paramount. Kant even goes as far as to state that, by employing the use of one¡¯s reason, the single correct way of exiting the state of lawlessness will be revealed. However, the application of the principles of individual action to the conduct of nations is problematic, since the latter involves exercising the collective will of many instead of only one. It is unclear how the participant nations would be able to function as representative of the will of the populace. Kant might respond that the head of state serves as the executor of the population¡¯s will, which in turn can be established by a simple majority.
Furthermore, since reason is universal, the rational decisions of a commonwealth or head of state can be no different than those of any rational being if the same ends are being considered. If, as Kant argues, reason can provide the way to the establishment of peaceful societies, the fact that this state does not currently exist suggests that either Kant is mistaken about the universal nature of reason, or that many nations are simply irrational. Relativists would argue that Kant is making unfounded assumptions about the existence of objective, universal traits and that conflict between nations is merely a result of friction between varying cultural frameworks. In the case of individuals forming societies, John Locke takes a very similar approach to Kant, arguing that rational self-interest is the basis for consenting to be ruled by a government, since it is in our best interests overall to secure the protection of the state. Locke goes on to say that as one¡¯s wealth and status increases, without governmental protection it becomes increasingly difficult to protect one¡¯s property, and therefore the formation of civil society is of most benefit to the privileged. Applying this claim to the formation of intergovernmental societies would suggest that powerful nations would benefit from the establishment of a state of nations; however, in practice it is usually the disadvantaged nations which benefit.
Kant¡¯s notion of a "lawless condition" bears similarity to Locke¡¯s state of nature, in which no common authority exists. In such a state, the only laws which are in effect are natural laws, since they are based on certain fundamental rights such as the right to life, liberty and the acquisition of property. Locke also argues that in order to escape this state, the members of the population must consent to giving up control of certain liberties to obtain the protection of laws set by the commonwealth. However, Kant¡¯s statement contradicts Locke in that he views the state of nature as one characterized by perpetual warfare, much like Thomas Hobbes, who saw civil society as necessary to save mankind from its own inherent savagery. Locke allows that warfare is much more common in the state of nature since there is no common judge to render punishment for crimes or adjudicate disputes between parties, but he stipulates that peace is eminently possible in the state of nature. Provided that each person follows the law of nature and allows his fellow citizens their natural rights, no conflict need arise. If necessary, it is even possible to settle disputes by mutual subjection to the ruling of an arbitrator ?i.e. calling upon an impartial third party to arbitrate a dispute, both sides having agreed to be bound by the ruling.If nations are able to appropriate these methods, and there would not appear to be any reason they could not, it would seem that the term "lawless condition"is misleading: certain laws can be followed and conflicts can be resolved without aggression. However, it must be noted that these natural laws are very basic, being concerned only with what Locke took to be fundamental necessities for freedom, and do not provide a foundation for a comprehensive legal or ethical structure.
The establishment of a state of nations, according to Kant, involves relinquishing the savage freedom enjoyed by independent nations and accepting the regulation of practices by public laws. This is very similar in concept to Locke¡¯s notion of the emergence of civil society, a crucial part of which is the establishment of common, known laws. However, consent plays a key role in this matter: Locke argues that we always have to the right to choose whether or not to belong to a particular society, but that once consent is given, it cannot be revoked: if I consent to becoming a member of a nation, I would not be able to withdraw my membership if, for example, a war broke out. The establishment of a state of nations, then, also seems to require consent ?who then is to give that consent? Presumably, the commonwealth or chief executive of a nation would be charged with that duty, being the representative of the will of the people. However, in the Second Treatise of Government, Locke stipulates that, in order for a community to agree to collectively join together in a society, consent must be universal. What is noteworthy is his further statement that a simple majority is all that is required to select a commonwealth ? something that in most modern societies has been interpreted to mean a democracy. While this is one form of government, for Locke the matter is irrelevant: so long as the ruler has the support of the majority of the people (i.e. acts in their best interests), even a monarchy or an oligarchy are possible options. How, then, can international federations be formed? It could be argued that the head of state, as an executor of the collective interests of the people, could give consent on behalf of the nation. However, this contradicts the principle that each member of the proposed society must independently consent to the matter. The only possible way to bring about a state of nations, then, seems to be to hold a referendum which includes the entire populations of each participant nation, where only a unanimous decision would validate the shift to the encompassing state. Following this, a majority vote would have to be held in order to select a governing authority.
The practical infeasibility of this process, combined with negligible probability of obtaining universal approval of the citizens of multiple nations, means that the Lockean political process cannot be effectively applied to the creation of international federations. Theoretical similarities can be identified between societies composed of individuals and nations, but in practice a more pragmatic approach is required to establish the latter. Kant does not touch on the issue of consent or authority here, but in light of the limitations of viewing the formation of a state of nations as directly parallel to the formation of civil societies, he would likely be directed toward a different solution from Locke¡¯s. Practically speaking, it would seem that a satisfactory method would be to simply trace the authority invested in the commonwealth by the populace and argue that its consent is reflective enough of the consensus of the society that it can be considered legitimate. Furthermore, since the commonwealth has the authority to make decisions of the utmost gravity, such as declaring war, which could potentially even lead to the destruction of the society, it seems reasonable to suggest that the commonwealth¡¯s authority entitles it to make decisions on international policy as well.
What is interesting about Kant¡¯s position is that he sees independent nations and individual people as equally savage. It can be objected that if this is the case, then there would seem to be no reason to make the transition from the state of nature to civil society. Also, in light of this, it is doubtful whether a state of nations would in fact be a preferable option. At least, Kant¡¯s position is relative ?states in relation to each other are equally savage as individuals in relation to each other, with both needing the direction of a common authority. A global federation would provide a solution to the debilitating state of lawlessness, since it would "encompass all the nations of the earth"and therefore no higher-order societies could be formed among humanity. This means that a state of nature could not exist (excepting those who have not given consent to joining a society) on any level, since all would be included in the "state of nations". However, a consequence of shifting to the highest societal level would be the erosion of distinctions between the lower societies. A global society could possibly make irrelevant e.g. national or ethnic boundaries, leading to a homogenization of society. The existence of societies on different levels also has implications for the degree to which a member is responsible to different societies. It could be argued from a utilitarian perspective that one has a greater responsibility to a state of nations, rather than a singular nation, because the actions and policies of the state of nations affect a much greater number of people. A response to this could be that since one¡¯s national society has fewer members, its policies and the actions of individual members have a much greater significance to each member, because their effects are not dispersed among such a large group. This is, of course, dependent on the particular policy in question, however.
The establishment of a global state of nations would greatly impact acts of war between nations. In Lockean terms, a state of war arises from an unjust act of aggression. In the state of nature, this state of war must continue until one of the parties is either killed or enslaved. Due to the lack of common laws or judges, the only way a conflict can be settled pre-emptively is if the aggressor ceases his attack and offers reparations for damages (an exception is the mutual arbitrationpresented earlier). Applied to acts of war between societies, this pattern seems common. However, with the advent of a society of which individual nations are members, there are common, known laws as well as knowing but indifferent judges, which serve to prevent acts of aggression from occurring and prescribe penalties for such acts. Also, the society must include an entity for the execution of laws, meaning that aggressors would be made to forcefully comply with the law. Instead of waging war, member nations could turn to the legal system for the rectification of injustices.
In conclusion, the nature of states in relation to each other is similar in many ways to that of individual human beings in relation to each other. However, important distinctions between the two cases exist, particularly in the issues of consent related to the formation of a higher-order society. Kant¡¯s position is quite similar to that of John Locke, who examines many of the same issues in his political philosophy, but also shares some characteristics with Thomas Hobbes. The claim that different nations will be locked in perpetual war without the guidance of an international community is slightly skewed: a "state of lawlessness"is perhaps more conducive to the waging of war than a "state of nations", but certainly does not make war a foregone conclusion. Furthermore, the significant practical obstacles involved in the establishment of a global society make it very difficult to assess the possible effects of such a community.
Essay On Topic II
Alexandru Dan Mandru
The evolution of Politics through Existence and Vacuity
The social nature of man has always been a theme of interest and interrogation for theorists of political and social philosophy, and also for those concerned with the philosophy of history. The becoming of the human being, more exactly, a mere overview of the evolution of man is the proof of the possibility of defining man as possessor of sociability as an essential trait.
In this excerpt from Toward Perpetual Peace, German philosopher Immanuel Kant asserts that the only reasonable state which is to exist is the global one, which shall encompass all of the world¡¯s nations, and this is because the actual situation of countries, i.e. a "savage (lawless) freedom" has only one solution: the abandonment of this chaotic liberty, and the accommodation to a common, public law. The final purpose of this process would be the establishment of a "state of nations", incapable of creating undesirable phenomena, such as war.
The thesis which I shall endeavour to demonstrate is that a global, "always growing" state would mean the beginning of a tragic process of dehumanisation. The evolution of man, even at a large-scale level is a dialectic of plenitude and vacuity, of being and non-existence, of existence and nothingness, and dialectic hiatus is the portrait of progress. I shall embark upon this effort, from an atemporal position.
When formulating such an idea, Kant considers a symmetry between the evolution of man and statehood, which is viewed in the light of contractualism: the solution to the savageness hitherto is to abandon the multitude of liberties, which exist for states as a consequence of the lack of any supra-state structure. Nevertheless, the solution to war and to political tensions is not giving up personal liberty, that is uniting in such an abstract governing entity, but dialogue and reciprocity. Dialogue is an essential part of communication and, in the political world (and not only there), communication can become efficient only through critical discourse, which aims to consensus. The main idea is not to sacrifice freedom, but to direct it, in order to achieve rationally motivated consensus. The man to think at this phenomenon is the theorist and philosopher who continues, in the 21stcentury, the line of great German philosophers, and this is Jurgen Habermas.
After a very wide spectre of academic disciplines which he intensely studied, Habermas made his entry into Philosophy within the Frankfurt School, as he was the assistant of Theodor W. Adorno. He taught at the University of Frankfurt, and he was considered to be the critical voice of West Germany. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, Habermas became more and more actively involved into the public life of the Federal Republic of Germany, portraying a different, innovative profile of intellectual: the intellectual of the late modernity, with a powerful, authoritarian and critical voice, coming from the democratic left.
One of the major works of Habermas is Theorie des Kommunikativen Handelns (Theory of Communicative Action). In this volume of profound philosophical rigour and conceptual richness, he makes a step forward from his masters ?Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, and reveals new and very relevant sides of the critical theory. The furtherance from the ideas of the Frankfurt School, which Habermasmanages to achieve, is nowadays called "the linguistic turn". The linguistic turn of the critical theory states that an efficient critique is accomplishable only through intersubjectivity, mediated by language. Only through speech and communication, can we improve our current state. In Habermas¡¯s philosophy, language is strongly linked with the concept of discourse. Discourse ethics is a key point in the philosophical system of Habermas. He defines discourse as a discussion about language, and its main goal is to eliminate all possible errors. The purpose, the finality of discourse is reaching rationally motivated consensus.
I made this propaedeutic of Habermas¡¯s philosophy, in order to define his way of thinking and his theory of communication as a counter-argument to Kant¡¯s assertion, regarding the civitas gentium. It would be ineffective and dangerous to sacrifice a state¡¯s liberty in order to avoid imperfections and tensions in the relationships between countries. The efficient solution is an efficient dialogue, i.e. intersubjectivity, mediated by language. The final achievement would, then, be rationally motivated consensus ? an utterance shared by all participants in discourse, on strong, rational, grounds.
Moreover, it is risky to state an universal state of good, which is equally applicable to all subjects, without making appealing to consensus through intersubjectivity. American philosopher Michael Oakeshott creates the conceptual framework of such an effort: he introduces an essential difference, between nomocratic societies and teleocratic societies. Teleocratic societies devote themselves to a purpose, and would do anything, in order to achieve it, even involve too much in the personal sphere of the individual, thus committing a very inappropriateand dangerous deed. In teleocratic societies, the individual exists, only in the matter of taking part in the achievement of the general objective of society. Society as a whole is advantaged, and the individual¡¯s importance is put aside, as long as she doesn¡¯t participate in the collective mechanism. On the contrary, nomocratic societies are characterised through the principle of the supremacy of law. The law is defined by Friedrich Hayek as an abstract framework, which is universally applicable and must be known ? and in this abstract framework, the individual has the possibility of embarking herself upon achieving her personal purposes, as the society as a whole doesn¡¯t have a general objective.
Thinking, in the manner of Kant, of achieving such a good,while avoiding war, in the context of eternal peace is more or less the same view which totalitarian states, throughout history, have had. That is, in the name of universal good, the individual is so strictly controlled, and her life is so subdued to the collective, that this cannot be called otherwise but bad. Therefore, the solution to this lawless liberty which states possess would be to conceive an abstract framework of laws, values and norms, which must be respected by countries, and this framework should be adopted through rationally motivated consensus.
Although the author of this text doesn¡¯t share this view, he considers appropriate to present the determinist counter-argument to Kant¡¯s idea of a state of nations as the solution to the imperfections which occur in the current situation. In his Prelections on the Philosophy of History, German idealist philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel states that the universal guiding principle in history is reason, and each and every historical event happens for a reason. Moreover, one of the so-called "young" of "left-wing"Hegelian philosophers, Karl Marx, said that we are determined by economic laws, and the historical evolution of political and economical systems is a consequence of a conflict between relantionships of production (Produktionsverhaltnisse) and forces of production (Produktionskrafte). An intermediary conclusion would be that there is no chaotic state of being between countries, because of the determinism which functions upon the world. Therefore, countries have never had such a freedom, described by Kant, because of the determinism of the Reason (according to Hegel) or of the economic laws (according to Marx).
The final argument against such an idea of state is that we cannot imagine the evolution of political life as a permanent ascension, as immer wachsende, and this is because man, even in its political dimension can and must be defined through the concept of dialectic hiatus. For a better grasp of this notion, I shall divide the dialectic hiatus into its main components: vacuity and progress.
The writer views non-existence (nothingness) at a microlevel, and shall call it state of eclipse, which is a system of factors strictly regarding the human individual. The social and political sideof the human being (that is, the macrolevel) relates to the idea of non-existence through vacuity. Vacuity is a portion of nothingness, of ontological emptiness between what is and what is to be. Therefore, the great historical events and revolutions have occurred because of the conflict between what is ? the state of being, and what is to be ?the abstract utterance of a certain collectivity regarding the state of being. The void between what belongs to immanence and what is transcendental, between the factic and the norm is the motor of furtherance, of progress. There cannot be any evolution, neither at a political level, nor individual one, without this conflict, this vacuity.
Progress is generally understood in two senses: on the one hand, there is the approach of efficiency, which will be called "progress as optimisation", meaning that progress is viewed as a permanent improvement (Verbesserung), towards an absolute good, which is considered to be accomplishable through the achievement of several tasks and difficulties; on the other hand, there is the approach of advance, which the writer considers more feasible, and will call it "progress as furtherance". Progress of furtherance is the realisation of human nature, as it is in our essential system of traits to advance, to go further, for the sake of furtherance, and not in order to satisfy a strict set of tasks. Kant tacitly sustains that this "state of nations", as alwaysgrowing, will be an everlasting improvement of the idea of state, i.e. an eonic, positive development; which is a utopia.
Therefore, dialectic hiatus is the prime condition of furtherance, and this cannot be done without a significant other, who has the main function of criticising. For example, I cannot see my faults. I am faulty, but I have no knowledge about these imperfections of mine, whereas the alterity, the otherness has the abstract capacity of noticing what is flawed regarding my person. This abstract capacity becomes concrete, when the otherness is represented ? and becomes "the Other". The Other, the man near me, symbolises my faults. This generates the vacuity in me: there is a conflict between what is factic (a man with faults) and the norm (a perfect man). The voidbetween what I am ? a person who makes mistakes and my perception of me ? a person who doesn¡¯t make mistakes generates progress as furtherance. I want to advance on my path, to realise my human nature ? therefore, I won¡¯t make any mistakes anymore, and myperson will stop having faults. If it would not have been for the Other to symbolise what was wrong about me, there would have been no hiatus between me and the image of myself. And furtherance would not have been possible, if it were not for my will to be as good as possible and the hiatus would not have became dialectic.
The application of this principle in a political perspective is as follows: if a state has a certain imperfection, the international community will immediately take knowledge of it. Theinternational community, which is the otherness, through the voice of a certain state, which becomes the Other, will express, through a system of symbols, that state¡¯s imperfection. Then, the hiatus, the void, the vacuity will occur: there will be a difference between what the state is and how it is perceived inside the state. This void will generate a historical event, for example, a revolution. The historical event is meant to annul, to cancel the existing void, and to bring the being of state, its existence, at the level of its perceivability. The void will, then, become dialectic, as it will bring progress as furtherance, because the state will advance more and more, until a new void will occur, and this dialectic is permanent.
This is why a single, global state cannot exist: because only the otherness can notice and symbolise, through the Other, the faults of a certain existence. If one man, and only one man, would live on a desert island, he would think of himself that he is perfect, although he has bruises a lot of deficiencies, due to, let us say, the conditions he lived in. He would be perfect, because he would be the only man. If another man would appear suddenly, the latter would notice the limitations of the first one, would express them through symbolisation, and this would generate a hiatus, which would become dialectic, and so one. Bringing to discussion up to our theme, at a political level, there would be no eternal peace with only one state, because this unique state wouldn¡¯t be flawless. The only difference would be that its flaws wouldn¡¯t be seen and symbolised by others, and the difference between the image of the state and the state in itself would result, in the concrete world, in tragic phenomena of rebellion, in masses of people living in a state of eclipse.
In conclusion, uniting all the world¡¯s countries into a civitas gentiumwould not only be ineffective, but also dangerous. It would be ineffective, because the lack of consensus or the consensus based on no rational grounds leads nowhere. Moreover, not putting an emphasis on the law, but on the general objective of the society may the favourable conditions for totalitarian regimes to develop. Nonetheless, the lack of void to be seen and symbolised and to become dialectic hiatus results, in the writer¡¯s opinion, in the lack of progress as furtherance. Therefore, the political life of man can and has to be defined through progress, generated by dialectic hiatus.
We should never forget, nevertheless, that Kant was the man with the mostoutstanding ability of understanding and systematically treating complex human issues, such as moral, knowledge, and faculty of judgement. In this attempt, the author doesn¡¯t have the intention of annulling Kant¡¯s work, nor does he despise his efforts and contributions to philosophy. On the contrary, he voices that Immanuel Kant¡¯s work has considerably enriched the cultural conscience of humanity. However, on this particular work and on this particular fragment, there are counter-arguments to be brought, as above, and only with the intention of putting in light other concurrent views, and, with maximum certainty, not looking down upon the one who revealed to us, the posterity, what should we do (Kritik der praktischen Vernunft), what and how can we know (Kritik der reinen Vernunft) and how can we judge (Kritik der Urteilskraft).
Regarding our thesis on dialectic hiatus, on existence and vacuity, which we attempted to clearly exhibit and argument throughout this paper, it must be treated with prudency, for Philosophy is par excellencebound to question. We must avoid falling into the apophantic word and way of judgement, and to always interrogate and be critical, even with our own utterances. The problem which was, in this context, put into discussion, shall be left open, for future philosophical efforts to find themselves, again, confronted with the duty of searching for answers.
Essay On Topic I
Helene Sorgner
The question, whether there is a higher aim for human existence, which can be achieved by perpetual improvement and should be envisioned in all our actions or whether what we call improvement is just a series of random occurrences since there is no superior quality we could possibly aim at, is one of the most challenging and probably the most crucial one for myself. Since I am a Christian believer and at the same time fond of rather agnostic philosophical theories such as constructivism, in my personal opinion I do agree with both concepts, well aware of the evoked contradictions. In this essay, I will try for the first time to work out how both convictions can coexist and why it is not an absolute necessity to erase either of them.
The assumption, the mere idea of "the good and chief good" is typical of monotheistic ideologies, although it was introduced to occidental philosophy bythe Greeks. Following this weltanschauung, we can rely on a hierarchic structure of values and qualities in everything we perceive, do and think. Plato advised us how to climb the hierarchic ladder, up from the mere images of ideas to the concepts behind them and then, if we work really hard and contemplate on it a lot, probably recognizing the everlasting ideas themselves; and the heaven of ideas is illuminated still by the most sublime, the good. This ladder, however, requires two preconditions: the ambition and the capability of climbing. Assuming that there is "some end of the things we do, which we desire for its own sake"also includes the assumption that any human being as such is willing and able to reach this end; it considers the desire for a higher value or level as a fundamental aspect of human nature. Monotheistic religions and their concept of good and evil, of punishment and grace, and, most importantly in case of the Christians, redemption, base on this assumption as well. As a consequence, history is seen as a linear process with a clear beginning and an envisioned end, the final judgment or apocalypse, after which the ultimate good will reign; but everything happening in between is not chaos, but a more or less efficient development, since the believers are strongly advised to attempt to get as close to the highest value as possible already during their lifetime.
There are, of course, several strong objections against this concept. First of all, there is no definition for the chief good, orrather, values depend on cultural value systems, and they are defined in differing cultural contexts ? how can we postulate the "chief good"as the highest aim when there are various ideas of what "good" itself means? We probably can make out a certain aim of history by reflecting what has happened so far, but these reflections are always biased. What may seem to be an improvement for some can be most devastating for others; what is good and what is evil very often depends on the situation, and there is no way of defining an overall, ever-valid and objective base of judgment. Good is not a very reliable term; it is a matter of definition. Secondly, on what bases can we assume that human nature is willing to develop, that development itself is even taking place, how can we make out a goal in the contradictory and mysterious course of history? Knowing that any observer is always part of the observed system and that no observation is possible without certain preconditions, we must admit that we cannot judge from an objective point of view; we are always interpreting on the bases of our own convictions and expectations. It seems that the idea of the chief good roots in the human desire to find a meaning for our own life and a certain structure in everything thathappens around us, rather than being a logic consequence of the process of constant development. Actually, we have no real proof for development, even though our technical, cultural and political achievements may seem to result from it. Throughout history, advanced civilizations rose and were extinguished, some hardly leaving traces, periods of peace and flourish were interrupted by most devastating wars, and honestly, we cannot be sure that this will not happen to our high-tech age sooner or later as well. Hegel¡¯s dialectic concept of history may explain that every development must be followed by an antithesis so that a higher level (the synthesis) can be reached by guarding the positive aspects of both; but still, this also relies on a clear distinction between good and bad, which is a subjective definition, and in addition, Hegel did not yet know of nuclear weapons; the possibility of simply erasing a whole civilization, the absolute antithesis without any possible synthesis, was not conceivable to him. We are now capable of doing things of which we cannot estimate the consequences; and we may assume that the straightforward concept which explains every occurence being the cause of another does not really meet the complex and sometimes irrational developments which have taken place. For example, why do we not learn from history, why do we establish a thesis whose aspects we should have overcome long ago? How can a country consciously enter into war, when it has only twenty years before lost a whole generation on the battlefield, as Germany and Austria did in 1939? Of course there are several explanations for such grave mistakes, such as a desire for revenge, and it is obvious that the political conditions in Europe where quite different at that time than they had been before WWI, but still the thesis ? being at war with the rest of the world ?was the same. It is also remarkable that after having just got rid of a totalitarian system like the Nationalsocialism, some countries would immediately establish another one (communism in its Stalinist appearance). I am not a historian, but I think that it will not be too difficult to find some more examples for such a re-employment of a negative condition, and even more for developments leading to a dead end and therefore contradict the dialectic theory.
It may consequently seem more reasonable to speak of evolution rather than development in terms of human history. The difference between these two processes is that evolution has no aim; its basic mechanism is chance. Autopoetic Systems, biological as well as social ones such as human society, do not develop, they evolve; their single attempt is to sustain, and since they are structurally coupled (in a way depending) to their environment, they must react to the changes taking place around them. This is why a system is constantly mutating; it does not seek to improve itself, because it does not follow any values but reproduces itself from its own given structures and conditions; it is simply adjusting. The evolved mutations are not necessarily helpful, and many of them do not become part of the system¡¯s genuine structure but are dismissed, which could serve as an explanation for the arabesque ways e.g. history, but also biological evolution itself takes. Evolution is coincidental, intransitive, not necessarily improving (in terms of sustainability) and only depending on certain inputs in order to keep the system mutating.
Regarding human society as an autopoetic social system and human existence as an evolving rather than adeveloping process, we cannot conceive an end to it; the linear concept of history does not work here. Also, we are confronted with the total lack of a hierarchy of values; anything that helps conserving the ability of the system to reproduce itself is valuable to it, in conclusion, we cannot postulate a desire for a certain state or value except survival.
What concerns me now in order to get back to the initial question: Despite of these aspects of evolution, is there any conceivable "ideal state" a system can reach, a condition equivalent to the idea of the "chief good"? Let¡¯s assume that all autopoetic systems in the world coexist in perfect harmony: they have employed structural couplings to one another without any irritations, they can all sustain and reproduce themselves without any effort and without destroying others; is there any possibility to reach such a state? In fact, it means that they have become one single unity, a system which is divided into many sub-systems and still contains them all, and therefore has reached the paradox condition of existence and non-existence at the same time, because a system that contains everything does not have an environment anymore of which it could be distinguished. The lack of difference means a lack of justification for existence; it might as well be there or vanish since whether there is something which contains everything but has no surroundings or whether there is nothing is but a matter of definition.
The idea of a perfect condition, where everything is united in one single higher form of harmonic existence, where no contradictions and irritations exist anymore, somehow sounds familiar to me. Probably, what we refer to as "paradise"is but another expression with the same meaning; it is the place where our terrestrial history, our evolution has come to an end, the place of the ideal condition. The "chief good" is everything which allows us to sustain without effort and mutation, but having stopped to evolve and reached this final destination will also meanthat we have no reason to exist anymore. Can an evolving process lead to this end? It may seem very unlike, but it is not impossible. Concluding my reflections on this topic, I would say that human nature does not necessarily desire the good as a higher value, but that human existence is evolving and will find its end ? given that we do not extinguish ourselves ?in a condition of perfect harmony with everything else equivalent to the idea of good and the idea of heaven, which we are unable to conceive right now; or that human existence, if it is not wholly extinguished, will sustain and not come to an end at all.
Essay On Topic II
Lee-Hyun Kim
Introduction
In this international society, where such "lawless"activities like terrorism and war plague certain parts of the world during the scientific advancement and globalization which are characteristic of the 21st century, it becomes increasingly harder to understand Kant¡¯s vision of the "state of nations." Theclosest apparent example that we can think of to this concept is the United Nations, but even this international political structure has displayed glaring faults that Kant would have frowned at. Such a paradoxical example as the United Nations serves both as a supportive evidence and as an opposing detail to the state of nations that Kant envisioned. It is due to these recent international developments which seem to tangle with Kant¡¯s theory that has motivated me to explore the philosopher¡¯s idea and its application to the world today.
Before I go on, another interesting thing I find worth noting is that the "public coercive laws"which Kant mentions in his 8th volume of Toward Perpetual Peace is surprisingly supportive of Utilitarian views, which are actually the antithesis of Kant¡¯s moral theory of the Categorical Imperative. I will find room to further discuss this particular piece of contradiction later in this essay.
Overall, in this essay I will examine Kant¡¯s idea for perpetual peace via constructing the state of nations, and then discuss the current trends of the 21st century that work against this idea. I will finally strive to find a mediating solution that will hopefully solve the conflict between Kant¡¯s vision and the reality of the world.
Kant¡¯s Vision
Several millennia have passed since the first humans emerged on the Earth. It took some time for these humans to come together to form a society, however ?a couple centuries, in fact. Anthropologists have come up with various theories to explain how societies were formed and gave birth to civilizations, such as the idea of the specialization of labor and urbanization.
How Kant describes the birth of a state (or a civilization, in this particular example) is interesting as he places the individual¡¯s action over economical or social aspects of the event. Essentially, Kant explains that individuals had to surrender their "savage freedoms,"which consisted of actions such as theft and murder ? lawless actions. After giving up these lawless freedoms, individuals submitted to a higher power to rule for the good of the many. Whether it was the Chinese emperor¡¯s Mandate of Heaven or the European monarch¡¯s Divine Right, there was a certain body or regime that instituted a set of laws which governed the group of individuals who laid down their savagery in exchange for peace and stability in society.
What Kant seems to imply in his "state of nations"theory is the possibility that this process be also used in constructing a global society. The individuals laid down individual freedoms and succumbed to "public coercive laws," thus making a peaceful society ("peaceful" used in a relative term, that is.) Is it not then equally plausible for nations to lay down their own national freedoms, so to speak, and adopt an all-encompassing power to set laws for the good of all the nations of the earth? Would that not take us closer to a perpetual global peace? The idea is credible and persuasive, but it is stopped short by the realities of the world today.
The Reality
A variety of inventions and technological innovations ?the telephone, the airplane, and the Internet are few examples that come to mind ? have caused the process known widely as globalization. Indeed, amazing advancements in communication and transportation around the world have enabled feats unprecedented in history. Thanks to globalization, the world has become smaller, separate continents are virtually enjoined, and access to the Internet has all but eliminated the darkness which used to shroud different communities around the world. The advent of multi-national corporations such as Coca-Cola or Disney is also strong evidence of an integrated global society.
Yet interestingly enough, it is because of these developments in international integration that a relatively new phenomenon emerged. Fragmentation serves as a direct contrast to globalization. It literally means the divisive and separating trends engendered because of too much globalization. For example, many communities in various parts of Asia are known to reject Americanism or Western influence because they believe that their own cultures are put in jeopardy as they import Western goods and ideas. Nationalism is a critical factor which causes fragmentation; a nation (defined as a group of people bound together by a common ethnicity or culture) which determines that its identity is threatened by imposing (and even invading) trends such as globalization struggles to maintain its autonomy by struggling against that trend.
The Contradiction
It is at this point that I pause briefly to examine the contradiction which I mentioned earlier in the introduction. Kant¡¯s argument that states should "accommodate themselves to public coercive laws" in order to "leave the lawless condition" is vaguely reminiscent of utilitarian values that are opposed to his own values delineated in his Critique of Practical Reason.
What is worthy of note in his argument is that instead of emphasizing the individual nation¡¯s dignity, Kant pushes for the surrender of all the states of their unique "freedoms"for the greater good. Instead of making the analogy that since individuals should be considered not merely as a means but as ends-in-themselves, nations should likewise be considered equally autonomous and self-important, Kant rather discourages each nation from acting by its own laws and values, to instead obey laws constructed for a larger society of nations. This is a chillingly similar notion to the ideas of John Stuart Mill¡¯s Utilitarianism: aiming for the greatesthappiness for the greatest number of people. To achieve happiness for the greater number of people, individual happiness must sometimes be sacrificed. Kant and Mill have been typically presented as contrasts to each other in the debate on moral philosophy, but in this peculiar theory, Kant seems acquiescent at least to a certain part of Mill¡¯s idea.
Confusing though this situation of self-contradiction may seem, it is understandable that Kant came up with this argument. Perhaps he had intended to distinguish between the importance of an individual¡¯s dignityand that of the nation. Perhaps the individual and the nation are to be considered as two completely different entities (a concept difficult to imagine, since nations are comprised of individuals). We would never know, at least from the given prompt alone. The world around Kant¡¯s lifetime (mid-18th century) was experiencing turbulent times of the Age of Exploration ?perhaps Kant wanted to construct his idea for perpetual peace in lieu of his observations of the global trends at the time. All things said, the fact of the matter is that he was not able to see far enough into the future to predict the 21st century as it is today.
The Problem
Returning then to our observation of the reality of today¡¯s society, we clearly find conflicts in applying the "state of nations" idea to the global phenomenon known as fragmentation. Take nationalism, the main motivating factor behind fragmentation, for example. Nationalism is caused mostly by countries¡¯ differing cultures, ideals, traditions, and values. Would it be justified by Kant¡¯s theory to call these things "savage laws" which should be given up by individual states? Is it favorable to have all cultures, each and every one rooted in a rich tradition, to give up these ideals so that a pan-national culture may be formed? Who are we to say that people from different cultures as ourselves have it all wrong? A slip in this particular question caused major events in human history, such as the Crusades and the World Wars. How is it possible for an all-encompassing set of laws to be constructed for such a diverse collection of states? Who decides which values are better? Which values to be adopted and which to be discarded? The questions become endless, with no satisfying answer to be found.
Reaching Civitas Gentium
It becomes increasingly apparent, then, that such a set of "public coercive laws"is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to attain. The role of the Internet and that of other developments in communication and transportation has been great, but the effect of globalization has only been far-reaching in a socioeconomic sense. When it comes to creating a political international body such as the state of nations depicted by Kant, globalization and its trends are hardly considerable.
Autonomy for each state must be guaranteed. The problem which I have discussed above clearly seems to require this crucial political factor. The purpose of a law is to strengthen stability and order in a certain society. Yet if said law is contravening to traditional values and culture, that law is rarely powerful in that society. If we were to craft a constitution which was to take into account each and every distinctive culture of all the members under that constitution, that constitution would probably face failure within seconds of its realization. It may be easy for individuals to lay down savage freedoms to form a society, but for societies to lay down their cultures to form a larger society is a different question with different circumstances.
The United Nations today seems to be respecting self-governance quite well; all nation-states are expected to participate in the international agenda, and yet debate over each agenda is careful not to infringe upon national sovereignty. However, this practice is itself a problem if the United Nations was to be a model for Kant¡¯s state of nations; resolutions passed in the General Assembly of the U.N. are not binding ? in other words, individual states are not obliged to obey the "laws" supposedly agreed upon by members of the Assembly. If such laws were to be enforced, however, the problems that I previously mentioned will undoubtedly manifest. The conflicts and "lawless condition, which involves nothing but war" that Kant strove to avoid would become inevitable, ironically due to his own solution to prevent that very problem.
It is at this concluding point that I offer a solution which will hopefully be somewhat agreeable to both individual states and the hypothetical state of nations. The first and foremost fact that we should acknowledge is the uniqueness and variety of separate cultures that are spread across the earth, and the impossibility of forcing these cultures (some that even clash in certain practices) under a larger body of laws. To be sure, the "state of nations"can only be achieved by accommodation and respect for each of these differences in value.
The idea, then, is to simply mediatebetween the desire of states to come together and the potential repercussions that may arise in relation to each state¡¯s autonomy and identity. I am speaking of the Kantian ideal that I previously mentioned during my discussion of Kant¡¯s self-contradiction: dignity. If we were to agree that each state to have its own dignity, its own importance, its own end-in-itself, we would achieve the mutual recognition and understanding, something that plays a pivotal role in creating global peace.
**I also assert as a relatively minor proposition that in "public coercive laws," we should emphasize the "public" qualities. Each respected state, as a member of this world, is entitled to participate in worldwide discussions on constructing certain international guidelines that all states can follow, without contradicting their own cultural values. It is in this way that the political aspect of the state of nations can be achieved, and what is more, this state of nations will respect the different variations in beliefs among its members, unlike the state of nations which coerces its members to submission.
Additional Reflections
Coming together in this world is difficult. A glance around this year¡¯s International Philosophy Olympiad event is enough to show that although some mixing and socializing between ethnicities is easy, true agreement is hard to find in the initial stages of contact. Due to differing cultures and differing experiences, the participants tend to talk exclusively to people from their own ethnicities who are from a common background. Yet I know that after the activities, after the philosophical discussions on our schedule, by the time we reach the end of this year¡¯s IPO, the participants will have put aside such differences and successfully mixed together. We will be in mutual understanding and respect for each other¡¯s opinions and values, and will have found a common ground to stand on, effectively forming a mini-model of the state of nations.
Kant¡¯s idea of the state of nations may not be possible in the strictest sense, but once we disregard the slightly utilitarian touch in that idea, replacing it with the truly Kantian ideal of dignity, we will be able to overcome the trends of fragmentation and manage to integrate the world into a truly global society. Every culture will have a say; there will be no imposing power that oppresses certain states for the greater utilitarian good. And yet even after achieving all this, the effects will not be obvious at first ?like the example of the IPO, it will take time and a series of common experiences before such a state of nations can be achieved fully. All that remains for us to do, at that point, is to wait.